Politics.co.uk: The break-up of the UK is coming - but will it be violent or peaceful?

 Contrary to the current talk of the British empire and the nostalgia around it, they are not Powellites. Their overriding concern instead is the restoration of the Westminster system. For them, our EU membership has been an historical parenthesis. Westminster is all. A century ago, ceding part of Ireland was a price worth paying for keeping the Westminster system intact. So was the loss of India, and the loss of the colonies in the 1950s and early 1960s. Today, next year, whenever, Northern Ireland will follow.

The more troubling question is whether the Brexiters see Scotland in the same way, and whether their view of Scottish independence is the same as that of Unionists south and north of the border. Scotland is a nation of the United Kingdom, not a province that can be snapped off and tacked on to another state. It can only become separate by becoming independent and sovereign. [...]

That project's mode of governance is not the centralised one the less intellectual Brexiters constantly moan about, but actually about subsidiarity - decisions being made at the most local feasible level. By contrast, the heart and distinctiveness of the Westminster system is centralisation. Scottish nationalists believe Scotland would be freer to act autonomously within a federal, decentralised European Union than they are with devolution inside a unitary state.

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Freakonomics: How the Supermarket Helped America Win the Cold War (Ep. 386 Rebroadcast)

 Aisle upon aisle of fresh produce, cheap meat, and sugary cereal — a delicious embodiment of free-market capitalism, right? Not quite. The supermarket was in fact the endpoint of the U.S. government’s battle for agricultural abundance against the U.S.S.R. Our farm policies were built to dominate, not necessarily to nourish — and we are still living with the consequences.

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The Atlantic: Want to Cultivate a Liberal European Islam? Look to Bosnia

What is too little noticed, however, is that a tolerant European Islam has already existed for centuries—on the southeastern part of the continent, where Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Turks, and others see themselves as fully Muslim and fully European. A 2013 Pew Research Center study shows that they’re among the most liberal Muslims in the world. For example, only tiny minorities of surveyed Bosnian Muslims, known as Bosniaks, think adulterers must be stoned and apostates executed, in contrast with large majorities in favor of both stances among Pakistani and Egyptian Muslims.[...]

The majority of Bosnians gradually accepted Islam after the Ottomans brought it to the region in the 15th century. They ruled until 1878, when they lost Bosnia to a longtime rival: the Austro-Hungarian empire. Many Bosniaks at that point felt uncomfortable under their new rulers, not least because classic texts of Muslim jurisprudence had banned living in territory ruled by non-Muslims. From 1878 to 1918, an estimated 150,000 emigrated to Turkey.

But prominent Muslim intellectuals voiced arguments that helped stem the tide of Bosniak emigration. Among them was Grand Mufti M. T. Azabagić, who argued in the 1880s that a Muslim can in fact live happily under a tolerant non-Islamic state “where he is neither abused nor insulted for his acts of devotion.” In response, Bosniaks accepted Austro-Hungarian rule and began to organize themselves under the secular state. [...]

The Islamic Community cites the “requirements of time” (in the words of Bosnia’s top Islamic legal scholar) as one of the principles animating its religious interpretations: Islamic thought can and should offer Muslims answers on how to practice Islam here and now. The result is that “the institutions are given an element of flexibility, while maintaining Islam’s timelessness.” The same institution today asserts its credibility to “serve as a constructive partner for other Muslim communities and EU institutions.”

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openDemocracy: We must not forget Srebrenica

Along that way, they have found some measure of each. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has determined that genocide was committed in Srebrenica and convicted some of the war criminals that orchestrated and took part in it. And grass-root organisations are overcoming great obstacles to starting the difficult journey to reconciliation. [...]

They demand that their loved ones be found: but the slow identification process can only inflict additional suffering. They demand health care to treat their trauma, and they get substandard therapy. They demand accountability, but many war criminals still go free and unpunished. They demand recognition, but their suffering is ignored, vilified or denied. [...]

Mono-ethnic schools and the “two-schools-under-one-roof” system still characterises education in Bosnia and Herzegovina.It is also characterised by the ignorance of the past and manipulation of the facts about the recent war. [...]

Like the Holocaust and the Rwanda genocide, the Srebrenica genocide was not an accident. It began well before it occurred.

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Jacobin Magazine: In Search of an Alternative in Slovenia

SDS is not a new party; party leader Janez Janša led governments in the past. The international media outcry was not so much about Janša being a nationalist, anti-immigrant, or a representative of harsh neoliberal reforms, but about his open political alliance with Orbán’s Hungary. Rather than becoming a new Switzerland, Slovenia is looking more like authoritarian Hungary. [...]

In the small and richer republics, the political representatives of the Slovenian and Croatian League of Communists used to complain during the 1980s that their efforts for a “fairer” (which meant more neoliberal) distribution of wealth were thwarted by Belgrade and central institutions that privileged the periphery. Rather than addressing the class question, rising unemployment, and the implementation of the IMF’s structural adjustment programs, the Yugoslav political class translated social issues increasingly into nationalistic terms. In this respect, the Yugoslav crisis of 1980s speaks directly to the crisis of the European Union today. [...]

Behind the ideological affiliation lies a naked agenda of economic interests: the Slovenian “silk road,” which consists of building additional railway infrastructure between the coastal port of Koper and the interior. This would extend the traffic of port cargo. Thanks to an agreement with Orbán, this would also become Hungary’s corridor to the Adriatic Sea. Orbán’s government would not only receive profits from tolls on the infrastructure and a return on credit, but also become the owner of this strategic infrastructure.

The electoral results show that only 52 percent of all eligible voters actually voted. From those that voted, a predominant amount favored the authoritarian SDS, with 25 percent (twenty-five seats in the parliament), and the second new center party — the one-man show Marjan Sarec, came in second with 12.5 percent (thirteen seats). All other seven parties gained between 4 percent to 9.9 percent of the vote, speaking to the fragmented nature of the political crisis and the collapse of ideological hegemony.

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Politico: Slovenian survivor targets victory à la Orbán

Janša, 59, is campaigning not just as an ally of Orbán but also as a political survivor. Almost 30 years ago to the day, Janša and three others were arrested for spreading military secrets, when Slovenia was part of communist Yugoslavia. The arrests catalyzed the so-called Slovene Spring protest movement, a key episode in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. [...]

Leading in opinion polls, Janša has run a campaign based on his anti-communist past and promising a future free of migrants, with a dose of rhetoric suggesting powerful nefarious forces are ranged against him — much as Orbán often does. Like Orbán’s Fidesz, the SDS is part of the European People’s Party center-right grouping in the European Parliament. [...]

Orbán came to stump with Janša in mid-May at a rally in the eastern town of Celje, declaring, “If Europe surrenders to mass population movement and immigration, our own Continent will be lost … The aim is to settle among us people who do not belong to our culture, and who will want to live here according to their own religions and customs.”

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The Economist: How to bring down a dictator

Bloomberg: How to Fix the Eastern Ukraine Problem

The operation would be modeled on a largely forgotten initiative in the Yugoslav wars -- the UN transitional administration in Eastern Slavonia, a Serb-held region of eastern Croatia. A force of 5,000 blue helmets secured the area and the border with Serbia, an election was organized, a managed transition to Croatian control followed -- all in the space of two years from 1996 to 1998. The region retained a soft border with Serbia; thousands of refugees returned to their homes, although some residents of eastern Slavonia moved to Serbia as UNTAES wrapped up. [...]

Gowan's proposals for eastern Ukraine are based on a simple logic. The Minsk agreements require a local election before Russia restores control of the border to Ukraine. Elections won't take place without an external catalyst and wouldn't be fairly conducted without international administration and policing. Ergo, something close to a full international takeover of eastern Ukraine is desirable. It's also the only way to alleviate Russian President Vladimir Putin's stated concerns for the safety of the pro-Russian population if Ukrainians were allowed to re-establish control, a risk that Gowan acknowledges. The international administration would also serve as a buffer for non-combatants who have worked for the "people's republics" -- such as teachers or public servants -- to transition to a peaceful life in which they aren't persecuted by a vindictive Ukrainian government. [...]

"In peacekeeping as in war, no plan survives first contact with reality," Gowan concedes. It's important, however, to start with a clear understanding of the strategic political goals and then fit the means to them, and Gowan does just that. His proposal gives the Kremlin a way to end the conflict without surrendering the rebels to Kiev's vengeance and to maintain cultural and economic times with eastern Ukraine; and it provides the Kiev government with a way to getting its territories back and the border with Russia under its control again.

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Political Critique: European Union LGBT activism in the Western Balkans: a regional fight for rights

One of the fundamental conditions for a gay and lesbian movement to emerge in the region was the decriminalization of homosexuality, which first occurred in Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia’s autonomous province of Vojvodina, in 1977, as part of wider legal reforms in Yugoslavia. [...]

The first notable LGBT activism in the region was organized in Ljubljana in April 1984, when the students’ cultural center, SKUC Forum, put on the Magnus Festival that included films, exhibitions of gay publishing, and lectures and discussions on gay culture. Later that year, a group called Magnus, which embraced both gay men and lesbian women, was constituted as a section of the SKUC Forum, becoming the first LGBT group in the region. [...]

“When the war started some women backed away for personal reasons, some because of the wartime conditions,” Pamukovic said. “It just wasn’t possible to pursue that kind of political activism.” [...]

EU mechanisms that have been used in the precession phase such as insistence on reformed legislation have also been accused of putting form before substance, as once a country has joined the EU the rights of LGBTI persons are left to the whims of its government.

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Al Jazeera: Cracking down on independence movements is a bad idea

How should central governments treat independence movements? My own research shows that central governments can limit the uncertainty and violence over secession campaigns when they provide a legal path to independence. The most recent scenes in Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan only serve to further confirm this finding. When central governments crack down on independence movements, political and economic instability and even violence are the usual outcomes.

There are two major reasons why suppressing secession attempts by force is no solution to the issue. First, it is impossible to efface the dream of independence from people's minds. Repression raises latent support for independence, even if it removes all public expression of that support. If the state eventually faces a moment of weakness or crisis, that latent support could quickly break out into a mass movement, as happened in various parts of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Second, when governments try to eliminate the possibility of independence, they give themselves a freer hand to mistreat their ethnic minorities. My research shows that democracies that define themselves as "indivisible" in their constitutions are less likely to decentralise power to their regions and give more rights to local communities to govern themselves. [...]

Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, secessionism generally does not spread across borders. Some evidence suggests that self-determination claims are more likely to arise when there are more such claims in nearby countries, but no one has yet found that the success of independence movements in one country causes independence movements to become more successful in nearby countries.

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Al Jazeera: The Ratko Mladic disease infecting Europe

This verdict will not change anything in the lives of people in Bosnia, or those living in the diaspora around the world. But at least we can comfort ourselves that some kind of justice does exist in this world and that those who are responsible for such horrific crimes, sooner or later, will end up in prison. [...]

A new Europe was born and people were promised to live in unity and solidarity, under the rule of law, in respect of human and civil rights. However, that Europe was not wise or brave enough to find a way to prevent, or, at least, to stop the killings in its very heart. [...]

Instead, they were trying to find a way to negotiate with murderers, while using gentle terms to describe what was going on in Bosnia, like "ethnic cleansing", "conflict", or "civil war". It took them a long time to even recognise that war crimes were committed. Then, it took them almost four years to act and stop the war, four years that cost us over 100,000 lives and more than 2 million refugees. [...]

If the Karadzic's and Mladic's of the Balkans had been stopped on time, and their ideas proclaimed dangerous, it could have been a clear message to all those who support ultranationalist and fascist ideas. But, everybody forgot the lesson we should have learned in the 1990s in Yugoslavia - that fascism is like a disease; it spreads easily and can infect anyone.

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Atlas Obscura: The Misunderstood History of the Balkans’ Surreal War Memorials

The memorial house on Petrova Gora is one of many hundreds of unusual, oversized monuments that were built by the former Yugoslavia during the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s across the Balkan States. These Yugoslav war memorials—often dubbed “spomeniks” by Western media—have gained a lot of online attention in recent years. However, as viral images, they are increasingly taken out of context.

The monuments are often described as “abandoned” and “forgotten,” or lumped under the catch-all title of “communist monuments.” In reality though, these abstract designs expressed more than mere political affiliations, and many still serve their communities in the same roles they were built for. Few of the spomeniks are forgotten; “orphaned” might be a better word. They stand like children of a vanished state now scattered as memory markers across a post-Yugoslav Balkan landscape. [...]

With their wild and futuristic shapes, the monuments, by design, also looked relentlessly forward to the future. Depicting rockets and towers, fists, flowers, stars and wings, these steel and concrete monoliths didn’t dwell on images of suffering, but rather symbolized broader themes of anti-fascist struggle and the victory of life over death.

Instead of focusing on individuals—a Bosnian hero, a Serb or a Croat—the monuments of multiethnic, socialist Yugoslavia were also designed to celebrate universal ideals. “Brotherhood and Unity” became the slogan of post-war Yugoslavia, and the abstraction of these monuments was a gesture of inclusivity. Often, the monuments were formed from multiple segments that rose together without touching, and yet which, from a distance, might be viewed as one single object, an allegory for Yugoslavia itself.

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Political Critique: The Balkans can no longer be considered non-European

Insisting on the view that the Balkans is non-European because it is not part of the EU isn’t going to help anyone interested in the future of the region. I oppose the view that it doesn’t have a future outside the EU, precisely because it is part of Europe. Europe, or more precisely the EU, shouldn’t see its role as a transforming power in the Balkans or a key actor responsible for political change in the region. Instead, it needs to offer a partnership on an equal basis, starting with trade and connectivity and expanding into other priority areas for a European future.

Europe sees its future in trade and economy, investing in knowledge by supporting research – such as Horizon 2020 – and influencing the world order by being the largest development and humanitarian aid donor. It is also firm on investing in stability and security to keep the EU border regions peaceful, an action that has immediate implications for the Balkans. This is not unusual given that of the 25 most peaceful countries in the world, two thirds are European. [...]

Despite many worries, Brexit could prove a useful opportunity for the Balkans in case of a continued sluggish EU accession. The EU is in the process of developing a framework and negotiating extramarital ties with the UK, particularly around the single market and free flow of labour and similar model could work for the Balkans too. A unique market system and business ties were already a basis for considering Yugoslavian integration with the EEC more than 30 years ago and we need to think how to develop and bring this up to date. The Berlin Process is an existing framework that enables this, which not only supports EU accession but, more importantly, brings the Western Balkan countries closer to each other by strengthening regional cooperation, human connectivity, fighting against extremism and organised crime and dealing with irregular migration. This opens a door for the Balkans to act as a gatekeeper of Europe, as it has been many times in history.

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Political Critique: Back in the SFRY: Yugo-Nostalgia and Dreams of Communism

Perhaps these columnists had failed to win over the trust of those they spoke to. Perhaps it was they who were the ones uncomfortable with the topic. Perhaps things have changed. Or perhaps they were simply wrong. But, with the noteworthy exception of men around the age of 45-55 – those most likely to have personally fought in the conflict – I found during my time in the region that talk of the war, politics, Yugoslavia and the past is rarely far from the surface. Nowhere is this more true than in Bosnia, the Balkans’ most multi-ethnic region and one still perpetually hamstrung by an immensely complex patchwork of government organisation hammered out to bring the war to an end: three presidents, three postal services, three electricity companies, three of everything, each divided up between the three main ethnic groups, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats, and Serbs.

Not only are people willing to talk of the past, but their viewpoints are remarkably similar. The ethnic hatred of the 1990s – still so emphasised in the contemporary press – is nowhere to be found. And nowhere is any great remorse at the ‘failed communist experiment’ our schoolbooks teach us about. Yes, Luka is slightly more pro-communist and pro-Tito (the Yugsolav president from the end of World War 2 till 1980) than your average Bosnian. But only slightly. And his words chime with opinions I heard over and over again. [...]

Nor are such observations merely anecdotal. In May of this year, the polling company Gallup posed the issue in the form of a simple, direct question. “Did the breakup of Yugoslavia benefit or harm this country?” About 60% of the region answered stating they believe it’s done more harm than good. Only 25% think the opposite.* Numbers are even more stark in poorer, non-EU states like Bosnia, where 77% regret the break up and only 6% support it, and Serbia, where the ratio is 81%-4%. The only fully independent state where the majority thought their country had benefited (by a 55%-23% margin) was Croatia. Kosovo, still locked in a seemingly endless sovereignty standoff with Serbia, also backed the separation. Overall, however, opinion is clear. The populations of five of the six republics of former Yugsolavia wish, to some degree or another, that it had never disappeared at all. [...]

All of this does not excuse the very real oppression that occurred under Tito. Yugoslavia was, throughout its communist history, a one-party dictatorship. While economic and political democracy existed on a low level, influence-peddling, corruption, and backscratching were the only real root to power. Many may find the ethnic nationalism and religious conservatism of the right objectionable. However, Tito and his successors’ methods of imprisonment, as well as the suspected state-sponsored assassination of several expat dissidents, is far from a reasonable response. Suffering was real. This is no panacea and should not be treated as such.

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The Atlantic: First He Became an American—Then He Joined ISIS

In 2013, six Bosnian immigrants in the United States allegedly sent money, riflescopes, knives, military equipment, and other supplies to jihadists in Syria and Iraq through intermediaries in Bosnia and Turkey. According to the U.S. government’s allegations, individual ISIS fighters would make specific requests—mostly for money and military equipment—and the group would then raise funds and send supplies to Syria. The requests included what was surely an unexpected revelation of nostalgia—packets of Swiss Miss hot cocoa. By sending the cocoa mix and other supplies, federal prosecutors argue, these U.S.-based Bosnians provided what is known as “material support” to terrorists, in violation of the Patriot Act. [...]

Whichever side Pazara was on during the Bosnian War, understanding his experiences during those years is critical to making sense of his radicalization. After the civil war ended in 1995, and after Pazara and his father completed their alleged tour of duty for the VRS, they were still not allowed to return to their hometown of Teslic. Staying in Teslic or refusing the VRS would have surely resulted in imprisonment and torture. Ultimately, Pazara and his father were subject to the same ethnic cleansing inflicted on the rest of the Bosnian-Muslim residents. And so, Pazara carried the baggage of the Bosnian War to his new home in the United States. [...]

It is impossible to know with certainty what led Pazara to radicalize. The distance from his homeland, his professional failures, and his divorce all likely played some role. Certainly, a turn toward conservative religiosity in a period following personal loss is a well-documented phenomenon in the literature on radicalization. What is known is that Pazara found solace on social media, where an online community of Bosnian Salafists created a philosophical echo chamber. Within that echo chamber, the Islamic State’s ideology reverberated, exploiting personal grievances, laying out a narrative of victimhood (“Muslims are under attack”) that seemed to excuse Pazara from responsibility for his failures, and offering a new chance at success and redemption.

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Al Jazeera: Bosnia's Serbs vote over disputed national holiday

Bosnia's ethnic Serbs have begun voting in a referendum over a disputed national holiday, defying a ban by the country's highest court and Western pressure to call off a process that risks stoking ethnic tensions in the divided Balkan country.

The referendum, on whether to mark January 9 as "Statehood Day" in the Serb Republic part of Bosnia, on Sunday is the first since a 1992 vote on secession from then-Yugoslavia that ignited three years of conflict in which 100,000 were killed. [...]

The Sarajevo-based Constitutional Court has ruled that the holiday would be illegal because it coincides with a Serbian Orthodox Christian holiday and so discriminates against Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croats living in the Serb Republic. The court also banned the referendum.

January 9 is the date when Bosnian Serbs declared independence from Bosnia in 1992, precipitating the country's devastating war marked by mass killings and persecution of Bosniaks and Croats in Serbian territory. It was Europe's bloodiest conflict since World War II. [...]

The Serb region's administration has said it would comply with the court's ruling on the "Statehood Day" and make changes to its law on holidays to ensure it was not discriminating against other peoples - but only after the vote.

The Serbs celebrate the holiday by hanging out Serb flags and holding Orthodox Christian ceremonies in public institutions, which non-Serbs say is aimed at excluding them.

Western diplomats warn that the referendum violates the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the Bosnian war.

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