Social Europe: Belarus: toughness towards the regime, solidarity with the people

 As long as Russia, in particular, but also Ukraine, Kazakhstan, China, India and/or Brazil do not join, it cannot be assumed that the sanctions will lead to changes in Lukashenka’s behaviour. They represent a punishment for the regime and a signal of moral support for the opposition. They are right and important in view of the escalation Lukashenka is pursuing: his provocations require a firm response. But a continuous tightening of the sanctions screw will not change the balance of power, at least in the short term.[...]

The sanctions also have some undesirable side-effects. The disruption of air links makes it more difficult for ordinary people, including opposition members, to have contacts with foreign countries. Land routes to Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Ukraine were already largely closed for private citizens, under the pretext of Covid-19.[...]

As long as Lukashenka denies Belarusians the right to vote, Europe should give them the opportunity to vote with their feet. Nothing delegitimises a government more than when it loses its people. The exodus of specialists and skilled workers is also likely to have a greater and more lasting impact on the Belarusian economy than any other economic sanctions. At the same time, such an opportunity would offer protection to those living in constant fear of the security forces persecuting everybody who protests against Lukashenka.

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European Council on Foreign Relations: The slow dismantling of the Belarusian state

 The first and most visible parts of the intervention were in the media. The Belarusian regime not only replaced striking Belarusian state media personnel with Russian teams but also adopted the Kremlin’s style in its overall communications effort: depicting the protesters as foreign-orchestrated agents of a “colour revolution”, and promoting the idea of a border conflict with Lithuania. State media outlets broadcast stories that bore little resemblance to the reality on the ground, and that citizens could easily disprove. The amateurish ‘copy and paste’ techniques Russian media operatives used to spin the situation only reflected the prejudices of many Russians audience on Belarus. The protesters have increasingly responded by mocking Russia and its political leadership. In parallel, Russia will help Belarus refinance some of its debt. [...]

The third remarkable change in Belarus concerns domestic security. By calling on the police and the (Belarusian) KGB to restore order on 19 August, Lukashenka initiated a second crackdown that followed a completely different playbook than the first. Instead of engaging in random violence and repression, the security forces targeted the leaders of the demonstrations on 22-23 August and the following weekend. This crackdown struck at the political representation of the protest movement: members of the transition council and strike committee leaders. Without leaders, the regime reasons, the protests will lose steam sooner or later. The fact that the Russia Federal Security Service has closely consulted its Belarusian counterparts suggests that Moscow is, in fact, directing these targeted operations. And, when Lukashenka appeared to congratulate the riot police for handling street protests on 23 August, he was accompanied by bodyguards from an unknown security service who were carrying Russia’s new service rifle, the AK-12. As the rifle has not been introduced into any branch of the Belarusian security services, Lukashenka may well be receiving personal protection from Russia. [...]

Beyond the current crisis, the dismantling of the Belarusian state will have profound long-term consequences in the region. Before the 2020 election, Lukashenka preserved a minimal degree of independence from Moscow by refusing to recognise the annexation of Crimea or to allow Belarus to become a springboard for Russian military interventions. He will no longer have this freedom, and will have to accept new Russian military bases and deployments on Belarusian territory. Accordingly, Ukraine will have an even longer border with territory in which Russian forces can manoeuvre, leaving the country more vulnerable. The shift will alter the regional balance of power on NATO’s eastern flank to the detriment of the alliance. Europe must now prepare for all these changes.

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European Council on Foreign Relations: Poland in the EU: How to lose friends and alienate people

 This year, when Poland’s prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, was the first to call for an extraordinary EU summit to discuss the EU’s reaction to violent events in Belarus, his words did not generate an immediately positive reaction from other capitals. An extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council is eventually taking place today – but credit should also go to Lithuania, Germany, and Sweden. It is not just the result of successful diplomatic efforts on the part of Warsaw, even if the Polish foreign ministry has sought to present it this way for its domestic audience. If any capital is currently leading on the EU’s reaction to events in Belarus, it is not Poland but the much smaller Lithuania – which merits a separate story about how to punch above one’s weight. [...]

The Law and Justice party formed a government in 2015 with a lofty promise to lift Poland’s foreign policy from its knees. Since then, however, the country’s standing in the EU has hardly improved even a bit. If anything, the trend is in the opposite direction. The Coalition Explorer survey of policy professionals reveals that collectively they regard Poland as the second most disappointing country in the bloc, after Hungary. It is also among three countries (alongside Italy and Spain) that are most often seen as punching below their weight in EU politics. [...]

However, as usual, the devil lies in the detail. Apart from a limited group of the EU’s eastern member states (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria; half of them Polish neighbours), rarely does anyone consider Poland as having the same longer-standing interests on EU policy; and only some of these countries (plus Germany) include Poland on the list of their most contacted partners. This clashes with Warsaw’s ambition to play the role of one of the EU’s post-Brexit ‘Big Five’, alongside Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. [...]

Most notably, the United Kingdom used to be the key western EU member that considered that Poland shared similar interests with it. This translated into strong contacts between the two capitals. Now this alliance has been moved outside the EU framework and, as a result, nowhere in the EU’s western part do policy professionals consider Poland as sharing interests with their country. Germany is the only pre-2004 EU member where Poland is among the most contacted partners – but Poland ranks only fifth, after France, Netherlands, Austria, and Spain (with which Germany does not even have the border). Relations between Warsaw and Berlin are far from perfect, to say the least, largely upon Poland’s own wish.

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Time: #PolishStonewall: LGBTQ Activists Are Rallying Together After Police Violence at Protests in Warsaw

 By Saturday, thousands had gathered in Warsaw to denounce Margo’s arrest and police aggression against LGBTQ people. And although Poland is experiencing a rise in new cases of COVID-19, at least 15 solidarity protests, both big and small, took place on Monday in towns and cities across the Poland, as well as in Budapest and London, New York, Paris and Berlin, with more planned.

While not all activists may agree with Margo’s methods, her prosecution and imprisonment has been widely condemned. “These radical actions are a part of history that has happened in many other countries before,” says Julia Maciocha, chairwoman at the Warsaw-based LGBTQ organization Volunteers of Equality Foundation. In a nod to the Stonewall Uprising of 1969 in New York City, several users on Twitter started posting #PolishStonewall in tweets about the weekend’s events and subsequent solidarity protests. [...]

The church in Poland also wields enormous influence over education, law and politics, and about 86% of the population identify as Roman Catholic. Marek Jedraszewski, an archbishop, warned last year that a “rainbow plague” seeks to “control” the population. Since 2019, authorities in one-third of cities across Poland have adopted resolutions declaring themselves “LGBTQ ideology free zones.” In late July, the European Union announced it would not provide funding to six Polish towns that made this declaration.[...]

What activists want now is stronger international solidarity, particularly from European governments. Remy Bonny, a Brussels-based LGBTQ rights activist and researcher who focuses on Central and Eastern Europe, says “we have seen this kind of violence in Russia and Belarus, for example, but not in an E.U. country.” The European Commission should condemn police violence in Poland in the same way it recently denounced the repression of protests in Belarus, he says. Makuchowska says she and other activists are calling on the international community to “help us to immediately release Margo.”

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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Nobel Laureate Alexievich Says Lukashenka Has 'Declared War' On Belarusian People

 She said the Belarusian people were "absolutely sure" that Lukashenka lost the election to his main rival, Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who was forced to leave the country for Lithuania when she tried to file a formal complaint with the Central Election Commission about the official results. [...]

Alexievich also suggested that Russian riot police -- OMON security forces -- may have been brought into Minsk by Lukashenka's regime in order to violently disperse the ongoing protests. [...]

Alexievich said she thinks it is now impossible now for Lukashenka to resign without consequences because blood has been shed.

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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: How Lukashenka Won And Won And Won And Won And Won

 The election in 1994 that brought Alyaksandr Lukashenka to power in Belarus was arguably the first and last election in the former Soviet republic that met some Western norms. In fact, a U.S. commission hailed it as a “first step toward more pluralistic democracy and a free market system.” [...]

But after the vote, Lukashenka wasted little time dismantling Belarus’s fledgling democratic institutions. In 1995, Lukashenka called a referendum that included four questions on whether to make Russian an official language; whether new national symbols should be adopted, including a flag that largely resembled the Soviet-era republic banner; whether there should be closer economic integration with Russia; and whether changes should be made to the constitution making it easier for the president to dissolve parliament. [...]

The high-profile disappearances included top Lukashenka opponents: Yury Zakharenka, the former interior minister; Viktar Hanchar, the former chairman of Belarus's Central Election Commission; and Dzmitry Zavadski, who once worked as Lukashenka's personal cameraman. The disappearances have never been solved.

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UnHerd: How Europe’s Last Dictator survived

But unlike the near-teetotal judo enthusiast Putin, Lukashenko was a very conventional type of strongman, already retro in 1994. With his combover and thick moustache he was the perfect image of a Soviet regional boss, as if he had been cloned in a test tube kept on a shelf at a dacha between a jar of pickles and a bottle of home made vodka that made grandpa go blind. [...]

Lukashenko, in fact, was not at all keen on this whole independence thing. He opposed the break-up of the USSR and retained close contacts with the Russian communist party; in 1994 he addressed the Russian parliament and called for the creation of a new union of Slavic states. Lukashenko was less of a friend-to-oligarchs type and more of a state power type, seeking to preserve the USSR he had grown up in like one of those mammoths you occasionally find intact in a block of ice in Siberia. [...]

His Soviet style was a strength in other ways: Europe’s last dictator he might have been, but he came from the tradition of dull Eastern European despots whose names and faces you can’t quite remember unless, for some reason, you take an interest in these things. Unlike Kim Jong-il he wasn’t a megalomaniac intent on starving his people into submission while drinking cognac and collecting nuclear warheads. The success of his policy of sustained dullness can be measured by a quick look at the archives of Vice which has 5,594 articles on North Korea and 149 videos compared to 29 articles and no videos on Belarus. If you’re boring, nobody cares; you’ll be left to your own devices. [...]

But this was not actually a sign of anything much: Lukashenko remained cautious and conservative. When Putin annexed the Crimea, he gave his first ever speech in Belarusian and attempted to distance himself from his powerful patron, but before long he was holding joint drills with Russia again. Earlier this year in a fight over energy prices with Russia he bought some Norwegian oil and invited Mike Pompeo to Minsk, but he was still a long way from the bitter exchanges that characterise Russia’s relations with Ukraine.

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Al Jazeera: Putin's rating is collapsing as anger grows in Russia

Putin's decision to introduce constitutional changes, which would allow him to stay in power until 2036, when he would be 84 years old, have also been particularly unpopular. Although the Kremlin may consider this the best time to push through these amendments, given that protests are banned due to the coronavirus outbreak, they are making the Russian public that much more frustrated. The idea of Putin remaining in power for life is causing indignation even among his staunchest supporters.

In a May poll conducted by independent research centre Levada, just 59 percent approved of the Russian president, down from 69 percent in February. Just five years ago, amid the Russian intervention in the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea, Putin's approval rating stood at 85 percent. Support for his presidency was never so low, even during the anti-government protests of 2011-13.

Other indicators of public support have also fallen dramatically. In another May poll by Levada, just 25 percent of people said Putin is among the Russian politicians they trust - the lowest value this indicator has had for the past 20 years he has been in power (even during his premiership in 2008-12). In January this year, public trust in him stood at 35 percent; just three years ago, it was as high as 59 percent.

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openDemocracy: The game's afoot: scenarios of power transition in Russia

The first piece of evidence is the timing. Why did it happen now, when 2024 is still far away? American political scientist Henry Hale writes that the political calendar is significant even under authoritarian regimes, where elections, formally competitive, are hollowed out and no longer guarantee change of power. Indeed, it is precisely around election dates that different elite groups orient their expectations and plans. This is why elections themselves often throw out unpleasant surprises for regimes, whether electorally or on the streets. Despite the apparently iron-clad consensus among Russian elites over Putin, they still have reason to be dissatisfied. [...]

The second question concerns the transition’s format. The Kremlin has several options: Belarusian (removal of limits on presidential terms and re-election of Putin as president), Kazakh (reserving Putin the post of head of a new institution with unlimited powers, which the Kazakh Security Council became after Nazarbayev joined it), and, finally, Russia-2008 (moving Putin to the post of Prime Minister and elections for his successor, perhaps with a straight repeat of 2008 - a shuffle with Medvedev). For the regime, each of these options has its advantages and shortcomings. [...]

Several analysts believe that Putin won’t take the risk and, despite initial impressions of his speech, Putin will choose the Belarusian scenario – a life presidency. As Kirill Rogov has noted, the post of president, according to Putin’s speech, will also receive additional powers – for example, the right to remove judges from the Constitutional and Supreme Courts (in agreement with the Federation Council – it will be impossible to talk about an independent judiciary even formally). We can’t rule out that these new powers will be given to Putin, rather than someone else, and that during the “popular vote” on the constitutional amendments a new paragraph will appear on removing the limit on presidential terms. Besides, as Putin has already stated, Russian citizens will vote on all the changes at once, in a “packet” of laws.

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Bloomberg: Russia After Vladimir Putin

The Free Russia Foundation, a Washington-based think tank chaired by former Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer, has just published a 170-page report what the country might look like in 2030. The authors include some of the most insightful anti-Putin commentators today: political analyst Alexander Morozov, media expert Vasily Gatov, economists Vladimir Milov and Vladislav Inozemtsev, social anthropologist Denis Sokolov and energy expert Ilya Zaslavskiy. [...]

Russia will increasingly come under China’s sway. The alliance between the two countries will strengthen, with Russia supplying more raw materials and China industrial goods. The two countries’ extensive military cooperation may be bolstered by their increasing alignment against the U.S. In the most likely scenario discussed in the report, Russia will become a Chinese satellite, boosting its military power and gradually allowing its domestic market to be subsumed. Both Western sanctions and the U.S. confrontation with Beijing make this outcome likelier, despite the domestic unpopularity of such an alliance.

No high-cost military adventures, but watch Belarus and Kazakhstan. None of the authors expect Russia to make any militarily aggressive moves against the Baltic states, but Belarus could be an attractive, and domestically popular, target if Putin wanted to stay in power beyond 2024 as head of a unified state. Separately, the slow leadership succession in Kazakhstan is likely to pose a threat. If the neighboring state chooses to align itself more closely with China or Turkey, it would strip Russia of one of its vaunted security buffers. Thus the report's authors see Belarus and Kazakhstan as more likely targets for Russian meddling than any other country, if only because they are uncertain about Moscow’s true military strength and the potential domestic popularity of armed aggression. Recent victories in Ukraine and Syria were against only weak adversaries. The military remains underfunded, and any losses would likely be extremely unpopular.

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Foreign Policy: The Belarusian President Won’t Go Down Without a Fight

But there’s a new wrinkle in the spat this time: Belarus could provide a way for Russian President Vladimir Putin to prolong his political career. Putin, who won re-election last year, is slated to leave office in 2024 under constitutionally mandated term limits. But a 20-year-old treaty with Belarus could provide a way for him to take leadership of both countries, potentially offering a way to keep ruling while technically complying with the Russian Constitution. [...]

While president, Medvedev signed a law extending presidential terms from four to six years. That means that Putin, who regained the presidency in 2012, could stretch two terms until 2024. The question of what happens then is the single-minded focus of Russian political elites.

Russian leaders are suddenly paying more attention to a 1999 treaty of union with Belarus, which was intended to create a confederation in which the countries would remain sovereign but would share a legislature and a currency—and, crucially, a head of state. [...]

Lukashenko, whose nearly 25-year rule earned him the moniker of “Europe’s last dictator,” has sought to squash talk of a full union. “If someone wants to break [Belarus] into regions and force us to become a subject of Russia, that will never happen,” he told a group of Russian reporters in December.

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Political Critique: Breaking the Silence: The New Media Revolution in Turkey

The Turkish media is facing the wrath of a government that is using a coup attempt to root out the opposition. Under the cover of an ongoing state of emergency, journalists are being hounded and locked up, media outlets are being closed and the free press is gradually being bought by government-affiliated businesses. Yet, out of this despair comes a glimmer of hope, a silent revolution of new media, finding ways around the repression to get the message out. And it’s not just in Turkey. Eighty-seven percent of the world’s population lives in a country without a free press. As media censorship spreads across Europe, resilient journalists are bypassing the mainstream to raise their voices from brand-new platforms. [...]

Turkey has long suffered from state interference in the media, but matters have taken a steep downward spiral since the attempted coup of 2016, when a faction within the Turkish armed forces tried to wrest power from government institutions. This worrying trend continues in 2018, as a crisis in the judiciary weakens the media still; in January, two high-profile journalists remained in prison even after Turkey’s constitutional court ordered their release. Between January 20 and February 26, 648 people were detained because of their posts on social media. Under mounting international pressure, German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yücel was finally released. But he had been held in pre-trial detention for 367 days, without any charges. In another crushing blow, 13 journalists who worked for an opposition newspaper were sentenced to prison on April 26 for “aiding and abetting terror organisations without being a member”.

Another worrying trend is the state seizures of media outlets, which are subsequently bought by pro-government businesses, creating what has been termed a ‘pool media’ – newspapers all churning out exactly the same pro-government stories. In what some see as a death blow to Turkish independent media, in March, the Doğan media group, owners of the last credible opposition newspaper and television channels, was bought by a business conglomerate with government ties. In reaction to this trend, one young Istanbullite told me that she now avoids the news, as she considers it all to be government propaganda; trust in the mainstream media is at an all-time low. [...]

Media oppression has swept across European borders, an insidious creep into the new normal. As the prospect of EU enlargement fades and it focuses on achieving stability over internal reforms, its influence is waning in much of eastern Europe, while Russian influence is on the rise. At the same time, fake news websites increase media noise, and as well as the usual political and financial pressures, reporters are having to deal with being labelled as spies and foreign mercenaries.

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statista: The worst countries to be gay in Europe

The latest edition of ILGA Europe's Rainbow List has found that Malta, Belgium and Norway are the most LGBTI-friendly countries in Europe. The annual review ranks 49 European countries on a scale from 0 percent to 100 percent. Those closer to 0 percent are considered worst for gross violations of human rights and discrimination while the other end of the scale respects human rights and full equality.

LGBTI people planning a trip are best advised to avoid Turkey, Armenia and Azerbeijan. The latter is rock-bottom of the ranking with 4.70 percent. Russia, host of the 2018 FIFA World Cup, also scores poorly on the list with 10.90 percent.

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Bloomberg: How to Fix the Eastern Ukraine Problem

The operation would be modeled on a largely forgotten initiative in the Yugoslav wars -- the UN transitional administration in Eastern Slavonia, a Serb-held region of eastern Croatia. A force of 5,000 blue helmets secured the area and the border with Serbia, an election was organized, a managed transition to Croatian control followed -- all in the space of two years from 1996 to 1998. The region retained a soft border with Serbia; thousands of refugees returned to their homes, although some residents of eastern Slavonia moved to Serbia as UNTAES wrapped up. [...]

Gowan's proposals for eastern Ukraine are based on a simple logic. The Minsk agreements require a local election before Russia restores control of the border to Ukraine. Elections won't take place without an external catalyst and wouldn't be fairly conducted without international administration and policing. Ergo, something close to a full international takeover of eastern Ukraine is desirable. It's also the only way to alleviate Russian President Vladimir Putin's stated concerns for the safety of the pro-Russian population if Ukrainians were allowed to re-establish control, a risk that Gowan acknowledges. The international administration would also serve as a buffer for non-combatants who have worked for the "people's republics" -- such as teachers or public servants -- to transition to a peaceful life in which they aren't persecuted by a vindictive Ukrainian government. [...]

"In peacekeeping as in war, no plan survives first contact with reality," Gowan concedes. It's important, however, to start with a clear understanding of the strategic political goals and then fit the means to them, and Gowan does just that. His proposal gives the Kremlin a way to end the conflict without surrendering the rebels to Kiev's vengeance and to maintain cultural and economic times with eastern Ukraine; and it provides the Kiev government with a way to getting its territories back and the border with Russia under its control again.

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Political Critique: Belarus Let them pray for death. Belarusian war on drugs

Alexei was sentenced for distribution despite only sharing some cannabis with his girlfriend. Every year in Belarus, several thousand people go to jail for violating Article 328 of the Belarusian Criminal Code or “illicit trafficking in narcotic and psychotropic substances, their precursors and analogs.” The duration of imprisonment ranges from two years for manufacturing, acquisition, or possession of drugs without intent to twenty five years for drugs dealing if it results in the death of a person. In the first half of 2017, 1,568 people were convicted of drug-related crimes, according to official reports. In 2016, courts in Belarus sentenced 3608 people and almost 4000 a year earlier. Independent lawyers and human rights activists believe that about 12,000 to 13,000 young people have been convicted in the past three years.[...]

In Belarus, where all key decisions are taken by the head of state or under his direct control, drug policy could not be designed without the participation of President Alexander Lukashenko. In December 2014, during a meeting on illicit drug trafficking, the president, in his characteristic manner, declared war on drugs. “I should have broken your necks, like of ducklings, a long time ago,” the President swore at representatives of police and other law enforcement agencies, lamenting that their actions were tardy and conditioned by expectations of the conclusions of special committees and commissions. As a result of that meeting, the commander-in-chief gave the Minister of Internal Affairs full powers to coordinate the actions against drug trafficking. He also made a proposal to increase the duration of imprisonment for those “particularly distinguished” drug distributors to 25 years and make jail conditions even tougher: “Let’s set such a regime in these prisons so that they pray for death,” Lukashenko said. Other participants of the meeting suggested to introduce responsibility for being in state of drugs intoxication in public, to reduce the minimum age of criminal responsibility for those accused in manufacturing of banned substances, to create a database of drug users, as well as the other measures. Three weeks later, on December 28, Lukashenko signed the now famous decree No. 6 “On emergency measures for countering the illegal trafficking of drugs” (in Belarus the president’s decrees have the force of a law). Starting from 2015, the procedure for classification of new psychoactive substances as drugs is considerably simplified, criminal responsibility for manufacturing and sale of drugs is applicable from the age of fourteen, the maximum terms of imprisonment for convicts under article 328 of the criminal code increased: from 8 to 15 years for a sale to a teenager, from 15 to 20 years for sales operated by an organized group, from 8 to 20 years for manufacturing in a laboratory. In March 2015 an electronic database of drug users was created, and the Ministry of Health is responsible for its maintenance. A witch hunt ha begun. [...]

There is no division between “light” and “hard” drugs in Belarus. It also does not matter whether 0.1 grams of marijuana or a kilogram of synthetic drugs were found on a defendant. If the judge finds the charges in the trafficking as true, the = accused can be put in jail for at least 5 years. Often in court statements one can read phrases like “drugs were transferred to an unidentified person at an unidentified site”. Judges routinely consider these grounds sufficient to deprive liberty. Once the decree which has already been mentioned, entered into force, many opportunities for acquittal were abolished, and convicts began to be placed in the specially allocated colonies – a third special prison was created recently as the other two have been overloaded. Last month, the president, a big ice hockey fan, was photographed with an ice hockey stick made by prisoners. It was not specified in which colony sports equipment is produced exactly, although there are also woodworking, sewing and other workshops in prisons across the country. However, there is not a sufficient number of workplaces and pay is extremely low; usually people get around one euro cent per work day. Moreover, for several years now, visual segregation has been practiced: patches on prison clothes of those convicted for drugs are of green color.

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Political Critique: Back in the USSR? 100th anniversary of the October Revolution in Belarus

During the first years of independence, adherence to the Soviet past and ideology legitimized President Alexander Lukashenko. The socialistic (or pseudo-socialistic) rhetoric of socially oriented market economy, the viability of the revolution’s ideas, limited entrepreneurship, strong state patronage, etc. dominated the Belarusian political life and public opinion. However, quasi-implementation of these ideas required permanent financial allocations which the“socially oriented” and planned Belarusian economy could not generate. When allocations were coming from Russia, everybody was satisfied, including ordinary Belarusians who received their 500 USD salaries and enjoyed state subsidies, as well as Belarusian elites who were able to develop businesses extracting Russian resources and syphoning public funds. [...]

Firstly, after the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis,  Belarusian authorities emphasized a national – Belarusian – identity. While the Ukrainian crisis was not the only reason for this change, it definitely intensified the process. Similarly the October Revolution stopped being the only source of the Belarusian statehood and independence with links to the Principalities of Polotsk and Turov, as well as to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania coming into the official discourse. [...]

Socialist rhetoric is also disappearing: salaries are lower and prices higher than in Poland, Lithuania or Ukraine. The last ramparts of socialism – low transport and housing fares, as well as pseudo-free education and medical treatment rest on the chopping block.

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Politico: A tale of two Slavic strongmen

The calculating ex-KGB Russian has dismissed his Belarusian counterpart — who was the director of a state pig farm during the Soviet era — as a treacherous buffoon. And he hasn’t forgiven Lukashenko for his refusal to fall in line with other ex-Soviet leaders and recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. (Lukashenko called it a “bad precedent” instead.)

The Belarusian has also turned down Russian requests for an air force base in Belarus and closer military cooperation, and has increasingly tilted to the West to diversify the country’s economy, which has suffered from the economic downturn in sanctions-hit Russia, its main trading partner.

Putin didn’t take well to Lukashenko’s decision to grant visa-free travel to Europeans and Americans. He recently reintroduced border controls between the two nations, even though they’re part of a “Union State,” and cut back on supplies of subsidized gas and oil that power the Belarusian economy — an agreement known as “gas for kisses” — thus jeopardizing the country’s fragile recovery. [...]

Meanwhile, the Belarusian leader’s showdown with Moscow has escalated. In an emotional seven-and-a-half-hour speech during his annual press conference in Minsk in February, Lukashenko claimed the Kremlin had “Belarus by the throat” over concerns that the country “would move closer to the West.” He even threatened to give up cheap Russian gas if necessary. Lukashenko’s message to Putin was clear: I’m no lapdog and I’m willing to risk confrontation to safeguard my independence.

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Political Critique: Public Demonstrations in Belarus: A Society Stirred

t has been almost a whole month of public demonstrations in Belarus. The mere materialisation of these protests, which have taken place in a dozen of participating regional towns with hundreds, even thousands, of protesters, is unusual for Belarus. Public protest is a rare phenomenon here, as Belarusians largely perceive themselves as tolerant and passive. But the wave of public upheavals that is currently rolling across the country dispels this stereotype and can have unexpected effects.

There are several lessons one can draw about it from the evolving situation. [...]

At the same time, demonstrations have been unheard of since summer 2011, when after devaluation of the national currency to 56 percent (and other dramas of the domestic economy) Belarusians took to the streets for several consecutive Wednesdays. As demonstrations have to be authorised, people gathered without any slogans and simply clapped their hands. These so-called “silent protests” came to a close as plain-clothed policemen violently arrested hundreds of the clapping participants. Subsequently, the economic situation improved. [...]

Whereas Belarusian state-controlled media blames Russia for interfering into the internal affairs of Belarus and messing with its stability, there have been no pro-Kremlin slogans, no activists promoting a Russian agenda. At the same time, Moscow, the closest political ally and economic partner, became its biggest threat economically, politically, and military. But it’s good news to see that Russia doesn’t (yet?) have a plan or the capacity for a Ukrainian scenario in Belarus.

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Los Angeles Times: In Belarus, a rising fear: Will we be the next Ukraine?

At the heart of the feud is the status of what is quietly referred to here as the “oil for kisses” deal, in which Russia supplies Belarus with subsidized oil and gas in exchange for Minsk’s loyalty.

When Russia in 2015 refused to lower its gas prices to reflect a decrease in global oil prices, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko began exploring closer relations with the West.

Lukashenko has refused so far to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Last year, he said no to a Kremlin proposal to build a Russian air base in eastern Belarus.

Lukashenko, who has ruled this former Soviet republic with an authoritarian grip for 22 years, bowed to Western pressure in 2015 to release six prominent political prisoners, and ushered in a period of “softening” against political dissent and public gatherings. This earned him cautious praise from Western governments, which subsequently lifted sanctions on Belarus.[...]

In recent weeks, public protests have sprung up in Minsk and a few regional cities against an unpopular law instituting a yearly flat tax on the unemployed. So far, the protests have been small, and authorities have not cracked down on demonstrators, a rarity in Lukashenko’s tightly controlled Belarus.

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ArchDaily: The Fossilized Soviet Architecture of Belarus, in Photos

As a result of heavy resistance to German invasion in WWII, much of the traditional Belarusian architecture, which included wooden houses, Baroque palaces and cathedrals, and Renaissance-inspired castles, was destroyed. [1] In 1919 the city of Minsk was chosen by the USSR as the capital of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and as such was the site of Soviet efforts to rebuild and modernize after the wars, along with other cities such as Kiev and Smolensk. [2]

The rebuilding process of newly Soviet cities had to happen quickly, as many people had been displaced from their homes during the war. New apartment buildings and public transportation infrastructure were constructed in urban centers to facilitate industry by housing labor close to the country's production zones. The massive, concrete housing blocks that still exist in Belarus are a direct result of this urgency to house the populace, and constitute one aspect of the country's remaining Soviet Architecture. [...]

Large public squares are found in front of majestic state offices, city halls, and upscale apartment buildings that were almost always inaccessible for most citizens. The juxtaposition of elitist structures with public space provided a veneer of populism that fit with the communist ideology. [4] These buildings used a state-approved set of architectural vocabulary that drew on political histories of the time periods in which they were popular--for example, pastiches of classical styles were acceptable because of the Greek’s association with democracy. [5]

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