2 April 2017

Mic: 35 mosques have been attacked so far in 2017 — and Trump hasn't uttered a word

On Sunday, the Islamic Center of Fort Collins became the site of the latest act of vandalism against mosques in the country. The Council on American Islamic Relations has compiled a list of 35 anti-mosque incidents in the United States since the start of the new year, as of Monday. In other words, that's about one attack on a U.S. mosque for every 2.5 days. 

Anti-mosque incidents are on track to surpass the record set in 2016, when 139 incidents were reported, according to Corey Saylor, who directs the Council on American-Islamic Relations' department to monitor and combat Islamophobia. [...]

On March 19, an Islamic center in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, received a letter addressed to "the Children of Satan," stating Muslims should pack up their bags and leave because "there’s a new sheriff in town — President Donald Trump." The letter ended with a warning that Trump will cleanse America just like "what Hitler did to the Jews."

Places Journal: The Demagogue Takes the Stage

We live today in an artwork that follows the principle of reality television, which is not that it depicts reality, but that it becomes reality. As if watching in slow motion, we see this happening as it happens. The artifice entailed, the conceit, the ruse — all are on full display. Forthright disclosure, intercut with meta-commentary by the participants, adds a mocking twist to the old avant-garde technique of breaching the “fourth wall” separating audience and actors. What results is not awakening but rather sociopathic dissociation. For if reality is what comes afterwards rather than before, then whatever remains of the distinction between art and everything else melts into air. In the all-encompassing artwork, all facts are “alternative facts” subject to the free play of imaginative association, and all truth is “fake” before its deadly blow is felt. [...]

In order to function properly, this power must stand on ground that has been made sacred as a stage. In today’s United States, this is the ground of white nationalist patriarchy, or what its stage managers euphemistically call “economic nationalism.” Its jargon includes “alt-right” code words like “tradition” and “neo-traditionalism,” often accompanied by qualifiers like “Judeo-Christian” or “European.” This is the nativist jargon of a pseudo-philosophy peddled by self-promoting, anti-intellectual imposters. As such it fortifies a mythic, white “people” against their imagined enemies, both political and economic, and implies a gendered division of labor where men produce and women reproduce. As toxic common sense, this jargon helps to construct a socio-technical theater of power that authorizes and enables patriarchal, demagogic speech acts in the first place. [...]

To access this process, we must approach Ground Zero through its most sacred building. This is not the 9/11 National Memorial, which shrunk the “sacred ground” of commemoration to a bare minimum so that profit could be maximized, or the adjacent 9/11 National Museum, which relegated public memory to a series of underground exhibition spaces; rather it is the shopping mall, or “the Oculus,” that rises above the adjacent commuter subway station. Designed by Santiago Calatrava for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Westfield Corporation, the Oculus synthesizes secular-religious tensions by honoring its Gothic sources in the breach. Its massive, top-lit nave with a see-through structural ribcage barely sublimates the architecture of the Gothic cathedral — and with it crusading Christian piety — in an orgy of consumerist branding. This apotheosis of kitsch reveals the aesthetic and political program for the entire site, which is to generate a surfeit of theological “meaning” in order that business might proceed as usual, including the business of developing real estate and the business of securing the homeland. [...]

The “economic nationalism” now emanating from the White House attempts to compensate for this perceived disenchantment by calling forth capitalism’s sublimated “spirit,” or soul. That is the function of the presidential tweet or executive order as performative speech act: to reaffirm the sanctity of the homeland and, in the process, to secure the role of the master builder who restores meaning to the desolate landscapes of imperial decline. Preeminently, neoliberalism — understood as an economic, political, and cultural system — assigns this role the real estate developer. At Ground Zero, it was the lessee of the World Trade Center, Larry Silverstein, a relatively minor New York player whose unrelenting effort to turn tragedy into profit by “rebuilding” a sacred site was recast as an epic struggle with public authorities, insurance companies, and potential tenants. On the national stage, it was another minor player in New York real estate who cast himself as an artist — or better, an architect — charged with rebuilding the nation as sacred ground: “Make America Great Again.”

The Atlantic: Putin Likes to Pretend 1917 Never Happened

Just over 100 years ago, Russian Emperor Nicholas II abdicated his throne and his vast empire ceased to exist, setting off decades of world-shaking change. Yet this year, not a single Russian television station marked the anniversary. The decision to ignore the centennial arose from a meeting at the Kremlin last year, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin told his advisors that it would be unnecessary to commemorate it. Instead, the occasion should be discussed “only by experts,” he reportedly said. That is, let the experts, the historians, discuss the Revolution; the rest of Russia shouldn’t concern itself with such matters.

This order was then conveyed by Sergei Kirienki, the Kremlin’s new political strategist, to the directors of Russia’s state media companies. Russia doesn’t need revolutions—it needs stability, he said, according to those who attended these meetings. The collapse of empire had become taboo for Russian media, and apparently a negligible historical footnote for Putin. [...]

The idea of Russian empire, then, comes naturally to Putin. But his version of empire isn’t an exact replica of Nicholas II’s. Instead, it is an imagined, virtual empire, encompassing the traits of the Soviet Union, Russian Orthodox Christianity, sovereignty, populism, Joseph Stalin, victory in World War II, Yuri Gagarin’s trip into space, and the palaces of Catherine the Great. Putin’s ideology is built on a feeling of Russia’s inherent greatness, the idea that it is a country to be feared and respected. A world in which CNN airs a documentary about Putin called “The Most Powerful Man in the World” is his best world.

Slate: What Is Going On in Russia?

Oliver Carroll: Given the fact that perhaps two-thirds of the meetings were unsanctioned—every demonstration in Russia has to go through a process of being agreed to by authorities, that being one of the changes in the law which happened in Putin’s second term—and given that anybody going therefore automatically faced the possibility of arrest and a 15-day jail sentence, the fact that so many turned out obviously took everyone by surprise. And from what I hear it took the Kremlin by surprise as well. The rumors coming out on the day were that if there was a large crowd then there weren’t going to be any arrests because it would seem unsightly. I don’t know whether that was a red herring or whether, during the day, as more and more people turned out, a decision was made saying, “We need to show who’s boss here and crack down.” [...]

The other thing that is surprising to people is the makeup of the demonstrations. Previous demonstrations, such as those in 2011, were mostly made up of middle-class, well-to-do people, people who traveled extensively abroad and saw what was happening in Europe. Now you are looking at teenagers, kids from 13 upwards, and a sizeable proportion in their teens and 20s. It’s a cohort which really the Kremlin wasn’t too interested in. This isn’t something that the Kremlin really thought it needed to deal with but I think now you will see a lot of policies. It’s difficult because you can’t exactly come down with draconian policies on kids. That has really bad optics. But there will a response, you can be sure. [...]

I think his message has slightly changed. Before, he was making common cause with nationalists, which gave him a natural appeal. His nationalism is slightly exaggerated. It’s certainly there, a Russian nationalism. As a colleague said to me, in America he would be a Republican. Some of his statements have been pretty outrageous. But he has toned that down. It’s an anti-corruption and rule of law message now.

What’s important, I suppose, is that for Russians, rule of law and anti-corruption go well but only to a point. They want to have heroes and antiheroes. That’s important to understand. Navalny has managed to create that. They have a superhero in Navalny and someone they can make fun of in Medvedev. It’s a cynical and weary society.

The Atlantic: The Republican Identity Crisis

But with the rise of Donald Trump—and his spectrum-bending brand of populist nationalism—many longtime Republicans are now struggling to figure out where they fit in this fast-shifting philosophical landscape. In recent weeks, two prominent Republicans have told me they are sincerely struggling to explain where they fall on the ideological spectrum these days. It’s not that they’ve changed their beliefs; it’s that the old taxonomy has become incoherent. [...]

But virtually everyone who wrote to me shared a common complaint: The traditional “Left ↔ Right” spectrum used to describe and categorize Republicans has become obsolete in the age of Trump. The question now is what to replace it with. [...]

This is, of course, by no means a comprehensive list of the divisions within the GOP. For example, one of the most talked-about conflicts to emerge in the past year has been between “nationalism” and “globalism.” But despite efforts by Steve Bannon and other Trump advisers to frame the ideological debate that way, very few GOP voters—at least none who wrote to me—identify as “globalists.” Instead, these new spectrums represent a few of the ways in which Republicans—eager to escape the disorder and confusion of the Trump era—are categorizing themselves and each other.

Quartz: The overcrowded prisons of Europe are breeding terrorists

Many of the perpetrators in the highest-profile jihadist terror attacks in Europe in recent years had one thing in common—a stint in one of the region’s prisons. And those prisons have something in common as well. The major attacks have been carried out by men radicalized while held in overcrowded systems.

Prisons in France and Belgium, which have cultivated some of the deadliest terrorists in recent years, are especially known for poor conditions and overcrowding, Leonid Bershidsky writes at Bloomberg. Anis Amri, who trove a truck into a Berlin Christmas market last year, served time in Italy, another country where prisons are filled to bursting. These western European states are home to some of the most overcrowded prisons in the European Union, according to new data.

It’s clear that prison provides a fertile environment for radicalization. Muslims in places like Belgium and France—disenfranchised, poor, isolated, and ostracized—make up a disproportionate share of those who are incarcerated (In France, Muslims are just 8% of the overall population and yet make up 60% of the prison population.) Disillusioned inmates in these overcrowded, rat-infested prisons are often drawn to powerful figures—sometimes convicted terrorists themselves—preaching extremism. They also become prey for a network of recruiters working within the walls.

The New York Review of Books: Liberating China’s Past: An Interview with Ke Yunlu

This, in turn, got me thinking about Ke Yunlu. The pen name of Bao Guolu, Ke Yunlu was one of the most popular authors in China in the 1980s and 1990s. Though none of his books have been translated, he is well-known in China for his politically prescient novels, including one that is widely seen as having predicted Xi’s rise, and others that sympathetically described Qigong, a kind of meditation and physical practice that Ke and others believe can cure illnesses or even result in supernatural powers. [...]

The Cultural Revolution was an extremely autocratic period in Chinese history. Its biggest contribution to Chinese history was its failure. The successes [concerning China’s economic growth and stability] in the post-Cultural Revolution era are due to the country rebounding from its negative repercussions. This is true for economics, the liberation of thought, China’s cultural revival, fewer limits on personal liberty, and fewer limits on religion. We can see much of this reflected in Qigong Fever. [...]

In accounting for one’s mistakes in the Cultural Revolution, apologizing is better than not apologizing, and reflecting is better than not reflecting. As for whether the apology is adequate, or the reflection is deep enough, that’s another matter, but we should treat well those who have apologized and reflected.

More important is liberation from the dominant ideology. The Cultural Revolution shouldn’t be a forbidden territory. The authorities should allow academic circles and thinkers circles to begin deep research into the Cultural Revolution, and speak without inhibitions.

Vox: Opioid overdoses are climbing. But prescription painkillers aren’t driving them anymore.

The crackdown on opioid prescriptions to rein in the raging epidemic of opioid abuse and overdoses is picking up steam. Ten states have passed legislation that limits new opioid prescriptions to 10 days or less (in line with 2016 Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention guidelines), and more states are likely to follow suit. This week, President Trump signed an executive order that would create a commission to review various strategies to prevent addiction. [...]

More than 33,000 people died from opioid drug overdose in 2015 — the highest number of opioid-related deaths since at least the late 1990s. But for the first time, in 2015 more people died from heroin than prescription painkillers such as hydrocodone and oxycodone. [...]

"Heroin use appears to have become more socially acceptable among suburban and rural white individuals, perhaps because its effects seem so similar to those of widely available prescription opioids," wrote Silvia Martins and Columbia University researchers.