11 November 2017
Jacobin Magazine: The Avoidable Rise of Andrej Babiš
Almost everyone classifies Babiš as a populist, but it’s harder to find someone who can define what that means. Babiš presents himself as a straight-talking man of the people, standing above petty party politics, and he has chimed in with anti-immigrant rhetoric and rejected European Union quotas on migrants. Yet to lump him in with the governments of Poland and Hungary, or the far right in Germany and Austria, stretches the definition of populism beyond meaning. In fact, looking for evidence of this affiliation, a BBC correspondent resorted to commenting on his “handing out donuts at Metro stations.”
Babiš is no ideologue: he is first and foremost a technocrat. He packed his manifesto with language that describes challenging corruption and building a smaller, more efficient, and more transparent government. He wants to introduce e-government, citing Qatar as a model, and he wants to grow the number of professionals and businessmen who participate in civil service, increasing wages to compete with the private sector. The words “transparent” and “understandable” appear throughout this platform, and his campaign presented him as man of action, opposed to other politicians’ “blah-blah-blahing.” [...]
But this hardly amounts to root and branch opposition. Indeed, the European Union has helped make Babiš very rich, and members of ANO already sit in the European Parliament as part of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. One of them even serves as commissioner for justice, consumers, and gender equality. That few news outlets have commented on this reflects how distorted European politics look when seen through the prism of centrism against populism. [...]
Although Babiš himself is nowhere near as hostile to the European Union as some suggest, anti-European sentiment clearly played a big part in this election. Although few outside the SPD seriously want to leave, TOP 09, the only party that openly campaigned in favor of the EU, barely scraped past the 5 percent threshold.
Social Europe: Examining ‘The Corbyn Effect’
The next six weeks saw an extraordinary turnaround. Labour’s vote soared to 40%, some 10% higher than its 2015 performance, and the biggest rise in any party’s share of the vote since 1945. The Tory government, anticipating a post-Brexit landslide, lost its majority, sending it into a chronic tailspin. [...]
For Goodfellow and others, Labour’s rise vindicates Corbyn’s strategy of building support through a radical programme capable of appealing to those who usually don’t vote rather than triangulation to appeal to those who do. The party’s challenge is to consolidate and extend the support it won in 2017, a coalition encompassing not just the infamous ‘metropolitan elite’ but also low paid public sector and precarious workers, students, and the poorer working class in former industrial areas, amongst whom Labour retains significant support (though it has indeed fallen back among the older working class). [...]
There are interesting thoughts here about the substance of Labour’s agenda. There is praise for the bold social democratic intent of the 2017 manifesto, with its commitment to the principles of universalism and a strong state. But there is also an appeal for a social democracy that goes beyond statist managerialism. Hilary Wainwright draws a contrast between a paternalist ‘power-as-domination’ according to which the state seeks to do things for people and ‘power-as-transformative capacity’ exercised by people themselves once given greater opportunity to access and shape political and economic systems. [...]
Jo Littler locates the emotional appeal of Corbyn’s message in his insistence, against neoliberal orthodoxy, that individual freedom can only be realised through collective agency. With his gentle demeanour and heartfelt language Corbyn seeks to reclaim the language of aspiration from the right, and presents an ideal of collective provision that evades conservative stereotypes of statist authoritarianism.
The Economist: The struggles for independence and the impact of redrawing borders
From Catalonia to Kurdistan and Quebec, many people are demanding independence. What does it take to transform a cultural identity into a nation-state? And what is the impact?
The number of countries in the United Nations has grown over the decades – from 51 states in 1945 to 193 today. Many more places want to become independent.
But national governments almost always oppose secession. Catalonia’s parliament declared independence from Spain in October 2017 following a referendum deemed illegal by the central authorities in Madrid. Spain dismissed the region’s government, and decreed that a fresh election should be held. Catalan politicians leading the independence movement could be jailed for decades if found guilty of rebellion and sedition.
The autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq also held a recent independence referendum. It outraged the government in Baghdad and neighbouring countries, which also have Kurdish minorities. The Baghdad government claimed the independence referendum was illegal and seized back the lands Kurds had taken beyond their region.
The desire for secession is nothing new. There are estimated to be more than than 8000 ethno-cultural groups in the world. With many independence movements demanding that their homelands be recognised as countries. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, said that if every region had its way, the EU would become unmanageable. So who gets to form a state? There are no clear international rules.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention declared that a region needs 4 things to become a state:
- a permanent population
- a defined territory
- a government
- and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
But these are only guidelines. Ideally a region would also meet other conditions, such as: - show that a clear majority have freely chosen independence - respect its own minorities - have a viable state - and settle terms with the state it leaves and its neighbours.
In practice, all these conditions are hard to meet. Taiwan is a modern, democratic state in all but international law. It’s an island off the south-eastern coast of China which has its own constitution, functions as an independent state, has democratically elected leaders, and was the first place in Asia to rule in favour of gay marriage. Per head it’s around three times richer than mainland China. But China regards Taiwan as a renegade province. It insists that no country can have diplomatic ties with both itself and Taiwan. Only 19 countries, plus the Vatican, officially recognise it.
Somaliland is another region seeking to be recognised as a country. The semi-desert territory on the coast of the Gulf of Aden declared independence from Somalia in 1991. It has its own government, police force and currency. But no foreign government recognises it. Perhaps for good reason. To recognise Somaliland would encourage other separatists in the region. It would undermine the already-weak federal government of Somalia. And it would probably lead to war. There have only been two major changes to African borders since the 1960s and neither is a success story. Eritrea declared independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Today the country has a despotic government and its people are mired in abject poverty. In 2011 South Sudan seceded from Sudan, making it the world’s newest country. Soon after South Sudan formed civil war broke out displacing 2.2 million people. Although a ceasefire was signed in 2015, the country lies in ruins - plagued by hyper-inflation, famine and violence. Independence has a romantic ring. Many sympathise with the demand for freedom. But redrawing borders is dangerous, and often causes as many problems as it solves.
The number of countries in the United Nations has grown over the decades – from 51 states in 1945 to 193 today. Many more places want to become independent.
But national governments almost always oppose secession. Catalonia’s parliament declared independence from Spain in October 2017 following a referendum deemed illegal by the central authorities in Madrid. Spain dismissed the region’s government, and decreed that a fresh election should be held. Catalan politicians leading the independence movement could be jailed for decades if found guilty of rebellion and sedition.
The autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq also held a recent independence referendum. It outraged the government in Baghdad and neighbouring countries, which also have Kurdish minorities. The Baghdad government claimed the independence referendum was illegal and seized back the lands Kurds had taken beyond their region.
The desire for secession is nothing new. There are estimated to be more than than 8000 ethno-cultural groups in the world. With many independence movements demanding that their homelands be recognised as countries. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, said that if every region had its way, the EU would become unmanageable. So who gets to form a state? There are no clear international rules.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention declared that a region needs 4 things to become a state:
- a permanent population
- a defined territory
- a government
- and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
But these are only guidelines. Ideally a region would also meet other conditions, such as: - show that a clear majority have freely chosen independence - respect its own minorities - have a viable state - and settle terms with the state it leaves and its neighbours.
In practice, all these conditions are hard to meet. Taiwan is a modern, democratic state in all but international law. It’s an island off the south-eastern coast of China which has its own constitution, functions as an independent state, has democratically elected leaders, and was the first place in Asia to rule in favour of gay marriage. Per head it’s around three times richer than mainland China. But China regards Taiwan as a renegade province. It insists that no country can have diplomatic ties with both itself and Taiwan. Only 19 countries, plus the Vatican, officially recognise it.
Somaliland is another region seeking to be recognised as a country. The semi-desert territory on the coast of the Gulf of Aden declared independence from Somalia in 1991. It has its own government, police force and currency. But no foreign government recognises it. Perhaps for good reason. To recognise Somaliland would encourage other separatists in the region. It would undermine the already-weak federal government of Somalia. And it would probably lead to war. There have only been two major changes to African borders since the 1960s and neither is a success story. Eritrea declared independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Today the country has a despotic government and its people are mired in abject poverty. In 2011 South Sudan seceded from Sudan, making it the world’s newest country. Soon after South Sudan formed civil war broke out displacing 2.2 million people. Although a ceasefire was signed in 2015, the country lies in ruins - plagued by hyper-inflation, famine and violence. Independence has a romantic ring. Many sympathise with the demand for freedom. But redrawing borders is dangerous, and often causes as many problems as it solves.
Financial Times: Another bad week for Theresa May
In another bad week for the Tory leader, she was forced to find a new defence secretary after Sir Michael Fallon's resignation amid a swirling sexual harassment controversy in parliament. FT editor Lionel Barber and Janan Ganesh discuss the outlook.
CityLab: Can We Just Call This a Bus?
Since late October, oblong, self-driving vehicles have been using sensor technology to follow markings painted on the streets of Zhuzhou, China. Operators are behind the wheel for now, but the idea is that they won’t be needed by the time the city builds a network larger than the 3.1-kilometer test track, a dedicated lane on a heavily trafficked boulevard. Word of the apparently successful pilot reached Carlos Gimenez, the mayor of Miami-Dade County, who was so impressed by videos of Zhuzhou’s system in action that he says he’s planning a trip in person to see if it wouldn’t make sense as an answer to his city’s transit challenges. “It’s a solution we can implement now,” Gimenez said last week. “Not one that will take decades to complete.” (All aboard the “Commie bus,” according to one none-too-impressed local columnist.) [...]
In essence, trackless trains hit every objective high-quality transit systems should: They fit lots of people, run in dedicated lanes, are electric-powered, and are relatively cheap and easy to build. In other words, they are nearly identical to bus rapid transit, with a crucial, and arguably worrying, distinction: They’re called trains instead. (Or, in the case of the video the Miami-Dade administration recently showed business leaders, “rapid transit service.”)
What’s in a name? When that word is “bus,” a lot of strongly negative reactions. Studies in cities over the world show that riders overwhelmingly prefer trains—whether subways, streetcars, or light-rail systems—to buses. Some of the reasons are tied to bad bus riding experiences: Buses belch diesel fumes, get stuck in traffic, clump and cluster, hit potholes, and break down. Fare collection can be both tedious and flustering, and they can be difficult to board if you’re older or disabled. And some bus stops are unpleasant by design. Fixed rail transit, on the other hand, is less susceptible to the whims of traffic, more predictable, easier to hop on, and often provide a physically more comfortable ride.
Quartz: Brexit Britain is wasting its time obsessing over a highly unlikely Article 50 reversal
Former prime minister Gordon Brown told the BBC Nov. 9 that Britain is heading towards a “crisis point” because Leavers will realize that they won’t be getting what they were promised as it becomes clearer what kinds of effects Brexit will have on day-to-day life. He thinks that could trigger a massive change in public opinion could lead to an overall rethink, “may be scope for a reassessment.” [...]
The UK government has never formally acknowledged if there is, indeed, an ability to revoke Article 50. A London-based lawyer, Jolyon Maugham, actually filed a lawsuit in an Irish court hoping to find the answer but as Quartz reported, he withdrew the suit after opposition from the Irish government and the unlikelihood that it would make it to the European Court of Justice—the only legal body that can answer the question definitively. [...]
“Would the Tory government do anything any? Because in the end, it’s not really about public opinion, it’s about the opinion of the Conservative party. When we talk about the Conservative party, we are talking about the parliamentary side, which are just finding their voices, and then the party across the country [members], in which the party is shrinking, aging, and getting increasingly Brexit-y. However many members of the government think about this, their minds will go to the reactions of their party members across all constituencies.”
Slate: Is Saudi Arabia Holding the Prime Minister of Lebanon Prisoner?
Hariri unexpectedly resigned during a trip to Saudi Arabia. In a televised statement, Hariri said he believed his life was in danger and condemned Iranian interference in the affairs of Lebanon and the greater Middle East. The resignation happened at almost the same time that Saudi Arabia was detaining dozens of princes and former officials in what appears to be a power play by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Given that Hariri’s statement sounded like the sort of thing the Saudis might draft, Iran’s allies in Lebanon were quick to accuse the kingdom of forcing him to resign. Anonymous U.S. officials told Reuters that Crown Prince Mohammed and other Saudi officials had “encouraged” Hariri to step down.
Since then, there have been increasing indications that Hariri himself has been detained. Lebanon’s president is demanding that he return home to explain the circumstances around his resignation. Lebanese officials say they believe he is being kept under a form of house arrest. The Saudis have denied that his movements are being restricted, but he himself has not, nor has he spoken to journalists or his political allies back in Lebanon. His private plane returned to Beirut on Wednesday—without him on it. [...]
It would be, to put it mildly, deeply unusual for one country to essentially detain the head of government of a foreign country. The most comparable possible recent analogue I can think of involves Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was flown out of Haiti by the U.S. military after resigning amid increasing unrest in 2004. Aristide claimed later that he had been forced to leave by the U.S., though the Bush administration denied it.
Jacobin Magazine: Power Play
On November 4, scores of prominent Saudi figures, including eleven princes and several of the kingdom’s wealthiest individuals, were arrested under the authority of an anti-corruption committee that had been formed — at the bidding of MBS, naturally — just hours earlier. While the Saudi media, and some particularly credulous western reporters, have dutifully characterized these detentions (and at least one royal death) as part of a crackdown on Saudi corruption, it’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that they more about removing potential sources of opposition to MBS’s succession and his policies. [...]
But the most interesting targets of the anti-corruption committee, at least so far, appear to be Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah and his brother, Prince Turki bin Abdullah. Both are sons of the former King Abdullah. Turki served as governor of Riyadh for a few months in 2014-15, but Mutaib has been in charge of the kingdom’s powerful national guard since 2010 (he was fired from that post shortly before being taken into custody). Because of his position, as well as his stature within the royal family, Mutaib was a potential rival for MBS. [...]
MBS has already tried to introduce austerity and been forced to ease off, but when push comes to shove and it’s time to choose between government salaries and his next war of choice (these days it’s Yemen), or between social-welfare programs and the monarchy’s financial well-being, there’s little question what a King MBS will do. Many of the business leaders who have been jailed were thought to have disagreed with parts of the Vision 2030 plan (and with parts of MBS’s foreign policy), and some — like Alwaleed bin Talal — had the money and the media prominence to become very visible opponents of the plan if they chose to do so.
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