This blog contains a selection of the most interesting articles and YouTube clips that I happened to read and watch. Every post always have a link to the original content. Content varies.
Showing posts with label 2017 Catalan independence referendum. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2017 Catalan independence referendum. Show all posts
The date for the dialogue between the president of the Generalitat and the prime minister of Spain was organised in June, following the pardons issued by Sánchez to former political prisoners. It symbolised the start of what both sides describe as a transition towards progressive deliberation between Spain and Catalonia. [...]
Aragonès has consistently championed two main objectives for the dialogue: amnesty for exiles and former political prisoners and another referendum for Catalan independence. Sánchez, referencing the Spanish constitution (a clause about Spain’s ‘indivisibility’) and consistent with his dialogue throughout this year, said ‘neither amnesty nor a referendum are possible’ and suggested the two sides need to talk about ‘closer issues’. [...]
Controversy was sparked the day before the dialogue when the Catalan president rejected proposed attendees for the meeting from Junts—the other half of the ruling Catalan coalition. Aragonès justified his decision by saying that the attendees should only consist of members of the government.
The answer wasn’t too difficult to find. First, there was the “great recession” of 2008-2014 which led to record high rates of unemployment, in particular among young people (Spain’s unemployment rate was twice the eurozone average in 2012, with a staggering 57.9% of youth unemployment in 2014). Then, there were the politicians eager to tap into the “pool of rage” created by the unprecedented economic crisis to further their own agendas. Chief among these was Artur Mas, former President of the Government of Catalonia (2010-2015) and the former leader of the centre-right Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union), who succumbed to intraparty pressures in 2012 and decided to break with the traditional – middle-of-the-road – approach of his predecessor Jordi Pujol to carry the banner of independentism, till then brandished by Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (The Republican Left of Catalonia) and other groups; and Mariano Rajoy, the notorious Prime Minister of Spain between 2011-2018 whose centre-right Partido Popular (Popular Party) initiated the process which ended with the amendment of the 2006 Estatut on Catalonia’s autonomy by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2010, after it was approved by both the Catalan and Spanish parliaments, and by the Catalan people in a referendum – thereby partially crushing Catalonia’s hopes for more self-rule. [...]
Yet facts can help only so much when it comes to understanding the current crisis in Catalonia where reality is bifurcated, with few, if any, points of contact between the opposing secessionist and unionist visions. In this bifurcated world, one’s “independence referendum” is another’s “illegal consultation” just as one’s “political prisoner” is another’s “imprisoned politician”. But truth is not the only casualty of this battle of realities. Another important casualty is rule of law, the sine qua non of any democracy. After voicing his concerns on la sentencia, or the final ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court on independentist leaders, Xavier Arbós, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Barcelona told me, “The Spanish government acted as if the only thing that exists is the law whereas the Catalan government acted as if the law didn’t exist.” [...]
First, independence means different things to different people. According to the latest barometer of the Catalan Centre for Opinion Studies, only 34.5% of the population believes that Catalonia should be an independent state – as opposed to 27% who would want Catalonia to remain as an autonomous community in Spain (status quo). But there are also those who believe that Catalonia should be a state within a federal Spain (24.5%), thereby bringing the total percentage of people who would like to see a change in the existing state of affairs to 59%.
His candidacy is a grand gesture—one that represents the ideal of the European Union, of late so beleaguered, as a space where national borders and identities can dissolve into a glorious, larger transnational project. In practice, Valls’s campaign is a living example, even a cautionary tale, of how all politics is local, and of how that European ideal can be a vague and elusive abstraction in the rough-and-tumble of an election. [...]
By then, Valls was one of the most disliked politicians in France. Socialist voters felt betrayed not only by his joining En Marche, but also by the policies he had championed while in power: market-friendly labor reforms that didn’t go over well with the party’s left-wing base, and his stance in what could loosely be called identity debates, such as his efforts to strip French jihadists of their citizenship, a proposal the Socialists ultimately withdrew for lack of support. Valls was essentially seen as a neo-conservative. [...]
At the height of the independence push, when Valls was still an elected official in France, he made impassioned speeches in favor of Spanish unity, saying that “unmaking Spain is unmaking Europe,” and in this moment, the germ of his candidacy first sprouted. Valls has repeatedly said, including to me, that he’s a republican in France, which replaced its monarch in the French Revolution, and a royalist in Spain, where he sees the royal family as defenders of Spanish democracy. Opposition to the Catalan independence movement is a pillar of his mayoral campaign. One of Valls’s opponents in the race is an independista running his campaign from jail, adding an element of romantic martyrdom to the political drama. [...]
Barcelonians don’t seem to resent Valls for being an opportunist or a carpetbagger. The city has a pretty open heart for welcoming newcomers from all over the world, to say nothing of Catalans such as Valls. But it isn’t so keen on the fact that he lived here for only a matter of months before announcing his intention to run in September. That he keeps making gaffes doesn’t help. Valls got some flak after a television interview in which he admitted that he didn’t know how much a metro ticket cost here.
How should central governments treat independence movements? My own research shows that central governments can limit the uncertainty and violence over secession campaigns when they provide a legal path to independence. The most recent scenes in Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan only serve to further confirm this finding. When central governments crack down on independence movements, political and economic instability and even violence are the usual outcomes.
There are two major reasons why suppressing secession attempts by force is no solution to the issue. First, it is impossible to efface the dream of independence from people's minds. Repression raises latent support for independence, even if it removes all public expression of that support. If the state eventually faces a moment of weakness or crisis, that latent support could quickly break out into a mass movement, as happened in various parts of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
Second, when governments try to eliminate the possibility of independence, they give themselves a freer hand to mistreat their ethnic minorities. My research shows that democracies that define themselves as "indivisible" in their constitutions are less likely to decentralise power to their regions and give more rights to local communities to govern themselves. [...]
Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, secessionism generally does not spread across borders. Some evidence suggests that self-determination claims are more likely to arise when there are more such claims in nearby countries, but no one has yet found that the success of independence movements in one country causes independence movements to become more successful in nearby countries.
In the rest of Spain a wave of nationalist sentiment has seen a clear shift to the right, with some polls showing the PP and Ciudadanos, the two main right-wing parties, winning an absolute majority if general elections were held today. Podemos, the only major Spanish party to vote against suspending Catalan autonomy, has found it difficult to operate in a climate dominated by the national question. Defending an alternative federal model for the country that would recognize the right to decide, they have repeatedly been painted as “traitors” and close allies of the independence movement by much of the Spanish media. [...]
It remains acute. The Catalan crisis is a fundamentally political one and cannot be resolved judicially or through the detention of political leaders. With the imposition of direct rule, Spain might have won as a state but it has failed as a nation. Indeed at the origin of this crisis is the historical failure to construct a form of political coexistence in Spain that could aggregate the national differences and political wills into a more universal imagined community. [...]
At the same time the pro-independence parties’ strategy based around a “process of disconnection” from the Spanish state has also failed. The idea that through a series of parliamentary declarations and one-off mobilizations Catalonia was going to secede from Spain underestimated both the coercive powers of the Spanish state and the lengths to which it would go to maintain Catalonia as part of its territory. The regional elections in December look likely to result in a further impasse. The pro-independence parties might maintain their slim majority of seats but they don’t, as yet, have the capacity to advance their historic objectives. [...]
It is true for a moment on October 1st the independence movement managed to overcome its own limitations, moving from an identitarian idea of the Catalans as “a people” to a democratic sense of “we the people”. The vote succeeded as a form of popular mobilization, incorporating many who didn’t support independence but believed in the right to decide. But it should not be understood as a referendum capable of giving the Catalan government a mandate for independence. And from the moment it was interpreted as such, the possibility of building upon this mobilization to construct a broader majoritarian bloc closed. [...]
Podemos needs to concentrate on strategic considerations, but at the same time we also clearly have to respond to the demand from much of Spanish society to get rid of the current government. In theory this would involve enabling the PSOE to govern in minority while we remained in opposition. But even this seems difficult right now as it would only be possible numerically with the support of Basque and Catalan nationalists. We have to acknowledge that the opening which the re-election of Pedro Sánchez represented has closed again.
“We can’t take definitive steps until we have solid international allies,” said Mas, 61, who was Catalan president from 2010 to 2016 and continued to wield influence as part of an unofficial group of more than a dozen people making the big decisions during the independence process. [...]
In an interview in his office in Barcelona, Mas acknowledged the problems facing the secessionist camp, saying the European Union had positioned itself against Catalan independence “at this stage,” and adding that it was hard to imagine Brussels changing its mind in the short term. [...]
There has been a great deal of soul-searching in the Catalan separatist camp after the events of the past two months, which saw a referendum on secession marred by police violence; businesses moving out of Catalonia; a failed declaration of independence; a swift move by Madrid to take direct control of the rebel region; and a judicial push that could see separatist leaders — including Puigdemont, who fled to Belgium, and others currently in previsionary detention — end up behind bars.
As a result, the two main secessionist parties have slowly started to signal their willingness to move away from further confrontation with Madrid without renouncing independence. As those two goals have thus far proven incompatible, some radical secessionists have interpreted it as giving up on independence altogether.
There´s no mandate for independence. Not enough social support. No international recognition. There´s no plan. Just irresponsible politicians promising something they cannot deliver. But who can stop lies from making the headlines? Who will tell citizens that they have been fooled? As Bertolt Brecht said, when the truth is too weak to defend itself, it has to go on the attack. But that has become difficult in a Schrödinger-like Republic of Catalonia: a republic that exists and doesn’t exist at the same time. Where many people demand Democracy but show contempt for democratic norms. Where people demand their right of self-determination but overlook the political rights of those who don’t want to spend their days waving flags. A Republic that is not the next step towards a democratized and better European Union, but a step backward into nationalism and intolerance. [...]
Regardless, the situation is deteriorating. Despite the call for regional elections on December 21, the imposition of direct rule and the detention on of eight members of the Puigdemont cabinet have made a bad situation worse. Article 155 had never been applied before, while the detentions are being described by many as an attack against freedom and democracy. However, we should emphasize that we are not talking about political prisoners: a quick read will tell us that they don’t qualify as such. They have been detained because they ignored the law, took decisive steps to establish a parallel state and refused to comply with judicial rulings. We can disagree about the nature of the crime, and, certainly, about its punishment. But that doesn´t make them political prisoners: they were not arrested for believing in independence, but for violating the laws they promised to respect. [...]
These are turbulent times to be Catalan, Spanish and European. But there´s room for positive strategies and common solutions: the point of departure should be a peaceful negotiation about Catalonia´s place in Spain. However, acknowledging that Constitutions can change doesn’t mean we should dismiss the laws that allow us to live together: mob rule and social media cannot replace democracy. The future of Spain (and Europe) lies in cooperation within federal structures, not in separation. But a negotiated solution will only be possible if Puigdemont and Rajoy understand that the first step towards being a democrat is to behave like one.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the continuous demands coming from the independentists, the EU has firmly backed the Spanish government, not showing any of support to the secessionist cause. In such context, we could ask ourselves whether this situation is affecting the attitudes of Catalan citizens on the EU. In other words: could this lack of European support undermine citizens’ perceptions of the EU? In this article, I will try to find a preliminary answer to this question, by analysing survey data coming from the last Public Opinion Barometer from the Catalan Opinion Studies Centre (CEO). [...]
The trend shown in the chart suggests that the response coming from the EU has significantly affected all population groups. On the one hand, trust in the EU strongly increases among those who believe that Catalonia should be part of Spain, something that is probably triggered by the perception of the EU backing their position. On the other hand, independentists go through a reverse process, where the lack of EU support for their aspirations may be driving the decline in trust shown in the data. [...]
Once again, we see a similar divergence. The starting point varies little among voting groups, with the exception of CUP voters (which is not surprising, the CUP being a leftist antisystem party), while the difference after the 1st of October is almost 5 points. The voters of constitutionalist parties feel more attached to the EU now than they did a year ago, while secessionists feel less attached. The most striking case is that of PDeCAT voters, who were the most attached to the EU in 2016, and whose decrease in attachment is the most pronounced. [...]
A complementary interpretation could build on Sanchez Cuenca’s explanation of the support of European integration. This is based on the idea that citizens tend to be more supportive of integration when they hold negative opinions of their national leaders in comparison to European ones. Following this line, we could say that Catalan nationalists supported the EU because they perceived the quality of the policies made in Brussels to be somehow superior to those made in Madrid. But this mechanism would break down at the moment when Brussels policies are no longer perceived as distinctly better than those coming out of Madrid.
From Catalonia to Kurdistan and Quebec, many people are demanding independence. What does it take to transform a cultural identity into a nation-state? And what is the impact?
The number of countries in the United Nations has grown over the decades – from 51 states in 1945 to 193 today. Many more places want to become independent.
But national governments almost always oppose secession. Catalonia’s parliament declared independence from Spain in October 2017 following a referendum deemed illegal by the central authorities in Madrid. Spain dismissed the region’s government, and decreed that a fresh election should be held. Catalan politicians leading the independence movement could be jailed for decades if found guilty of rebellion and sedition.
The autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq also held a recent independence referendum. It outraged the government in Baghdad and neighbouring countries, which also have Kurdish minorities. The Baghdad government claimed the independence referendum was illegal and seized back the lands Kurds had taken beyond their region.
The desire for secession is nothing new. There are estimated to be more than than 8000 ethno-cultural groups in the world. With many independence movements demanding that their homelands be recognised as countries. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, said that if every region had its way, the EU would become unmanageable. So who gets to form a state? There are no clear international rules.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention declared that a region needs 4 things to become a state:
- a permanent population
- a defined territory
- a government
- and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
But these are only guidelines. Ideally a region would also meet other conditions, such as: - show that a clear majority have freely chosen independence - respect its own minorities - have a viable state - and settle terms with the state it leaves and its neighbours.
In practice, all these conditions are hard to meet. Taiwan is a modern, democratic state in all but international law. It’s an island off the south-eastern coast of China which has its own constitution, functions as an independent state, has democratically elected leaders, and was the first place in Asia to rule in favour of gay marriage. Per head it’s around three times richer than mainland China. But China regards Taiwan as a renegade province. It insists that no country can have diplomatic ties with both itself and Taiwan. Only 19 countries, plus the Vatican, officially recognise it.
Somaliland is another region seeking to be recognised as a country. The semi-desert territory on the coast of the Gulf of Aden declared independence from Somalia in 1991. It has its own government, police force and currency. But no foreign government recognises it. Perhaps for good reason. To recognise Somaliland would encourage other separatists in the region. It would undermine the already-weak federal government of Somalia. And it would probably lead to war. There have only been two major changes to African borders since the 1960s and neither is a success story. Eritrea declared independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Today the country has a despotic government and its people are mired in abject poverty. In 2011 South Sudan seceded from Sudan, making it the world’s newest country. Soon after South Sudan formed civil war broke out displacing 2.2 million people. Although a ceasefire was signed in 2015, the country lies in ruins - plagued by hyper-inflation, famine and violence. Independence has a romantic ring. Many sympathise with the demand for freedom. But redrawing borders is dangerous, and often causes as many problems as it solves.
More than 150 Catalan officials have been fired, most notably President Carles Puigdemont and his entire cabinet. Defying Madrid, Puigdemont went ahead with an October 1 referendum on independence that was declared illegal by Spanish courts, and used its contested results to support a unilateral declaration of independence last Friday. Madrid later that day moved to take over the region. [...]
Catalonia’s motley coalition of pro-independence factions swerved in recent days from negotiations with Madrid to a hasty declaration of independence that they lacked the levers to enforce and that was not recognized by any country. For its part, Madrid has asserted its authority in Catalonia, at least for the time being, almost effortlessly — dispelling fears, including among some members of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s Cabinet, according to a senior government official, that it would be met with active resistance.[...]
There are numerous risks lurking in the weeks ahead for Madrid, including the likely possibility that the same or larger pro-independence majority regains control over the regional legislature. But government officials these days point to missteps by the Catalan leadership to justify their optimism. [...]
The main pro-independence Catalan political parties have vowed that they will take part in the ballot, implicitly accepting Madrid’s direct rule. The question remains if they will form a common front and under what motto they will run their campaign — with some separatists arguing they should frame the ballot as some sort of ratification for the new Catalan Republic. [...]
The prospect of economic trouble — with nearly 1,900 companies fleeing Catalonia since the disputed independence referendum on October 1 — and the cold welcome of the international community to the newly declared republic, said the official, should’ve convinced the separatist that the path of confrontation leads nowhere.
There is, in fact, no wave of separatism across Europe. In Belgium, the Flemish nationalist party is part of the national government but has not even insisted on a constitutional reform. It talks about confederalism; independence is, at most, a long-term and rather vague aspiration. [...]
Within the European Union, there are precisely two independence-seeking movements of any significance, in Catalonia and in Scotland. In both cases, support for independence is around 40-45 percent. Both are governed by nationalist parties, which have sought to test support in independence referendums. [...]
The Scottish referendum was won by the anti-independence forces, who gained 55 percent of the vote. While the nationalists were defeated, however, they had demonstrated that they are a considerable force in Scottish society. Neither side had scored a knock-out victory. So, after the referendum, the two sides engaged in a negotiation to produce a compromise of further autonomy for Scotland. [...]
Catalonia has gone into a confrontation that could have been avoided some years ago with a bit of statesmanship. With some recognition of Catalonia's national status, stronger guarantees for its competences and language and a deal on taxation and spending, the great majority of Catalans would have been content to remain in Spain and Spain itself would have been strengthened. Instead, there has been a series of miscalculations on both sides and a failure to think through the consequences of their actions. [...]
The same proportion thought that the actions of the Spanish government had encouraged pro-independence forces. A clear majority favoured proceeding gradually towards more autonomy, as the current Basque government is doing. A poll taken after the referendum showed 44 percent in favour of independence (where it has been for the last few years) but, when Catalans are offered the alternative of more autonomy, support for independence falls to 29 percent.
He did not indicate when — or even if — he would return to Barcelona. Instead, he said, “We are seeking guarantees from the Madrid government; on this will depend whether we return to Catalonia. We can’t avoid the rule of law, and we won’t shy away from our responsibilities, but we do need guarantees." [...]
On Monday the Spanish central government began to enforce Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which gives the central government the right to take away regional powers in order to enforce the indivisibility of the country of Spain. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy dissolved the Catalan parliament and took control of the Catalan police force, installing a new police chief. [...]
But his supporters were not the only ones to head the call. On Sunday, some 300,000 protestors did take the streets of Barcelona. But they did so under the Spanish flag — demanding not secession but unity.
On October 1, the Catalan government held an independence referendum in which less than half – some estimates say a third – of the region’s population participated. By the standards of the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the vote could never be accepted as “free and fair.” In addition to being illegal under the Spanish constitution, the referendum did not even have a voting register to determine who was entitled to participate. [...]
The EU is an association of nation-states, not regions. Although regions can play an important role within the EU, they cannot stand in as an alternative to member states. If Catalonia were to set a precedent of secession, encouraging other regions to follow suit, the EU would be thrown into a deep, existential crisis. In fact, one could argue that nothing less than the EU’s future is at stake in Catalonia today. [...]
One can only hope that reason will prevail, particularly in Barcelona, but also in Madrid. A democratic, intact Spain is too important to be jeopardized by disputes over the allocation of tax revenues among the country’s regions. There is no alternative but for both sides to abandon the trenches they have dug for themselves, come out to negotiate, and find a mutually satisfactory solution that accords with the Spanish constitution, democratic principles, and the rule of law.
The votes, which were not binding and held in line with the Italian constitution, contrast sharply with the independence campaign in Catalonia, which held a referendum on October 1 that was ruled illegal by the Madrid government and Spanish courts. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said Saturday that Madrid will dismiss the whole Catalan Cabinet, assume all the powers of the regional executive, curb the role of the Catalan parliament and call a regional election within six months.
According to partial data in Italy, turnout was around 60 percent in Veneto and just below 40 percent in Lombardy. In both regions, more than 95 percent of those who voted said Yes to more autonomy. [...]
The referendums are a boost for the Northern League as its leaders negotiate with Rome on the devolution of powers and tax revenues. The two regional governors pledged to ask for more autonomy over infrastructure, the environment, health and education.
Although the Northern League began life as a secessionist party it has been transformed by current leader Matteo Salvini into a populist, anti-immigration party with national ambitions.
Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy announced in Madrid on Thursday that the parliament would meet Saturday to begin stripping Catalonia — one of Spain’s wealthiest regions, anchored by Barcelona — of autonomous rule. It is an unprecedented moment for Spain, and the worst political and constitutional crisis the country has seen in four decades. It is also sure to set off a fresh wave of protests and anger in a region already on edge. [...]
While 90 percent of those who voted in the October 1 Catalan independence referendum checked off yes for independence, only 43 percent of the eligible voters participated in the ballot. The day was marred by police violence — voters were pulled from polling booths by their hair, and rubber bullets were used on crowds. [...]
Secessionists hold a slim majority in the Catalan parliament, but those who want to remain a part of Spain feel the decision to hold a referendum, let alone break away from Spain, is itself an undemocratic move that doesn’t represent the will of the people. [...]
And the tremendous uncertainty about the future of the region has already had an impact on business. Banks and multinational corporations based in Barcelona have begun the process of relocating their headquarters elsewhere in Spain. Today’s news won’t calm that economic anxiety anytime soon.
For Bou, and many Catalans regardless of their age, a discussion about independence isn't complete without mentioning the brutality of Spain's civil war, which began in 1936, and the Franco period, which lasted from 1939 to 1975. [...]
The Franco government was responsible for a wide gamut of human rights abuses and was known for its efforts to homogenise Spain. Catholicism was the only state-sanctioned religion. Minority languages and culture, such as Catalan, were made illegal. [...]
"I quickly realised they were the same dogs with different collars," Bou said of post-Franco Spanish politicians. "Nothing changed … so in the [first free] elections in 1977, I didn't vote."
Though there is no official count of the people killed or disappeared during the Franco government, Human Rights Watch (HRW) placed the number at more than 100,000 between 1936 and 1951. [...]
If the Spanish government does enact Article 155 and national police are again sent to Catalonia, Soler said Catalan people would "take the path of Gandhi. It's the only choice we have."
It is not that I don’t have an intuitive judgement about the issue. As I indicated in a piece I wrote during the Scottish referendum, I do think regions like Scotland and Catalonia should be allowed to secede. What I have struggled with is locating an adequate justification for that position. In the literature in political philosophy (my field) there are some fascinating books and articles, but few arguments I find convincing. It is only now, in reaction to Catalonia, that I finally have a better sense of what is grounding my pro-secessionist stance. I return to that grounding below, but first let me review what I regard as some common false starts. [...]
In short, the democracy argument fails to overcome what we might term the ‘symmetry problem’. Democracy can be advanced both as an argument for secession and an argument against it. To justify secession, we need to justify ‘asymmetry’: to explain why it is Catalonia, not Spain as a whole, that has a right to decide. [...]
If there were two discreet nations then Spain would be other-determining not self-determining when it takes part in Catalan affairs. But the very fact people proclaim this slogan demonstrates how controversial it is. National identity is not physics. Nations exist, split or overlap depending on inter-subjective beliefs. As long as there are people inside Catalonia and the rest of Spain who believe in an over-arching Spanish nation, the concept of national self-determination can be invoked by both sides. It offers no firm ground for secession. [...]
I realise the argument raises many questions. How many people need to feel alienated to demand a referendum? How alienated must they feel? What about the possible costs of secession, for those inside and outside the seceding region? There cannot be an absolute right to secede no matter how high the costs – that would be absurd. But how high must the costs be to defeat the right to secede?
As the north-eastern Spanish region continues the debate over its independence, we are in Catalonia hearing from people worried that mainstream media are not representing their voices.
As Catalonia continues to debate independence from Spain, the Guardian has been hearing from people in the region who worry that their views have not been represented in the mainstream media.
Catalonia’s relationship with the rest of Spain was not idyllic but it took the shape of a healthy contest, epitomized by the eternal rivalry between Spain’s two world-famous soccer teams: Real Madrid and Barcelona. If other Spaniards sometimes perceived Catalans as arrogant, they also thought them more efficient, more modern, more “European.” The Catalans, for their part, would sometimes grumble about Spain’s too easygoing approach to life, but then they would mock their own sense of superiority, and they, too, celebrated southern Spain’s vibrant culture. After more than a century of receiving a constant stream of migrants from other parts of Spain, Catalonia had become “a little Spain,” where Andalusian flamenco, Gypsy rumba, and Galician bagpipe music were almost as significant a presence as Catalan culture itself. This was particularly true of Barcelona. Barcelona, says Spain’s seventeenth-century literary hero Don Quixote, is a “fountain of courtesy, shelter of strangers, …reciprocator of firm friendship.” [...]
And then 2010 changed all that. In that fateful year, two things happened. The economic crisis that had struck the whole world at the time was felt hard across Spain, but in Catalonia the cutbacks to social services and the austerity measures of the Catalan government were harsher than those Madrid imposed on the rest of Spain. This caused a wave of anger at the establishment and created an atmosphere in which any radical idea could succeed. At the same time, after four years of agonizing deliberations, the Spanish Constitutional Court issued a controversial ruling. The Catalans had approved in a referendum a new, reformed statute of autonomy. Now the court was annulling parts of it. Catalonia was not to be called a nation, the Catalan language would not have absolute primacy over the Spanish language, Catalonia was not to have its own justice and tax system. [...]
By 2015, it had become clear that the “Scottish option” was not available. Artur Mas tried something else. He called a snap regional election and turned it into a plebiscite. Votes for nationalist parties would be counted as votes for independence. It was a narrow miss. The secessionists won a tantalizing 47.8 percent, almost a majority, but short of it. Yet the whims of the electoral law handed them a parliamentary majority nonetheless. Faced with the temptation, they succumbed. The relatively moderate Mas was replaced by the much more radical Puigdemont, who was willing to call a referendum even if it meant stepping outside the law. He wouldn’t care if the Constitutional Court did not approve or if the turnout didn’t pass the 50 percent threshold. What had hitherto been an irreproachably democratic movement morphed into a popular and institutional insurrection. Ithaca could wait no longer.
