The first civic groups were created in a completely organic way and saw the involvement of experts in psychology and psychiatry, Christian activists and, most importantly, active or former drug users themselves. The last group was the only one possessing any real insight into the drug scene: to exaggerate a little, they managed to naturally develop the trend of a participative approach which has only recently started appearing here thanks to some of the more enlightened international organizations. Their enthusiasm for the new possibilities helped set up a – for the time – very sophisticated and complex system of secondary and tertiary prevention. The relevant positions at ministries and advisory organs were staffed by experts holding pragmatic attitudes to drugs and addiction and a system of financial support for services that were until then financed by subsidies from abroad started taking shape. Maybe it was because of this well-off drug policy that the less fortunate side of the situation started showing itself; however, in that time of euphoric beginnings, this was hardly noticed. [...]
Halfway through the decade, a rising number of drug users among the Romani was noted in several regions. In Prague, there were families in which all three generations took heroin together and its use and trading overtook entire city districts inhabited traditionally by the Roma and a similar situation arose in Brno shortly afterwards, with drug trade paralyzing the neighborhood around the now-legendary Cejl street and decimated the local community of the Olachian Romani. The social services did not handle the crisis well, failed to spread information about the risks and means of help including the harm reduction services among the affected community and clinics have not managed to find a way to reflect the specific needs of the Roma. In Prague, the on-site harm reduction teams played a game of cat and mouse with the open drug scene – which was chased around the districts by the police applying their „forcing out“ strategy. Those originally responsible for the creation of anti-drug strategies, by now firmly planted in high political circles, focused on creating management positions and obtaining money for the drug sector, resulting in a neoliberalization of the field where all the deciding power was concentrated in the hands of a closed circle of experts, the “founding mothers and fathers”. The non-profit sector missed a unique opportunity to respond to the sharp increase of drug users’ numbers in their natural environment in a time when the public was not yet completely hysterized and trusted the experts, and politicians had yet to use the public scares for their own gain. It would not even be necessary to go too far for inspiration: at the time, the Swiss Zurich managed to stabilize what was the biggest European open drug scene with their progressive drug policies. [...]
Another legislative intervention that greatly affected the pervitin black market and the behavior of its users was the limit enforced on selling prescription drugs containing pseudoephedrine (necessary for making pervitin). As a result, the pills could only be sold in a much smaller amount and only upon providing an ID. This measure utterly failed at lowering the amount of drug users, but the one thing it lowered drastically was the quality of pervitin. Production of the drug was taken over by large, well-organized groups capable of securing a sufficient supply of pharmaceuticals; they, however, made the drug exclusively for sale, which resulted in lower quality and side effects. Last January, the same measure was taken in Poland, which used to supply the pharmaceuticals for most of the Eastern part of the Czech Republic; it is only reasonable to assume another drop in the quality of pervitin and a resulting outbreak of health issues of its users will occur soon.
