The debate that followed, Stephen Kinzer writes, was “arguably even more momentous than the debate over slavery.” Leading those who believed it was America’s destiny to acquire an empire were Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and Theodore Roosevelt, a newly minted war hero. Intimate friends and political partners, the two advocated a global strategy of overseas markets secured by a powerful navy. Although America was at peace during the 1890s, Roosevelt wrote in 1895 that he “would welcome any war, for I think this country needs one.” Within three years, pushed by inflammatory reporting by William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal, the country was consumed by war fever against Spain. The “splendid little war,” lasting only ten weeks, fulfilled the expansionists’ dreams of new colonies.
Opposed to the acquisition of colonies was the Anti-Imperialist League, led by Andrew Carnegie, William Jennings Bryan, Mark Twain, Carl Schurz and two former presidents. The League believed that the United States should allow foreign peoples to govern themselves. Carnegie and Twain supported the war with Spain in the hope that it would liberate the Cuban people from colonial rule. Their hopes were soon dashed, however. In 1901, Congress adopted the Platt Amendment, which became the template by which the United States dominated countries that it did not formally annex, especially in Latin America. Instead of granting Cubans their independence outright, the legislation stipulated that the United States would “exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence.” The interventionists won other victories. In a political fight that lasted six years, they won every major vote in Congress, soundly defeated the League at the polls and dominated foreign policy for the rest of the 20th century. [...]
Denied independence, the Filipinos rebelled against the American military. A war that lasted 41 months killed more Filipinos than three and a half centuries of Spanish rule. Americans practiced water torture, killed civilians, burned villages and slaughtered farm animals to crush an insurgent rebellion. By the time Roosevelt won the presidency in his own right in 1904, the rebellion was crushed. [...]
The urge of the United States to intervene reflects a deep ambivalence, Kinzer believes. On the one hand, Americans believe that nations should decide their own destinies. On the other, Americans see themselves as the indispensable nation unique in its capacity to change the world for good. McKinley exemplifies this conflict. Initially opposed to war and acquisition of territory, he saw a vision, after prayer, that the United States must “uplift and civilize and Christianize” the Filipinos. Kinzer documents, however, how these best of intentions made things worse.