The concluding episode in our series, Seeing White. An exploration of solutions and responses to America’s deep history of white supremacy by host John Biewen, with Chenjerai Kumanyika, Robin DiAngelo, and William “Sandy” Darity, Jr.
31 May 2018
The Guardian: Italy is facing regime change. The future will be repressive
That talks have now collapsed hardly dissipates the danger. On the contrary, the very fact that these populisms have struck hard at the constitutional powers of the Italian president, Sergio Mattarella, shows how determined they are to upend the country’s institutional setup. With new elections, probably in the autumn, the populists are likely to emerge even stronger. But for now Italy is set to be led by a transition government – with no majority.
Both populisms raked up support with Europhobic slogans and concepts of a revolt of “the people” against the “elites” – all in the name of an imaginary “direct democracy”. One is the Five Star movement, founded by the comedian Beppe Grillo alongside a prophet of web-based democracy, Roberto Casaleggio. The other is Matteo Salvini’s League – no longer a secessionist party of the north but a far-right party that expresses sympathy for the regimes in Russia and North Korea. [...]
This Italian “double populism” will not renounce its programme, which aims to control the government through a sort of politburo known as the “conciliation committee”, placed wholly under the control of Five Star and the League. It aims to neutralise parliament by making it impossible for lawmakers to switch parties – whereas the freedom of MPs to do so is written into the constitution. Unpopular laws would be submitted to a sort of screening by referendum; the same would apply to international treaties, and therefore to all the steps that Italy has taken to be part of the EU and the eurozone – even though backtracking on treaties is forbidden by article 75 of the constitution. [...]
The contortions of both parties paved the way for populism. The Democratic party proved unable to move on from Renzi’s leadership, despite a long series of defeats – not least a crushing one in the 2016 referendum on wide-ranging constitutional reform. Forza Italia and the moderate centre-right are tied to the ailing but still hegemonic figure of Berlusconi. On top of that, both mainstream parties did nothing during the campaign but imitate the themes, proposals and styles of the populists, instead of pushing back against them.
The Atlantic: Why Trump Hasn’t Fired Sessions (APR 13, 2018 )
The president has fired or forced out upwards of 20 cabinet officials and top aides, so why does the man he has most-often criticized still have a job? And what would happen if he were fired, which Trump has reportedly been mulling this week? Legal experts and political strategists who have either worked directly with the president or observed his behavior from afar attribute Trump’s reluctance to fire Sessions to two major considerations: Fears in the White House that the move would cost the president support among GOP voters and members of Congress, who generally like and support Sessions, and the risk of provoking further allegations of obstruction of justice—both of which could deepen the challenges already facing the administration. [...]
Some legal experts disagree, arguing that, depending on Trump’s motives, such a dismissal could actually constitute obstruction. “The issue would be whether the president had a corrupt purpose—that is, a desire to cover up his own wrongdoing—when he fired Sessions,” Louis Seidman, a professor of constitutional law at Georgetown, said. Seidman acknowledged the debate among legal scholars about whether a sitting president can be charged as such for performing acts that are otherwise within their constitutional powers. But he said he believes Trump could be charged with obstruction because “obstruction of justice, by its nature, is inconsistent with the president’s constitutional authority to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.” Jens David Ohlin, a professor at Cornell Law School who specializes in criminal law, said he believed that firing Sessions “would immediately provoke a political crisis for Trump and would accelerate impeachment talk—because the firing would be a major obstruction of justice, this one even larger than the Comey firing.” And despite its skepticism of the legal merits, it’s clear that the White House is taking the political consequences of the charge seriously. Roger Stone, a long-time informal adviser to Trump, said the president’s advisors “have convinced him he will be impeached if he does” fire Sessions. [...]
The former campaign adviser raised this as an issue, too, noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee has warned Trump that it won’t hold confirmation hearings for a new attorney general if Sessions is dismissed (and leading Senate Republicans said last summer that recess appointments were not an option). But that was then, and this is now, said the person familiar with the president’s thinking. “If you had asked me six months ago what the consequences would be if Trump fired Sessions or Rosenstein, I would have said: ‘He would be impeached and Republicans would be leading the way.’ Now, I’m not so sure.” This person, who is a Republican, pointed to what he saw as the GOP’s reluctance to hold Trump accountable for actions ranging from firing former FBI Director James Comey to failing to adequately address allegations that he had his lawyer pay hush money to a porn star. “If Trump makes the political calculation that he can weather the storm of firing these guys, whether it’s Sessions or Rosenstein, and shutting down the investigation, he’ll do it,” this person said.
openDemocracy: Harakiri, Italian Style
In my view, Mattarella’s decision is bad for Italy, Germany, and Europe. The only political force which is likely to profit is the Northern League – an extreme right-wing party which campaigns chiefly against migrants, and sides with Vladimir Putin and Marine Le Pen. Liberal democracy will be the greatest victim in Italy and beyond. Centrist parties will be reduced to a political footnote in the next Italian elections. Politics in the coming months will be ever more contentious, if not violent. Europe will be even more paralysed, faced with instability in one of its most important member-states. Germany will have to live with the implications. [...]
The first victim of Mattarella’s decision will be Italian democracy. The president cited concerns about international markets as the prime reason for his veto. This implies that the markets, and not voters, are in a position to determine the future of the Italian Republic. Put differently, elections can be considered valid only if they lead to outcomes welcomed by the markets. [...]
The second victim of Mattarella’s decision will be the European Union. The president told Italians that the proposed government, and especially the proposed minister of finance, could or even “inevitably” would take his country out of the Eurozone. The winners of this year’s Italian elections are clearly no fans of the Fiscal Compact because they believe that excessive austerity hampers Italy’s growth.
LSE Blog: How Brexit Will Affect Germany’s Role In The EU
If the EU wants to realise its ambitions as a relevant defence and security actor, for example, this will only be possible if Berlin is willing to do significantly more. It would need to increase its defence spending and its willingness to deploy its forces in Europe’s neighbourhood. France can play an important role in this, but won’t be able to do it alone. Much here will also depend on the extent to which the UK remains integrated into European security efforts more broadly. Ensuring continued close and mutually beneficial cooperation between the UK and the EU27 post-Brexit would lower the pressure on Germany. [...]
The UK has long acted as a counter-balance to German power within the EU. Particularly for those member states broadly sharing the British scepticism towards political integration – e.g. Denmark, Sweden or Poland – the UK offered protection against Franco-German integrationist drives. They knew that while Germany was powerful, the British generally could be relied upon to stand up to and constrain Berlin. [...]
Germany and the UK did not always see eye-to-eye on questions of European integration. Between 2009 and 2015, they were the two countries least likely to vote together in the European Council. Nevertheless, on some issues they agreed more than on others. Over the past decades, both were key drivers in shaping the EU as an economically liberal union: internally, by expanding and deepening the Single Market and placing strict rules on state interventions; externally, by ensuring the EU was open to global trade and investment.
This Anglo-German cooperation was particularly important to Berlin since it offered a useful counterweight to balance out the bloc’s more protectionist faction led by France. As the UK is leaving the EU, Germany will lack this crucial ally. This will be felt most directly in the European Council, where an economically liberal bloc formed around the UK and Germany – also including Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland – currently commands 36.8% of the voting share, handing it a blocking minority (at least 35%). After Brexit, the group’s share will drop to just 27.8%. Also in the European Parliament, the absence of British MEPs is expected to result in less market-friendly policy outcomes.
Haaretz: What Part of Bombing a Kindergarten Is OK?
This week, when a mortar shell fired from Gaza slammed into the yard of a border-area Israeli kindergarten just before the children and staff were to arrive, the answers to the question came fast and furious. [...]
Among other answers: The Israeli kindergarten is reinforced against attack, as opposed to the much more vulnerable construction of Gaza schools, one of which was hit by an Israeli attack later in the day. Or, the rockets and mortars fired at Israel by Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and others in Gaza are largely ineffectual weapons, as opposed to the deadly, state of the art munitions employed by Israel. [...]
Collective punishment is immoral no matter who carries it out. Us or them. It's immoral no matter what form it takes, indiscriminate shelling or gratuitously injurious siege, terrorism or oppression. No matter the justification. [...]
At this point, for people who truly want to see a workable solution of a shared Holy Land, the very statements of our ultra-maximalist leaders constitute a form of collective punishment.
Quartz: Why Europeans should be quick to investigate petty criminals for Islamic terrorism
In 2015, Louise Shelley, a university professor at George Mason University and director of its Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, wrote in the New York Times (paywall) about how “the financial profile of the ISIS inspired terrorists in Europe is very different. Many of them were small-scale criminals before they were radicalized and some continue to commit crimes subsequently. Financing from petty criminal activity allows them to support themselves, buy weapons in Europe’s illegal markets and rent cars and safe houses.” [...]
In 2007, a research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice (pdf) delved into how for Muslim boys facing an identity crisis by living in the West can manifest itself “into anger, petty crime, and becoming easily susceptible to extremist ideology.” In addition, one of France’s most prominent Islamic terrorism experts, Olivier Roy, highlighted how “half of violent jihadis in France, Germany, and the United States also have criminal records for petty crime, just like [Manchester bomber Salman] Abedi, who appears to have been radicalized without the involvement of the local mosque or religious community, an element that mirrors patterns in the rest of Europe.” [...]
Experts have warned that in order to understand and therefore tackle this type of terrorism, authorities need to probe into these links. “To better understand the threat faced by the new generation of jihadists in the West, security forces and intelligence services must also look at the micro-level of how lower level trafficking, drug dealing and petty criminal activity, combined with prison radicalization and ties to the black market and illicit underworld, combine to present a new spin on a longstanding threat,” said the authors of a study in the Journal of Strategic Security (pdf).
Slate: How Bad Could a Euro Crisis in Italy Get?
Neither of those two things is likely to happen because the Italian populace, as divided as it is, remains strongly in favor of the euro. They might hate elite politicians, and they might hate Brussels-imposed austerity, and they might vote for extremist parties like the Five Star Movement and the League—but they’re not about to vote to leave the euro, and the populists know that. [...]
Italy is too big to fail, but it’s also too big to rescue. While Greece could, ultimately, get bailed out by the European Union and the IMF, Italy can’t be. There just isn’t enough money. Without the low interest rates that accompany euro membership, Italy would be forced to default, and everybody who holds Italian debt, including virtually every major European bank, would be forced to take the kind of losses that lead straight to insolvency. Italy would become a disaster zone, but the rest of the world would suffer a major crisis and recession as well.
Ultimately, that’s why Italy’s president, Sergio Mattarella, refused to allow a euroskeptic to become finance minister. Governments come and governments go—that’s normal in Italy—but it’s Mattarella’s job as president to keep his country from self-destructing. He accepted the parties that won the election; he even suggested a different League representative as finance minister, one who didn’t want to bail on the euro. But the League didn’t bite, and the result is the current spate of nervousness and uncertainty, none of which is going to be resolved at least until the Five Star Movement and the League make it clear whether they’re going to fight the next election on an anti-euro platform. In the parlance of financial markets, we’re in “risk off” mode for the time being, with investors retreating to the safest havens they can find.
The Local: How the League's Matteo Salvini played his cards right amid Italy's political chaos
In the months of political horsetrading that ensued to form a government, the nationalist Salvini has seen his hand strengthened and is experiencing a meteoric rise in the opinion polls. From 17 percent on election day, surveys now put the League at over 20 percent – it scored 22 percent in a recent IndexResearch poll – while other parties' ratings have largely stayed the same as in March or declined. [...]
After the Five Star-League alliance collapsed, fresh polls looked to be the most likely outcome of the political saga. But while Five Star leader Luigi Di Maio is scrambling to put the coalition back on track, Salvini says he welcomes a return to the polls, confident that his party would emerge stronger than ever. [...]
Analysts also suggest that his unflinching stance on the party's core issues at a time of great uncertainty appeals to voters. The League appears "as the political group with the greatest consistency... this consistency makes them more clearly identifiable," said Marc Lazar, political science professor at Rome's Luiss University.
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