8 February 2020

UnHerd: Why is Sinn Féin rising?

Ever since Ireland gained independence in 1922, every Irish Government has been led by either Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael (or one of its antecedents). The two parties emerged from a split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty that paved the way to independence. The side that became Fine Gael accepted the Treaty, and the side that became Fianna Fáil, led by Éamon de Valera, rejected it. The pro-Treaty side, under Michael Collins, won the subsequent civil war but Fianna Fáil soon emerged as the strongest and most popular party in the new Irish state. [...]

But as time has gone on, and the Civil War recedes ever more into the distance, the historical differences between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael seem less and less important and increasingly they are seen as two sides of the same coin. [...]

Irish politics is also unusual in that immigration has barely raised its head as an issue, despite the fact that Ireland actually has a higher proportion of non-nationals living here than almost any other EU country, including Britain. Both the media and the mainstream parties absolutely refuse to permit a debate on the matter, but most of the immigrants to date are from other EU countries and fit in well for the most part. [...]

But every scenario is bound to strengthen Sinn Féin further. A second confidence-and-supply deal makes Sinn Féin the de facto opposition party, and if there is an outright coalition between the two parties, Sinn Féin becomes the official opposition. One way or another, the party of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness will benefit and the next time an election is called it will be running far more candidates and could potentially become the biggest party in the state for the first time since independence almost a century ago. It’s also possible that, if either main parties dumps their leader after the election, they choose a successor willing to cross that line and enter a coalition government with Sinn Fein.

Aeon: Given how little effect you can have, is it rational to vote?

This is fine, perhaps even compelling, as an esoteric argument. But taken to its logical extreme, this classical account of rationality would imply that nobody should ever vote. This outcome would gut democratic governance of its central regulating mechanism. Society would be left worse off, even if each citizen were spared the apparently pointless expense of time and energy involved in a trip to the ballot box. Two facts are missing from the classical view: that elections are ultimately cooperative ventures, and that the rationality of participating in them depends on more than an individual-level cost-benefit analysis of the effort involved in each pull of a voting-machine lever or crossing of a ballot paper. An individual’s true interest in voting is inextricably intertwined with the interests of the polity as a whole.

In this, voting is not fundamentally different from many other actions. Failure to participate in a collective endeavour is fundamentally irrational whenever it risks contributing to outcomes contrary to our own basic interests. We rely on cooperation to solve a range of pressing challenges, from global warming and extreme poverty to preventable disease. Few question the rationality of minimising our individual carbon footprints, for example, or individually deciding to boycott companies that rely on child labour. No one person who engages in such behaviour will individually solve the climate crisis or eliminate the exploitation of children. But it is still rational to undertake individual actions that contribute to a collective effort likely to have desirable effects for humanity as a whole. [...]

In my view, there is not. If we fail to save a child drowning in a pond – to use an example made by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer in 1972 – we are causally implicated in the death, even if we didn’t put the child in the water to drown. Similarly, one individual decision not to vote – combined with similar decisions by others – can keep unjust governments in power or just ones from being formed. There is nothing irrational about wanting to avoid these possibilities by acting in conjunction with others in the same way that we cooperate with others by recycling or donating to charity. Even if I have no way of knowing if others will vote, I should act as if they would vote, and they should act similarly. This is the logic of collective commitment that undergirds the morality of voting.

The Calvert Journal: Tashkent's first documentary photo gallery is striking out into new and untested waters

Following the death of president Islam Karimov in 2016, Uzbekistan has liberalised some of its social, economic, and political life. Meaningful change, however, still needs time to take root. In a country where visual art is nascent and official censorship still exists, encouraging free expression is a crucial yet often risky task. The 139 Gallery, therefore, is a badly needed forerunner. [...]

But Karpov’s vision is wider than the 139 Gallery. Apart from showcasing the work of local and foreign artists, the space will also provide a platform for discussions about art, social and cultural issues, and the changing reality of Uzbekistan. “Our goal is to build a space where everyone — artists, journalists, filmmakers, communities, and the government — everyone can work together on issues that concern us. It will be a place of dialogue. I have chosen art as a kind of mediator,” he says.

Karpov believes that out of all the visual arts, documentary photography is uniquely positioned to help Uzbek society start to discuss issues facing the country today, as well as to act as a stepping stone to open up new forms of art. “The moment you start doing something uncommon, there are always misunderstandings and criticism from society,” Karpov says. “But from my experience, when you show people documentary photography, very true photography, in which they see the reflection of their own lives, they understand. They see it as part of their being. This is what is so great about documentary photography.”

openDemocracy: Death of a movement

On 26 January, in both Emilia-Romagna and Calabria, M5S came third; its share of the vote was respectively 4.7% and 6.3%. This was an especially bad showing. The starred movement received considerably less support than the Democratic Party (PD), the junior member in Italy’s M5S-led government: it trailed behind the social democrats by a jaw dropping 30% in the northern region (PD won there with 34.7%) and a striking 9.4% in the deep south, where PD, despite receiving the most votes for a single party (15.2%), still lost to the centre-right alliance commandeered by Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. [...]

Jeremy Corbyn’s stance on Brexit, an age-defining issue, was negatively paradigmatic: by not sticking to the same take, whichever it might have been, throughout the entire exit process, the London socialist dug his political grave with an invisible spade. He didn’t even know he was holding one. A Eurosceptic all his life, Corbyn strangely campaigned to stay in Europe; then, at the time of triggering Article 50, MPs were bullied into voting for it. Eventually, Corbyn conceded that a second referendum was on his party’s cards, making matters shockingly worse. In other words, the Islington North MP was the only one in the country to swerve and proudly leave conspicuous red skid marks on British roads; the more these stood out, the more drivers were alerted to them and steered clear – frightened. Change red to yellow, and you’ve got a M5S recipe for failure – just as tasty as Labour’s.

Much has been said abroad about another Italian movement, an unofficial one, originating from civic society – the so-called ‘Sardines’, who packed Italy’s squares, especially in the north and centre, to oppose the right’s harsh rhetoric. Their contribution to PD’s exploits was tangible, but can be overstated. It certainly revived interest in politics among those who don’t vote or who stopped a long time ago, in a similar fashion to early-day M5S – these voters saw that the red party was the only bastion against the proposed policies of the hard-right (the self-styled liberal conservatism of Forza Italia does little to curb them). But M5S’ botched basic income policy did a lot to dent the movement’s reputation. The south of Italy can see it does not deliver; the larger a family the less the M5S-concocted basic income makes a difference. And so, in the absence of a clear vision as how to curb unemployment, why vote for them still?

Scientific American: How Does the New Coronavirus Compare with the Flu?

So far, the new coronavirus, dubbed 2019-nCoV, has led to more than 20,000 illnesses and 427 deaths in China, as well as more than 200 illnesses and two deaths outside of mainland China. But that’s nothing compared with the flu, also called influenza. In the U.S. alone, the flu has already caused an estimated 19 million illnesses, 180,000 hospitalizations and 10,000 deaths this season, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). [...]

“Despite the morbidity and mortality with influenza, there’s a certainty … of seasonal flu," Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said in a White House press conference on Jan. 31. “I can tell you all, guaranteed, that as we get into March and April, the flu cases are going to go down. You could predict pretty accurately what the range of the mortality is and the hospitalizations [will be],” Fauci said. “The issue now with [2019-nCoV] is that there’s a lot of unknowns.” [...]

The death rate for 2019-nCoV is still unclear, but it appears to be higher than that of the flu. Throughout the outbreak, the death rate for 2019-nCoV has been about 2%. Still, officials note that in the beginning of an outbreak, the initial cases that are identified “skew to the severe,” which may make the mortality rate seem higher than it is, Alex Azar, U.S. secretary of the Health and Human Services, said during a news briefing on Jan. 28. The mortality rate may drop as more mild cases are identified, Azar said.

Spiegel: The German Conservatives' Faustian Pact With the Far-Right

What happened in Thuringia this week -- where a center-right politician was elected governor with the help of the far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party -- was a milestone for the AfD. It was the first time the party, which has been criticized for being extremist and at times openly anti-Semitic, has helped to elect the leader of a state government. [...]

What remains is the embarrassment for mainstream conservatives, especially for CDU and FDP leaders in Berlin, who didn't intervene soon enough. What remains is the fact that conservatives in Thuringia allowed themselves to be seduced by the AfD. What remains is a triumph for Björn Höcke, the right-wing extremist state leader of the AfD in Thuringia, who made those on the center-right look like fools. What remains is the damage caused to liberal democracy. [...]

In their book, "How Democracies Die," Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt began with the chapter, "Fateful Alliances." This is how it usually begins, they write: Representatives of the current system ally themselves with its enemies in order to maintain their grip on power. That's how it was in the Weimar Republic, where Hitler wouldn't have stood a chance without an invitation from conservatives. According to Levitsky's and Ziblatt's analysis, this has also been the case in Brazil, Peru and Venezuela.