Jacobin Magazine: Last Chance, SPD

The report concluded that the SPD is no longer perceived as a credible voice on issues of social and economic justice. It argued that Martin Schulz’s election as leader had been a small step in the right direction, but that the many compromises among the party leadership (whose main goal seems to be avoiding having to distance themselves from the neoliberal reforms they imposed in government in the mid-2000s) meant that his election slogans about social justice rang hollow. Above all, the report emphasized a “collective failure of leadership” — not only were Schulz and his predecessor Sigmar Gabriel at fault, but the entire leadership which had set the party’s agenda for years. Despite these blunt truths, and earlier announcements that the party would be seeking to renew itself, the SPD has made an almost pathological choice to continue with more of the same. [...]

The SPD now promised to reinvent itself while in government and sent both Martin Schulz and Sigmar Gabriel into (temporary) political retirement. “Renewal,” however, meant that not a single member of the party’s left wing joined the new leadership: no one who campaigned against re-forming the grand coalition found themselves in a leading position. The only new face in the party leadership is the new general secretary, Lars Klingbeil. But Klingbeil is by no means a man of the Left; he is, in fact, a long-standing member of the Seeheimer Kreis (“Seeheim Circle”), an influential grouping on the right of the party. [...]

After the election, when it initially seemed as if the SPD would take up a position in the opposition, Nahles told journalists that the party would attack the CDU head-on. Now, she is busy explaining that Germany “can’t take in all” of the refugees. Pragmatism veering into cynical opportunism is nothing new for SPD elites, but nonetheless never fails to amaze. [...]

The list of Scholz’s political achievements is long but give the list to someone with no knowledge of the man, and they may be shocked to find out that he claims to be a social democrat. This is not to say that he could have been from the right-wing extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), but simply that Scholz largely embodies the archetype of a bourgeois rather than Social Democratic politician. In 2001, as the Hamburg city-state’s Senator of the Interior, he passed a law that allowed police to forcibly administer emetics to drug dealers — a measure the European Court of Human Rights later labelled a human rights violation. This, from a man who began his career as a left-wing Juso.

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Politico: Andrea Nahles: German SPD’s last hope

To revive the party, Nahles will have to keep both centrist and left-wing factions on side and find ways to give the party a distinctive profile even as it serves in a government led by Merkel’s conservative bloc. In previous stints as Merkel’s junior partner, SPD members have complained that the chancellor takes credit for their achievements while their voters are alienated by conservative policies pursued by the coalition. [...]

Nahles, who already leads the SPD group in the Bundestag, is viewed as being on the left of the party, but has shown a pragmatic streak. She is also known for remarks that are unusually blunt for a German politician.  [...]

She is also considered a gifted political operator responsible for some of the biggest milestones in the party’s recent history. As labor minister, she put in place Germany’s first minimum wage laws. [...]

At a tense congress in January, Nahles was widely credited with stewarding the party toward another partnership with Merkel. Following a long and meandering address by the party’s then-leader Martin Schulz, she woke up the room with a short, rousing speech in which she exhorted delegates to approve coalition talks.

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Social Europe: A European Germany Returns?

There also was something in the same briefing to Kohl of which he had been unaware and that Merkel may not yet appreciate: EIB bonds do not count on the debt of Germany or any other major member state of the Union, nor need count on the debt of others. In this regard, they parallel US Treasury bonds which do not count on the debt of California or Delaware. What’s more, the servicing of EIB bonds is by the member states which gain from the investments that they fund, not by fiscal transfers from others, or from the Commission’s tax funded Own Resources. Further, aided by the Amsterdam criteria for social and environmental investments, the EIB quadrupled its investment finance in the decade from 1997 until the financial crisis to four fifths of Own Resources. [...]

Moreover, the joint EIB-EIF case has been fully grasped by Emmanuel Macron. When minister of economy and industry in the second Valls government he argued in September 2014 that to offset the low subscribed capital of the EIF the EU should access unused resources from the European Stability Mechanism. As an adviser put it : “If we could mobilise €20 to €40 billion from the ESM, for example to recapitalise the EIF, you then have a multiplier effect on the EIB that can reach almost €200 billion of public money”.

Wolfgang Schäuble opposed Macron, claiming that this was not within the ESM’s remit. But legal advice to the European Parliament declared that it was not excluded that the ESM should ‘fulfil other tasks’ to assure the stability of the euro for which a sustained recovery of the European economy is vital. Besides which the private sector multipliers from EIB investments range up to three, which could mean that the total public and private investment generated could reach some €600 billion, with further employment and income multipliers. And, because the Roosevelt New Deal was bond financed, it managed to reduce unemployment from 22% to 8% in the seven years from 1933 to 1940 with an average annual federal deficit of only 3%, i.e. the Maastricht limit.  

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Deutsche Welle: Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel meeting a test for EU financial policy

Judging by what individual representatives of the CDU, its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the SPD have said so far about Macron's reform ideas, the grand coalition partners have indeed taken different positions. Until now, Scholz has held back because he knows that within Germany he is expected to continue the solid (some say, stingy) financial policy of his CDU predecessor Wolfgang Schäuble.

However, other SPD politicians have been extremely enthusiastic about Macron's ideas. Former SPD leader Martin Schulz — who also previously served as European Parliament president — had made a positive German response to Macron's ideas a prerequisite for a new grand coalition. As recently as Wednesday, new top diplomat Maas said in Paris that he had come to "finally take the outstretched hand of Emmanuel Macron with his proposals for the renewal of Europe." [...]

However, according to Caspary, the differences in opinion do not change the common goal of strengthening the European Union. A few days ago, Merkel complained that Europe was "too weak and too slow" in many areas. She wants to change that. She agrees with Macron that without him, without France, this is not possible. "I don't believe for a second that a European project can be successful without, or against Germany," Macron told the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. "We are completely interdependent."

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Jacobin Magazine: No Corbyn in Sight

And indeed, the conference vote ended up being remarkably close, with only 56 percent of the assembled delegates endorsing the negotiations for a new “GroKo” — the German media’s awkward abbreviation for “große Koalition,” a grand coalition between the country’s two main parties, the CDU and SPD. But fifty-six percent is still fifty-six percent. Formal talks to assemble a grand coalition — the third in sixteen years — will soon be underway. [...]

An uninspired character, Schulz did his best on Sunday to play the part of the passionate statesman forced to join the government out of a sense of national duty, while at the same time insisting that he and his team had wrung substantial concessions from Merkel. The initial agreement between the SPD and CDU, which forms the basis of coalition negotiations, includes several noteworthy, arguably “Social Democratic” reforms. [...]

Schulz and company want their supporters to believe that these concessions are the result of hard bargaining, but the fact is, after two decades of neoliberal convergence, very little difference remains between the two major parties. As Oliver Nachtwey argued in the lead up to last year’s elections, Merkel largely abandoned fiscally conservative policies after taking government, and has since presided over a stable spending and social welfare policy that has even seen her overturn the most extreme of the SPD’s neoliberal reforms of the early 2000s. Tweaking a few details to appease the Social Democrats probably didn’t take much work. [...]

At the same time, this will not be a grand coalition like any other. Last year’s elections not only delivered humiliatingly low results for both of the major parties, but also witnessed the far-right Alternative für Deutschland’s meteoric rise. With the SPD back in government, the AfD will now be the largest opposition party in parliament, posing the very real danger that further hollowing out of the political center will benefit not the Left, but the radical right.

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The Atlantic: How Far Can Germany's Social Democrats Bend Before They Break?

The 28-page framework Merkel’s conservatives and Schulz’s Social Democrats drafted is intended to form the basis of a coalition government. On immigration, both sides agreed to cap the number of asylum seekers the country takes in to between 180,000 and 220,000 a year; before talks, the SPD had categorically rejected such a cap as a violation of the country’s moral obligation to protect refugees. Some asylum seekers with limited status will be able to bring their families to Germany, but this, too, will be restricted to up to 1,000 people a month. There would be no tax hike for the wealthiest Germans. The SPD also failed to establish what it calls a “citizen’s insurance,” a healthcare plan that guarantees the same standards for public and private patients in Germany.  

There were some wins for the center-left, like a ban on exporting weapons to countries involved in Yemen’s ongoing war (German companies have been involved in lucrative arms deals with Saudi Arabia) and reforming the EU with a euro-zone budget and better protections against financial crises. After delegates voted on the framework agreement Sunday, Schulz promised to wrest further important concessions in the next stage of talks. [...]

If the grand coalition fails, the populists could point to the inability of centrist parties to achieve anything substantial. But if it succeeds, it could fuel the argument that nothing will change in Berlin, despite social upheaval over migration and globalization. The AfD would also gain important symbolic power as the largest opposition party. In parliamentary sessions, it would be the first to speak after the governing coalition, and it would chair parliamentary committees as well, possibly including the budgetary committee—the most important in the Bundestag.

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Political Critique: Corbyn can kick off a revolution among Europe’s political elites – an interview with Michael Hartmann

How many people make up the elite of a country? 

About 2000 people.

How accessible is the elite?

It really depends on which elite-branch and country we are talking about. For instance, in Germany, 75% of the chief economic officers who are part of the economic elite stem from the richest 4% of the population. Among German political elites, on the other hand, the figure drops down to 50%. In France the numbers are slightly different and rise to 90 and 60%, respectively. This implies, on the one hand, that the economic elite is more exclusive than the political one, generally speaking. On the other hand, it tells us that France has more “exclusive” features compared with Germany. [...]

We observed the last significant turn within elites when Thatcher took power in the UK. More specifically, at that time within the British Conservative Party the neoliberal paradigm gained traction. The transition was accompanied by a fully fledged shift in the composition of the Government’s staff. If, before Thatcher, the Labour government featured 30% of people stemming from the upper bourgeoisie, that same number reached the staggering proportion of 80%. From an ideological point of view, all other European countries subsequently followed that paradigm shift. [...]

Brexit is a symptom of the poor cohesion within the British economic elite. If compared to other economic elites in Europe, the former is the only one that has undergone a massive process of internationalisation. This dynamic created a gap between the economic elite and the conservative political ruling class. [...]

First of all, it makes no sense to talk about a crisis within Die Linke. Secondarily, the point is that the left has to live with a substantial mutation of its electorate. Leftist parties attract young people with high levels of education, not the victims of the economic system. This truth holds for anyone: Die Linke, Sanders in the US, or Corbyn in the UK. And it creates disruptions.

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Politico: SPD’s Martin Schulz wants United States of Europe by 2025

“I want there to be a constitutional treaty to create a federal Europe,” Schulz said Thursday during a speech at a party convention in Berlin, as he urged his party to clear the way for talks with Angela Merkel’s conservatives which could lead to a new German government and put an end to an unprecedented coalition deadlock.

The drafting process of such a constitutional treaty, Schulz said, should involve citizens across the Continent. Once drafted, it would “be presented to the member states, and those who are against it will simply leave the EU,” he said, adding that Poland was already systematically undermining European values and Hungary was increasingly isolating itself. [...]

Asked about Schulz’s speech at a press conference in Berlin, Merkel declined to respond to the specifics of his proposal but said the EU should focus on fixing its “weaknesses” and improving its “ability to act.”

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Politico: Cross-party support grows for Merkel minority government

From the ranks of the SPD, which would provide external support for the conservative chancellor without re-joining her government as the junior coalition partner, one party official described such an arrangement as “far from ideal, but the lesser evil.” A minority government would avoid a snap election and also avoid angering grassroots SPD supporters who deeply dislike the idea of another grand coalition, the official said. [...]

However, SPD chief Martin Schulz was quick to announce Monday that the party would not reprise its role of the past four years and would instead not “shy away” from another general election.

That triggered a major backlash inside his own party, where a growing number of lawmakers are worried that a snap election — and the spectacle of Germany’s two biggest parties in disarray — would risk an even more disastrous result for the SPD and further strengthen the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). [...]

At the same time, however, CDU officials in the Bundestag point out privately that a minority government would allow the longtime chancellor to fill all available cabinet posts with people from conservatives ranks, which could help her to silence a growing chorus of critical voices from inside her bloc.

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The New York Review of Books: Germany’s Election: Choosing the Unspeakable

The apparent calm of the election belied the real concerns of the German public, concerns evident in the election results. Merkel began her campaign late and then barely campaigned; she gave plain speeches that rarely mentioned her opponents. To the eyes of the public, the two major parties seemed nearly identical. This provided the AfD with an opening to be the opposition. If people turned to a party that said the unspeakable, it was partly because very speakable things weren’t being said at all. [...]

“Merkel and Schulz: they agree,” read a headline after the one TV debate of the election season, in which the two candidates seemed to bat canned answers back and forth. The four other parties that will enter the Bundestag, or Parliament—in addition to the AfD, the economically liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Greens, and the far-left Die Linke—were relegated to a follow-up show the next evening. Merkel and Schulz barely discussed the eurozone. Education and NATO spending did not come up. [...]

The central issue of the campaign, migration, barely came up at all in most of the speeches by Merkel and Schulz. Merkel herself hardly mentioned the subject in her campaign, as if hoping the issue would simply go away. The CDU’s “strategy was to not talk about it, hoping in vain that voters wouldn’t realize it,” Dr. Timo Lochocki of the German Marshall Fund told me. 

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Political Critique: This German election marks a tidal change in European politics

Germany voted. Almost 13% of the electors chose the Alternative für Deutschland. Another populist victory, another success for the right wing, as so many before since last June’s fateful Brexit referendum. With a voter participation rate of over 76%, we cannot even say that people didn’t care. Voters cared, they were fed up, and disillusioned with the established parties. 13 % demonstrated that they want the future of their country in the hands of a racist, reactionary troop. [...]

But while the AfD was celebrating its victory –greeted by 1000 protesters outside their election night party – the CDU and SPD were starting to grasp their losses. The SPD has suffered its worst election result in its history with 20,5% of the vote. The biggest loser of the last four years, however, seems to be the CDU/CSU coalition. Their results dropped by over 8% compared to the 2013 elections. [...]

As a leader of the opposition, Martin Schulz could show where his power truly lies: as an experienced European politician. A freed Schulz could defend the values of an open-minded continent in the face of xenophobic hatred.

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Katoikos: Schulz’s original sin

“The initial enthusiasm around Martin Schulz’s candidacy was the result of two facts. He never took part in a grand coalition and he inspired a great hope,” commented SPD MEP Tiemo Wölken during a debate on the future of the French-German motor for the EU after the German elections, held at the European Parliamentary Association in Strasbourg on Wednesday 13 September.

“Schulz disappointed the hope he inspired. Europe and its future should have been more at the centre of his campaign. Who if not the former president of the European Parliament is the most legitimate person to talk about Europe?” continued Wölken.

Schulz missed a great opportunity when he chose not to champion openly for “red-red-green” – the name normally given to a coalition between the SPD, the Linke and the Greens. This platform is the only one capable of proposing an “alternative” vision to the one of Merkel’s CDU. And this time, more than in the past, the three parties’ programmes had enough similarities to converge around a common project.  [...]

In this regard, the SPD proposes the creation of an economic government for the eurozone, endowed with a budget financed by taxes on the financial markets, which “were saved with public money and have not even paid a part of the costs for this intervention”. This plan is much more ambitious than the monetary fund Merkel promised Emmanuel Macron.

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The Conversation: German election: Merkel safe but don’t underestimate the right-wing populists

When it comes to junior coalition partners, there is plenty of choice. The leftist party Die Linke, the Greens, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) are all expected to secure the 5% of votes needed to enter parliament. Merkel has ruled out working with Die Linke and the AfD but has kept all other options open. [...]

A growing part of the German population feels left behind and disillusioned with mainstream politics. In this context, a vote for a party with a populist anti-establishment and anti-immigration stance is a small but powerful sign of political protest. One of the last polls before the election predicts that the AfD results will be in the low double-digit range. I think we must brace ourselves for the possibility that the AfD will be the third strongest party in the German Bundestag. [...]

Behind the scenes, though, she has made a number of concessions. While she continues to insist that Germany has to welcome refugees, she is now keen to add that asylum seekers from so-called “safe countries of origin” have to be deported as fast as possible , and she wants to prevent further refugee flows. [...]

It’s hard not to think that Schulz and his party colleagues attack Merkel to divert attention away from their own problems. Like other social democratic parties in Europe, the SPD is experiencing an existential crisis. In 2003, the SPD introduced a series of austerity measures that have contributed to the social and economic marginalisation of millions of people. Although Schulz promised to rescind some of these reforms, many people feel that the proposed changes do not go far enough to justify Schulz’s claim that he stands for social justice.

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The Atlantic: The Merkel Effect

2017 was expected to be Merkel’s toughest campaign yet: to start, it’s the year when Europe’s far-right populist parties, including the anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), have sought to showcase their electoral strength amid a growing backlash against globalization and Europe’s refugee crisis. When Merkel announced her reelection bid last December, she did so battered by more than a year of tough criticism over her open-door policy toward refugees, and facing a certain degree of voter fatigue after hitting her 12th year in office.

And then came Merkel’s main challenger, Martin Schulz, a political “newcomer” from the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) initially lauded as a charismatic and effective contrast to Merkel. After Schulz entered the race in January, support for her party dropped into the low 30s, putting her dead even with the SPD for the first time in more than five years. The German political world was abuzz over the “Schulz effect”: the new candidate’s widespread appeal and ability to take on Merkel to give the country new blood in the chancellery. “We were getting a little bit afraid and uneasy at the beginning of the year when Martin Schulz was introduced as a candidate,” Peter Beyer, a member of the Bundestag from Merkel’s CDU, told me. “The polls were completely different … he was a star.” [...]

What’s more, since the SPD is currently serving in a “grand coalition” with the CDU in Germany’s parliament, Schulz has struggled to explain just how his party differs from Merkel’s and why voters should change the status quo for something that appears on its face relatively similar. “Because the Social Democrats are part of that coalition government, that is always a very difficult situation,” Alexander Mauss, a Berlin-based political pollster, told me. “You can’t really oppose the politics or the policy of the governing coalition because you are part of it.”

That challenge for Schulz was apparent in three state elections across Germany in the spring, all of which were seen as potential bellwethers for September, and all of which delivered victories for the CDU (and by extension for Merkel). In Saarland, a tiny western state along the French border that voted in March, Merkel’s party expected to face a tough challenge, but instead gained 5 points over its previous performance there. And in May, the CDU ousted SPD governments in both Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state and an SPD stronghold. “For us it was extremely good to learn that we are able to actually win again, elections on the Länder [state] level,” Beyer, who hails from North Rhine-Westphalia, said.

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The Conversation: How Angela Merkel has become – and remains – one of the world’s most successful political leaders

Internationally, she is renowned as the leader of Europe who seemingly single-handedly rehabilitated Germany’s international reputation by welcoming refugees with the catchphrase “we can do it”. With electoral pressure building, however, she publicly distanced herself from this stance as the CDU/CSU party faithful sent back the message that they were not so sure.

Now, by accepting their demand for a Bundestag vote, she has outflanked Martin Schulz’s Social Democrats by securing the passage of marriage equality as one of her government’s achievements, despite openly voting against it herself. The issue has been effectively neutralised.

Before marriage equality had arisen as an issue, Merkel had also done the same with immigration and the hot-button issue of asylum seekers. As one report put it, Merkel’s “summer of welcome” that saw asylum seekers march across Europe to reach the safe-haven of Germany has been followed by a long winter of conservative base-pleasing changes to the country’s political asylum laws. These have made it much tougher to successfully claim refugee status and much easier for unsuccessful asylum seekers to be deported to countries such as Afghanistan. [...]

When called on by the press to explain her vote, Merkel again avoided emotive discussion or the appearance of deeply felt conviction. She said simply that the measure did not, to her mind, conform to Article Six of Germany’s constitutional protection of marriage. [...]

With recent polls placing the CDU vote at 40%, and the SPD languishing on 23% (with the AfD slumping to 7%), Merkel is looking comfortable. Barring the unforeseen, Merkel seems likely to win her fourth election victory looking like a centrist, in coalition with social democrats, but governing as a conservative.

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Politico: Merkel’s thunderbolt is starting gun for European defense drive

What she is doing is making it clear, following the election of resolutely pro-European President Emmanuel Macron in France, that the answer to increasing transatlantic and cross-Channel uncertainty should be to strengthen the EU, shore up the eurozone and take the next steps in building a European security and defense union. [...]

This positions her to run a resolutely pro-EU election campaign, as Macron did in France. In doing so, she’s robbing the mantle from her strongest opponent — Social Democratic Party leader Martin Schulz, who has the aura of “Mr. Europe” after his time as European Parliament president — and rubbing salt into the SPD’s divisions over greater defense spending and a more active military role for Germany.

She is also telling Macron that he will find a willing co-leader in building the EU into a more effective player in international security and diplomacy. And she is charging Trump and May a public political price for their countries’ rejection of multilateral governance. [...]

But the U.K.’s looming departure is a severe blow to German interests, and Merkel’s message to Britain is that it cannot expect to preserve the trade benefits of EU membership without abiding by the club’s rules. It comes as May has been trying to rescue her faltering general election campaign with a fresh round of Europe-bashing, suggesting the other 27 EU members are ganging up to punish Britain.

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Political Critique: No end in sight for German exceptionalism

The open question concerning Schulz is whether his leftist rhetoric is an elaborate campaign act or if there is real substance to it. Schulz claims, with some irony, that he wants to push back the ‘neoliberalisation’ of the welfare state even though it was the Social Democratic Party under Gerhard Schröder which introduced the Agenda2010 reforms, cutting back the welfare state and increasing flexibility in the labour market. Schulz’s political role during this period can indeed be seen as rather ambivalent. On the one hand he has always been known as a fierce critic of neoliberal policy. On the other, he has argued in favor of Agenda2010, calling the reforms a necessary sacrifice for the sake of future generations. Not only this, Schulz is a member of Seeheimer Kreis, a conservative group within the SPD, which has supported various processes of marketisation. As a result he has been continuously accused of populism and political opportunism.

Today, Schulz’s agenda comprises free daycare for children, extensions of unemployment benefits and the introduction of a universal citizen health insurance plan. At a European level however, there is justifiable doubt as to whether a social democratic legislation would put an end to German austerity politics in particular. When it comes to EU policy there is little to no difference between the SPD and CDU and it is highly unlikely that Germany would deviate from its exceptionalist, “Pro German Europism.” More probably, Schulz would continue to reject any substantial changes to the EU, such as a communitarisation of European public debt, moderate inflation, let alone a permanent fiscal transfer. In the midst of the Greek debt crisis in 2015, Schulz even called for the elected Syriza government to be replaced by technocrat rule until stability was restored. [...]

For while Merkel is being called “Volksverräter” (a traitor of the people) by the far-right, she is also seen as “the leader of the free world” by many more. This is especially true following UK’s Brexit vote, Trump’s election as president of the US and in a climate of ascendency for fascist oriented groups. For her supporters, Merkel stands for rational and pragmatic political decisions, presented in a soothing manner, almost a German manifestation of Margaret Thatcher’s TINA principle, ‘There is no Alternative.’ Confronted with shifting baselines in international politics, many people prefer to stick to the status quo, fearing that things can only get worse.

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Jacobin Magazine: After Tragedy and Farce: Martin Schulz

Schulz’s sudden arrival as a major national figure reflects an important change in SPD electoral strategy, as it attempts to replicate the personality-cult politics found in the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. Clearly looking for the meme magic they’ve watched galvanize the youth vote abroad, Schulz and company have imported North American campaign strategies in what can only be described as a case of combined and uneven development in the field of communications.

This scheme is made all the more remarkable by the fact that Schulz himself is not particularly remarkable. Unlike the Obamas or Trudeaus he’s trying to imitate, Schulz has neither youth nor charm. His impromptu remarks and impassioned yet vague paeans to social justice often come across as scripted. For the most part, he is a regular Third Way Social Democrat who perfectly illustrates modern German political culture’s “moratorium on charisma.”[...]

In 2003, he came to international attention in an incident that touched the highest levels of European Union politics: Schulz heckled then-Italian president Silvio Berlusconi during a speech in Strasbourg, raising potential conflicts of interest related to the Italian’s vast media empire. Visibly offended, Berlusconi retorted that Schulz would play a good Kapo (a concentration camp guard) in a Holocaust movie. The ensuing spat between the two governments ultimately prompted Berlusconi to personally apologize to then-German chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Although little more than a historical footnote, the incident has come in handy for Schulz a decade later, deployed as evidence of his tough, yet decidedly liberal pro-European stance. [...]

As the SPD shifted to the center, it began to attract a different kind of member. The generation of politicians now running the party are not the local peace activists, union militants, or leftist students that once characterized it, but political opportunists who began their careers precisely when large chunks of the SPD’s left wing were abandoning the party for Die Linke. These new leaders were not trained in Brandt’s SPD or in the social movements but learned politics in student parliaments and party factions. Their strategy amounts to electoral logics and tactical alliances; unfortunately, Schulz shares this orientation.

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Politico: 3 takeaways from the Schulz coronation

On Sunday, at an extraordinary conference of the Social Democrats (SPD) in Berlin, Schulz was formally made party chief and named the SPD candidate in the coming election, winning 100 percent of the vote. [...]

The goodwill among the party faithful follows a wave of good news that is known as the “Schulz effect” among Social Democrats in the German capital: Less than eight weeks after it was announced that Schulz rather than Gabriel would challenge Merkel, the SPD have gained more than 10 percent in polls, coming within striking distance of the chancellorship. [...]

Schulz offered a glimpse of how he wants to present himself as a candidate: Pro-EU, taking a clear stand against nationalism and populism, and showing respect for his political opponents. In short: to campaign as the anti-Trump. [...]

Schulz is a more emotive speaker than Merkel and often brings up his own back story to connect with voters. On Sunday, he spoke at length about his upbringing as “the fifth child of simple and very decent people.” He spoke about overcoming an alcohol problem — and how the party saved him. “I had lost my direction in life and my life was about to go off course. But then, I got a second chance … thanks to the [SPD youth organization] Jusos in my hometown.”

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