openDemocracy: How Mario Centeno could change Europe

Two years ago Mario Centeno was yet another finance minister of the Eurozone trying to convince his European counterparts that austerity was not working. Portugal was emerging from a severe economic crisis and an equally challenging bailout. Pensions were slashed, education suffered a 23 per cent cut and unemployment reached 17.5 per cent in 2013. The former centre-right government zealously followed the treatment recommended by the IMF and the European Union. But the results were far from satisfactory. Deep cuts were not after all the answer to improve our economy and the life of our citizens. However, things changed dramatically when Antonio Costa´s government assumed office in 2015. After finding an unorthodox formula to govern, the socialists showed Europe that there is an alternative: the solution lies, politically, in reaching broader consensus. Economically, in boosting demand, not suppressing it. [...]

Mr. Centeno’s metamorphosis from outsider to European leader started when Portugal left the EU´s excessive deficit procedure in May. The decision gave Portugal margin to ease austerity and to push away the threat of future sanctions. The decisive moment for Mr. Centeno, however, came the day after. Mr. Schäuble, then Germany´s finance minister, called him the “Ronaldo of Ecofin” and praised him in public. Many understood Mr. Schäuble words as an endorsement. However, few believed Portugal´s finance minister could be on his away to replace Jeroen Dijsselbloem. [...]

Every leadership position in Europe is chaired by the European People´s Party. The exception is the Eurogroup. And there was a gentlemen agreement between conservatives and socialists ensuring that the Eurogroup should be presided by the latter. There was also consensus around the idea that the President of the Eurogroup should come from a smaller country. Another decisive factor was the electoral calendar in Italy – elections will take place during the Spring – and the political instability in Spain. Nonetheless, Portugal´s role as Europe´s success case was a key factor. Whether we like it or not, economic results determine the perception of politicians and governments. And financial stability in a country used to the contrary is a sign of competence. And a synonym of political success, even if the results in other areas are not favourable at all.  

read the article

Social Europe: Pasok: New Leadership, New Discourse To Revive Greek Social Democracy

Even worse, in the 2015 elections when Syriza, the leftist party, won power there were two elections in six months. PASOK did very badly: 4.6% in the first and 6.28% in the latest elections. There we had the really downward route. From 44% we came back first to 13%, which incidentally is the start of the rot.

Now PASOK scores in single digits. It even went down to less than 5%. At that point, it was the seventh party in the Greek Parliament after always being the first or the second. Now it’s the fourth party in the Greek Parliament with 6.28%. It’s been a steep decline electorally since 2012.

I think that the main reasons for the decline have to do with two linked factors. The first is that PASOK has been for 30 years almost continuously in power or in a position to be the first or second party, so very much involved in decision making in Greece. This has taken its toll. But most importantly, this has taken the biggest psychological toll. Then it got translated into electoral terms with the advent of the crisis because for good or less good reasons it was perceived as responsible. Not immediately because it must be noted that the crisis in Greece only really began in 2009. [...]

It’s not only the personalities that are going to change. The main thing is that in light of the crisis, in light of the more general problem also of the European social democracy, there’s a big effort to change the propositions, the discourse, the main attributes of these parties. That’s the way the reconnection is perceived. Also through, as you know, the classical social democratic way of winning mayoralities in some towns, by using local connections, by trying to be more vocal in parliament etc. But the main thing is the new leadership, the new image of rejuvenation of the party and the new political discourse of this party.

read the article or listen to the podcast

Political Critique: Refugees in Greece. Traumas of Babel

Over the last decade many social and community centres have been created or expanded in response to Greece’s economic crisis. Today unemployment in the country remains at 25%, rising to over 50% among young people. Meanwhile as a result of austerity measures, pensions have been halved, and salaries in state jobs have been cut by 40%. Then on top of it all there is the infamous refugee crisis. [...]

Babel’s individual approach towards each newcomer creates trust. “This is what they have most lacked”, Janis continues. Nonetheless, he explains, it is difficult to establish this kind of relationship, as many refugees have never experienced psychological and psychiatric assistance before. In Babel, they try to go beyond the idea of refugees as a weak group of endangered people, unable to act and make decisions by themselves. [...]

The situation in Germany is a useful point of contrast. Mental health care through psychotherapy aimed at the control of PTSD (stress, anxiety, depressions and traumas) is an important part of integration activities there. Greece, on the other hand, suffers from a lack of professionals, and for this reason, an increasing number of pilot programmes aim to educate the refugees as equivalent psycho-social consultants who can help other asylum seekers or persons granted asylum though group therapy. “The problem is that most of them live in isolation in camps, out of society, so they hardly ever meet local people,” says Janis. [...]

It might sound surprising but in the experts’ opinion it is single men who are the most endangered group, as organizations and community centres pay the least attention to them. These are considered people who are not affected by such problems, or who can solve them on their own.

read the article

Al Jazeera: Imagining a post-Merkel Europe

Then there is the added Merkel factor: During Merkel's 12 year-reign, not a single coalition partner has emerged strengthened out of a coalition with the chancellor. So, small wonder that the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the SPD are both traumatised by dramatic electoral defeats following an alliance with Merkel, and are very hesitant to enter another coalition with her. [...]

The bigger danger is that the compromises necessary to form governing coalitions, in a more fragmented party system, will not lead to the necessary reforms that Germany needs to undertake, in the face of the digital transformation of its industrial base, competition from the US and China, as well as the demographic strain on its social systems. [...]

To be sure, Merkel's experience and stature as a crisis manager would be a big loss. During the Ukraine crisis, her political standing and her ability to bridge the divide between anti-Putin and more accommodating forces within the EU were key to managing the situation. This allowed Europe to play a crucial role in the crisis. [...]

The biggest foreign policy mistake a new German government could make would be to close the door on Macron's proposals for reforming the eurozone and the EU. In Germany, the only two parties clearly positioned against Macron's eurozone proposals are the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the FDP.

read the article

BBC4 Analysis: Europe Unbound

Edward Stourton asks how the European Union might change after Britain leaves. "The wind is back in Europe's sails", according to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. In September, in his annual address to the European Parliament, he set out a bold dream for the future. Soon afterwards it was echoed by another, this time from French President Emmanuel Macron who declared that "the only path that assures our future is the rebuilding of a Europe that is sovereign, united and democratic". Amongst the proposals that the two leaders put forward were a European budget run by a European finance minister, an enlargement of the Schengen passport-free travel zone, and much closer collaboration on tax, defence, and a host of other issues.

But at present, the European project faces huge challenges. Britain is about to leave the EU, whilst Catalonia's bid for independence is causing turmoil in Spain. In the face of such developments, how realistic are the grand visions that Europe's leaders have for the future of the continent?

listen to the podcast

Social Europe: No More Crises As Opportunities: An Answer To Yanis Varoufakis

The concept of crises engendering opportunities for the “rebirth” of Europe should have died with the Greek experience in the most dramatic phase of which Yanis Varoufakis took an active part. Having worked with former Prime Minister George Papandreou before embarking on his “radical Left” experiment, which nearly cost Greece its place in the Eurozone, Varoufakis should have learned that courting the abyss and generating crises is never a good way to change what needs to be changed. [...]

Varoufakis uses the Catalan crisis as a mere illustration for his favorite topic, which he espoused after he quit the Syriza government and denounced its policies: the reconfiguration of the European Union with “radical” changes like “fiscal autonomy”. He now has another radical idea: fostering regional governance (that’s where Catalonia comes in handy) and even creating a “Code of Conduct for secession”, facilitating regions all over Europe (why should one stop in Spain?) to become autonomous. This is presented as a progressive idea. In fact it is, to my eyes, both a misrepresentation of reality and a rallying call for nationalism, which, for all non-radical socialists, and a majority of democrats, constitutes the opposite of progressiveness.

The Catalan question flared up not on the basis of the economic situation in Spain but because of a combination of political mismanagement, or pure populism, by both sides of the conflict. The right-wing government of Mr. Rajoy challenged the special regime for Catalonia established under the socialist government of Mr. Zapatero, tolerated then disparaged a first referendum on independence, never treated the Catalan government as equal, constantly sought legal remedies to political and societal issues and opted for repression where it should have opted for dialogue. Still independence is at best a 50-50 option for the Catalan people and not an inescapable conclusion. On the other hand, the current Catalan government has been elected on an “independentist” agenda, but it overplayed its hand and misjudged both the Spanish environment (although it provides about 20% of Spanish output, Catalonia is only one of 17 regions) and the European drive for unity and integration. [...]

“Regionalization” is not the answer, nor do we need a crisis as dramatic as Catalonia’s to understand this. Regionalism is already a part of the European project – Varoufakis gets the relationship between Spain’s central government and Catalonia’s regional government or Barcelona’s City Hall completely wrong and of course there could be no such thing as a “secession (of rich regions like Veneto or Catalonia) with an obligation to maintain fiscal transfers” (to the poorer regions), since the main reason for secession would be to stop paying for others. From both a political and a legal point of view it is obvious that the EU framework allows for many types of regional settlement (ranging from advanced autonomy to federalism) other than separatism. The non-negotiable and unilateral “secession” of Catalonia evokes the populist themes of Brexit much more than the nuances of a regionalist settlement.

read the article 

Quartz: Germany and France thwarted far right populism—why did the US and UK fall to them?

The disruptions of the past decade, from the global financial crisis, to Brexit, and Trump, have combined to thoroughly derail the American and British governance models. In the face of crumbling infrastructure and public services, egregious inequality and stagnant policy-making, America’s reflex belief in eternal self-renewal appears somewhere between dangerously complacent and recklessly delusional. At least Britain, for its part, acknowledges that a stiff upper lip won’t suffice to salvage the country from its Brexit debacle. What is most worrying is the utter disconnect between the world-beating social and entrepreneurial dynamism of America and Britain and their total lack of plan to translate this into an inclusive future. There is simply no evidence that either country is ever going to get its act together again, period. [...]

This is the kind of long-term agenda—backed by action—that is simply unthinkable in the American and British systems today. And the reason for it is as simple as it is profound: Continental Europe actually has functional government institutions. While America and Britain are content to celebrate the theater of democratic campaigns and politics, France and Germany not only have more educated and informed voters but the candidates they have to choose from actually have experience governing cities, provinces and ministries. Equal if not more important is that they also have also strong civil services and well-funded public agencies that are seriously focused on how to expand the availability of affordable housing, create more jobs in urban services, and other long-term priorities.

read the article

Al Jazeera: Greece and economic recovery: Fake news in action

Indeed, now into its eighth year, Greece remains entirely dependent on international bailouts (three bailouts involving the European Union and the International Monetary Fund have been arranged since 2010), has lost a quarter of its GDP with no realistic expectations of recovering it for decades to come, experiences unemployment levels which have oscillated between a high 27.8 percent (in July 2013) and a low 21.2 percent (in June 2017), and has seen the standard of living decline to 1960s levels.

Worse, Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio has exploded since the start of the bailout programs, rising from 128 percent in 2010 to over 185 percent in 2017, and, with no debt relief in sight, the small Mediterranean nation has become truly a permanent debt colony inside the world's richest region. In the meantime, a mass exodus of young and educated people has been in motion for several years now (youth unemployment rate in Greece stands currently at 43.3 percent), a process that is bound to have long-term effects on demographic trends and a significant impact on future economic developments. [...]

First, the actual facts about the broken promises and the continuous lies of and the dissemination of fake news by the Syriza government. For starters, not only did Alexis Tsipras deceive the Greek people by winning the popular vote with passionate pleas that, if elected, he would do away with international bailouts, secure a debt write-off, and put an end to the vicious cycle of debt-austerity-recession-unemployment, but ended up signing a third bailout agreement with the country's international creditors and has even consented to the enforcement of Procrustean economics, which entail additional cuts in excess of five billion euros (about $6bn), even deeper pension reductions, and the attainment of outrageously high primary surplus targets - well into 2020. 

read the article

Politico: Merkel may be leading, but who’s following?

Internationally, Berlin has increased its engagement — in Mali, the Mediterranean and elsewhere — stepping up where others have stepped down. Perhaps ironically, the nation responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the 20th century has — for many — become the defender of global progress in the 21st. [...]

Take the never-ending eurozone crisis. Merkel’s dictum — “if the euro fails, Europe fails” — has remained Berlin’s tautological reply to a perpetual crisis in Greece and beyond. She certainly deserves credit for defending the euro; not every call for reforms is objectionable. But Berlin’s single-minded insistence on austerity and structural reforms is as one-sided as it is self-referential.

“Germans tend to view economics as part of moral philosophy,” former Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti liked to quip. The consequences for Europe, however, have been anything but amusing. The German obsession with the thrifty “Swabian housewife” has condemned a Continent in dire need of investment to years of economic stagnation.

Irrespective of its intentions, Berlin’s leadership in managing the crisis has not united the European Union but only deepened its fault lines. Even as southern member countries struggle with record unemployment and waves of populist unrest, Germany is booming. [...]

But there is a difference between political leadership and dogmatic isolation. In the two years since Merkel’s optimistic “Wir schaffen das” (“We can do it”), Berlin has not only failed to bring about a common European response to the challenges of migration; it has stopped pretending to try. [...]

Merkel’s view is, in fact, shared by her fellow citizens, whose appetite for global leadership remains limited. Berlin’s de facto dominance in Europe notwithstanding, Germans are as reluctant as ever to embrace a prominent international role. According to recent polls, only 42 percent support increasing the country’s minute defense budget, 41 percent favor a more robust engagement abroad, and only 38 percent would like to take a stronger military stance against the Islamic State.

read the article 

Katoikos: Deciphering Europe’s ‘populist moment’

Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau claim that “populism is not an ideology or a political regime and cannot be attributed to a specific programme. It is compatible with different forms of government. It is a way of doing politics which can take various forms, depending on the time and the place. It emerges when one aims at building a new subject of collective action – the people – capable of reconfiguring a social order experienced as unfair.” [...]

Moreover, Mouffe sees this emergence of populist parties as a reaction to ‘post-politics’, i.e. the blurring of the traditional political frontiers between right and left and the embrace of the idea that “There Is No Alternative” (TINA) to the neo-liberal world.

The spread of free trade, a product of post-war globalisation, was encouraged as a way to prevent future wars and keep the peace. Michael Hirsch, a former national editor for Politico Magazine, points out the fact that it made conditions more equal between countries, but at the cost of creating more inequality within countries. “In the aggregate global trade does bring growth – but in the richer countries, that growth has been largely captured by elites and white-collar workers, and it often comes at the expense of people who actually make the things that get traded.” [...]

The predominance of neo-liberal ideology has contributed to a situation in which the left and the right are divided primarily over the question of culture. Analysing campaign and survey data at the London School of Economics and Political Science, researcher Sara Hobolt found that the divide between the winners and losers of globalisation was a key driver of the vote in the Brexit referendum. Concerns about immigration and the loss of a distinct national identity were issues that clearly split the Leave and Remain camps in Britain. [...]

To save the EU from the growing political anger of the Europeans and to avoid the contagion of Euroscepticism, politicians will need to address current economic and political challenges, trying to reconcile radically different views on the appropriate scope and depth of integration across and within member states.

read the article