The Atlantic: Greek Elections Close a Chapter, but Not in Europe

Here in Greece, a cycle is ending, and the country is returning to political normality and stability. On Sunday, it will hold national elections—its first since exiting a bailout regime last year—in which Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s center-right New Democracy party, a pillar of Greece’s pre-bailout establishment, is expected to defeat the left-wing populist Syriza party, led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. Syriza came to power in 2015 demanding an end to the crippling austerity Greece was forced to undertake as a condition of its bailout, but ended up having to implement it anyway—at the behest of the European Union and the country’s other creditors. [...]

In Italy, for instance, few days go by without Matteo Salvini, the country’s right-wing populist interior minister and the man widely seen as a leader-in-waiting, saying that Italy doesn’t want to “meet the same fate as Greece.” In Salvini’s rhetoric, winding up like Greece means ceding national sovereignty to the baddies of the European Union, who in turn would impose an emasculating austerity regime on Italy. His party has long flirted with the idea of exiting the euro, or even creating temporary IOUs as a parallel currency—a notion that fires up the base, but is not likely to happen because it’s illegal and would cause the single currency to collapse. [...]

Europe’s handling of the Greek debt crisis also haunted talks last month about creating a common European budget for handling moments of extreme financial stress, something French President Emmanuel Macron has been pushing for, but which Germany opposes. That’s because in much of the German political and popular imagination, Greece has been the ultimate example of a spendthrift country whose soaring debts got it into trouble and that required the thrifty creditor Germany to solve its problems; never mind that for years before the crisis, Germany benefited from Greece buying German goods with money borrowed from German banks.

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The Guardian: Tsipras faces fight to stay in power after EU elections mauling Inbox x

After suffering an unexpectedly heavy defeat at home, Tsipras’s Syriza party was also resoundingly rebuffed by diaspora Greeks, it emerged on Thursday. With 100% of the vote counted, the country’s interior ministry reported that 33.9% had cast ballots in favour of the centre-right New Democracy party in contrast to 15.3% for Syriza. [...]

Asked why the electorate seemed bent on punishing the ruling party he responded: “It’s a little bit of everything; what has happened to the middle class, the [strictures of] bailout oversight, their style in power, a know-all approach and general over-assuredness.”

Diaspora Greeks from America to Australia, who also participated in the European poll, are believed to have been particularly negatively swayed by perceived concessions over Macedonia: in exchange for the neighbouring country agreeing to change its name, the leftist government recognised a Macedonian language and ethnicity which has left many enraged. Although applauded internationally, the name-change deal was aggressively derided by the conservatives as part of concerted efforts to appeal to nationalist voters globally. [...]

“One of the biggest reasons for Syriza’s defeat is the middle class,” said Kaki Balli, editor of the Sunday Avgi paper which reflects Syriza’s views. “Greece, unlike other European countries, has always had a lot of class mobility. Given that every Greek wants to belong to the middle class they have been lured by the promise of less taxation and those are promises that New Democracy is making.”

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Social Europe: Why Alexis Tsipras is still not a social democrat

Recently, Alexis Tsipras, Greece’s prime minister and leader of the populist left-wing SYRIZA, which forms a coalition with the right-wing populist ANEL (Independent Greeks) party, has been trying to approach European social democratic leaders in a strategy of opening up to centre-left forces. Indeed, the transformation of Tsipras, from a political leader who criticized the European Union, the “old” parties, including the social democrats, and the Troika (IMF, ECB, EC), to a prime minister who agreed and implemented the third memorandum of understanding in Greece with absolute prudence and agreement with the lenders, constitutes an interesting case study. But this shift should come as no surprise. The reason is specific and related to the very notion of populism; it also tells us whether Tsipras is a social democrat or not. [...]

Apart from cynicism, the radical left-right coalition government is also distinguished by another populist feature: “liberal authoritarian” leadership that undermines democratic institutions such as the rule of law. On the one hand, the government has criticized the independent judiciary for judging certain executive acts as unconstitutional, such as the proposed law on national channels – whose main aim was to reduce pluralism – that limited the licenses to four while the digital broadcasting system could emit more than ten. The restriction of pluralism was precisely the goal of a government that was finally reined back by judicial forces. The attack on the institutions of justice and the media continues even today and undermines the rule of law and democracy itself. [...]

EU social democratic decision-makers may consider that the imminent rescue of a minimum number of MEPs via the participation of SYRIZA members could be a solution to the prolonged crisis in social democratic political identity. But this means the legitimization of social democracy as such only through numbers and not the elaboration of values-based policies. It is more a process of echoing Tsipras’s populist discourse rather than undergoing a radical injection of progressive social values. Social democracy can only overcome its crisis through working towards humanizing socio-economic reality rather than accepting a populist discourse tied to the personal aspirations of one “politician”. Thus, this leader and his party still do not have any real relation with social democracy and its values, and consequently, a possible affiliation can only be dangerous for the latter.

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Haaretz: Angela Merkel Is Losing to the Orban-Trump-Netanyahu Camp

It was a showdown that Merkel, backed up by Germany’s economic might and a near consensus among EU leaders, was winning. In early 2015, she visited Budapest and forced Orban to cancel a tax his government had levied on German companies. But two weeks later, the Russian president visited Budapest as well, and Merkel should have read the signs. She was about to make a series of decisions that would lead to her current predicament.

Throughout 2015, she led the EU’s tough line against the cash-strapped Syriza government in Greece. Merkel insisted on severe austerity measures in return for a bailout. She broke Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, despite the referendum in which a large majority of Greek voters rejected the EU’s terms. The price was bolstering her domineering and coercive image, and that of the EU. A year later, things would end very differently in another referendum. [...]

In 2016, in a series of meetings with British Prime Minister David Cameron, Merkel refused to grant any concessions on the EU’s freedom-of-movement principle for immigrants. Without her support, Cameron had no chance with the EU, and though he continued to support remaining in the union, immigration was to become a main issue used by Brexit-supporters, motivating 52 percent of British voters to support leaving on June 23. [...]

In three years, Merkel has gone from leader of Europe to being almost isolated. Even French President Emmanuel Macron, nominally her ally, has been discreetly distancing himself. The photograph of Merkel at this month’s G-7 summit confronting Trump made liberal hearts soar across the Western world, but it also underlined how the West is now divided into two camps. And the Orban-Trump-Netanyahu camp is swiftly gaining ground.

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Al Jazeera: Greek PM Tsipras survives no confidence vote over Macedonia deal

The coalition's junior partner - the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a right-wing party - says it opposes the deal but only one of its MPs backed the censure motion in parliament. Panos Kammenos, leader of ANEL and defence minister, subsequently kicked the lawmaker out of the party.

The motion was brought by the conservative New Democracy party which accused the government of making too many concessions over the agreement which will eventually see the small country -  which declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 - renamed the Republic of North Macedonia. [...]

"It not only includes a compound name with a geographic qualifier, used erga omnes, but also sets as a condition a change of the constitutional name by which the country has been recognised by 140 countries. It includes a constitutional change to eradicate every irredentist term in their constitution," Tsipras pointed out. [...]

In Skopje, there has also been a heavy backlash against the agreement, with the president declaring his refusal to sign off on the deal. The agreement must clear the hurdles of parliamentary ratification, a referendum in September and a constitutional amendment. 

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Politico: Macedonia name deal is only end of beginning

Broadly speaking, there are two camps in the EU debate. One, led by France and the Netherlands, argues the bloc should focus on reforming itself after Brexit before considering new members. These countries also worry that inviting in countries from the Balkans, with its legacy of war and deep-seated problems of organized crime and corruption, would be a gift to populist opponents of the EU in next year’s European Parliament election. [...]

The pro-enlargement camp includes top European Commission officials, senior German politicians, and governments from Central and Eastern Europe. They argue the EU must keep Balkan countries in its orbit to counter increased influence in its southern backyard from rival powers. [...]

The deal is meant to finally resolve a 27-year-old dispute, which began when Macedonia seceded from the disintegrating communist Yugoslavia. Greece asserted that the new country’s name implied a claim on a region of northern Greece of the same name and also falsely laid claim to ancient Greek culture. Athens vowed to block Skopje from joining the EU and NATO until the dispute was settled. [...]

Macedonian President Ivanov could block the deal if it gets through parliament. Although he would in theory be compelled to approve it if lawmakers backed it for a second time, he could nevertheless still withhold his signature.

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Politico: Grazie Günther!

Instead of embracing the poll’s outcome, however, Tsipras fired Varoufakis. To keep the bailout funds flowing, Tsipras set about implementing everything the EU and other creditors had been demanding for months with the zeal of a convert. The reason? As tough as the bailout terms were, the alternative — default and ejection from the euro — was worse. [...]

Italians may opt to learn Greece’s lesson the hard way. If they do, there’s a good chance the euro won’t survive. Considering the difficulty Europe had coping with Greece, a country the fraction of Italy’s size, there’s little hope the common currency could withstand such a crisis.

The consequences of such a scenario would obviously be catastrophic, not least for Italy, whose savers would see the value of their assets decimated if the country reverts to the lira. Italy’s massive debt load, now at €2.4 trillion, would continue to balloon as its borrowing costs surged, assuming it could even find investors.

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Bloomberg: Tsipras Fights on All Fronts as Greece Is Back in the Spotlight

“The worst problem for Tsipras, for the government, but also for Greece is the evolving ‘rogueness’ of Turkey,” said Aristides Hatzis, a professor of law and economics at the University of Athens. “Diminishing American influence on the region is a destabilizing factor and the stakes are very high,” Hatzis said, adding that Greece is not a primary concern for Turkey, but a part of an overall plan by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to establish hegemony in the region. [...]

While “the possibility of deliberate escalation is relatively low,” there is increased concern of an accidental trigger event between the two countries, said Thanos Dokos, director-general of the Athens-based Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Greek and Turkish military ships and aircraft have always operated in close proximity, but the Turkish armed forces have been stripped of experienced officers following the 2016 coup attempt and shrinking U.S., EU and NATO influence over Ankara make outside mediation less certain in the event of an incident, he said. [...]

Any wavering of internal support could put Tsipras’s thin parliamentary majority at risk ahead of national elections scheduled for next year, a grave concern at a moment when the main opposition party, New Democracy, is leading in the polls.

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Social Europe: Why Greece Could Have Returned To Financial Markets Much Earlier

Those developments come into sharp contrast with the pursued objective of a nominal debt haircut in spring 2015 when then finance minister Yanis Varoufakis called for various changes in European monetary architecture through the issue of Eurobonds to resolve the Greek crisis. He sought a New Deal-type of solution via an international debt reduction conference reminiscent of the 1953 German arrangement of its post-war debt and perpetual bonds. All those proposals were rhetorical exercises because they shared the same fatal flaw, that is, they depended on the willingness of international lenders to concede favors without achieving any fiscal discipline on the part of the Greeks. Finally, Varoufakis and his team pushed for an unconventional double system of domestic payments with a shadow currency, contrary to ECB rules, which was massively risky for liquidity and would inevitably result in a Grexit and a return to drachma, while its possible implementation would have strained democracy in the country with unpredictable consequences. [...]

Diverting from this impassioned chapter in recent Greek history, we here highlight instead a policy lesson that was never discussed before: that back in 2015, the option of a return to international financial markets, which is now central to seizing political and economic gains, was wide open. However, blind with maximalist posturing and wasting time with vain plans, the Greek government failed to capitalize on this path because the blame was conveniently put on “others”, that is, on lenders.

In retrospect, the return to financial markets was the sensible approach to follow although it would have involved the adoption of structural adjustments dictated by the lenders. Was there an alternative path to liberate the country early on from lenders’ demands in return for their financial support lines? In my view, there was further room for maneuver through the issuance of structural adjustment-linked bonds based on policies determined by the Greek government alone.

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Atlantic Council: Moscow’s Eye Turns South

The parties across southern Europe that have sought to align themselves with Russia differ in ideology and position, but they all advocate for Russian interests, vote against common EU foreign policies, and undermine establishment parties to engender chaos and instability. For these reasons, the Kremlin has worked strategically and actively to cultivate closer relations with Europe’s emerging insurgent parties on the left and the right.

Italy is most vulnerable to Russian influence. In the past few years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has become increasingly popular among the Italian public; he is widely perceived as a strong and effective leader, the only one capable of saving Europe from the threats of Islamist terrorism and mass illegal immigration. Putin is seen by many as an adversary of the West’s “globalist elites,” and therefore a potential ally in Italy’s efforts to regain its sovereignty. [...]

M5S poses a particular danger. In the fall of 2017, it was consistently polling as the most popular party in Italy. The party’s documented pro-Kremlin stance combined with its grassroots mobilization capacity make it an especially important ally for the Kremlin, and thus a dangerous force against the EU, NATO, and the transatlantic partnership. With Italy poised for elections in early 2018, an M5S win could dramatically shift Italian foreign policy away from EU cooperation, support for common defense, and continuation of economic sanctions against Russia. [...]

But Moscow is only willing to go so far in supporting its allies. In 2015, Greece was still reeling from the economic crisis, which almost led the country to default on its debt. Alexis Tsipras, newly elected as prime minister after his party Syriza’s win in the elections, was locked in difficult negotiations with the EU over additional bailout funds. Tsipras’s government had made better relations with Russia a top priority, and that spring, Tsipras traveled to Moscow to meet with Putin. While both countries denied that the purpose of Tsipras’s visit was to request financial support, the timing raised eyebrows. Tsipras walked away empty-handed, nonetheless.

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Al Jazeera: Greece and economic recovery: Fake news in action

Indeed, now into its eighth year, Greece remains entirely dependent on international bailouts (three bailouts involving the European Union and the International Monetary Fund have been arranged since 2010), has lost a quarter of its GDP with no realistic expectations of recovering it for decades to come, experiences unemployment levels which have oscillated between a high 27.8 percent (in July 2013) and a low 21.2 percent (in June 2017), and has seen the standard of living decline to 1960s levels.

Worse, Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio has exploded since the start of the bailout programs, rising from 128 percent in 2010 to over 185 percent in 2017, and, with no debt relief in sight, the small Mediterranean nation has become truly a permanent debt colony inside the world's richest region. In the meantime, a mass exodus of young and educated people has been in motion for several years now (youth unemployment rate in Greece stands currently at 43.3 percent), a process that is bound to have long-term effects on demographic trends and a significant impact on future economic developments. [...]

First, the actual facts about the broken promises and the continuous lies of and the dissemination of fake news by the Syriza government. For starters, not only did Alexis Tsipras deceive the Greek people by winning the popular vote with passionate pleas that, if elected, he would do away with international bailouts, secure a debt write-off, and put an end to the vicious cycle of debt-austerity-recession-unemployment, but ended up signing a third bailout agreement with the country's international creditors and has even consented to the enforcement of Procrustean economics, which entail additional cuts in excess of five billion euros (about $6bn), even deeper pension reductions, and the attainment of outrageously high primary surplus targets - well into 2020. 

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Jacobin Magazine: Closed Rooms and Class War

He presents himself as both insider and outsider to this world. As if sketching a scene for a film script, he recounts a meeting with Larry Summers in a Washington bar, where Summers tells him that he must decide which he is going to be: an insider or outsider. It is clear that Varoufakis glories in being one of them, while still wanting us to believe that he is simultaneously on our side. He speaks of how great it was to have the support of Larry Summers, Norman Lamont, and other figures on the Right, but it was support for whom, for what, and in whose class interests? Class analysis is far from the foreground of the picture sketched out here. [...]

However, Varoufakis’s book conceals as much as it reveals. Most importantly, it does not clearly conceptualize the sociohistorical forces at play, both because of an overbearing egocentrism and a lack of systemic analysis. Capitalism disappears in the play of elite personalities, primarily his own. [...]

Varoufakis constantly uses phrases like “my solitary struggle” and tells the story in a way in which everyone else’s role is blurred, distorted, or even invisible. Syriza barely exists. The Greek Left are nearly absent. The Greek people fade into the background. It is a landscape of elite players and anonymous masses. [...]

He declares early on that there are “no goodies or baddies in this book,” but only people doing their best, as they understood it, in circumstances not of their choosing. This is not, however, how he writes it. He characterises some players as goodies, primarily himself and his band of star foreign economists, and others as baddies, although he is kinder to the troika than to certain figures in Syriza, whom he accuses of treachery. His preference for figures of the Right, such as Norman Lamont and Jeffrey Sachs, over the Left, in addition to his conceptualisation of many matters, make me wonder if he even understands the difference between right and left.

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Al Jazeera: Eurogroup approves $9.5bn bailout for Greece

The Eurogroup praised Greece for legislating all 140 prior actions required to pass its second review under the programme – specifically in terms of tax reform, pension reform and labour market reform, all of which aim to make its economy more competitive.

In terms of debt relief, the Eurozone made two concrete concessions. First, it promises to link Greece's rate of debt repayment to its rate of growth. The better the economy does in a given year, the more Greece will pay back. The corollary is that if Greece has little or no growth, it ought to receive a reprieve from creditors. This was a key demand of former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis in 2015, who claimed that a depressed economy could not reasonably be squeezed for debt repayment. [...]

Second, the Eurogroup agreed to defer and extend repayment of Greece's second bailout loan by up to 15 years. This loan, which ran from 2012 to 2015, was Greece's largest and $145bn (€130bn) of it is still outstanding. That amounts to almost half of the entire debt.

These two measures will be put into effect between now and the end of the programme, but the Eurogroup will specify further debt relief measures to take effect after the summer of 2018. It has to specify these by July 27, in order for the IMF to become a participant in the third bailout. [...]

The Greek economy was forecast to grow by 2.7 percent this year, but the Hellenic Statistical Authority reports that it Grew by just 0.4 percent in the first quarter. The Federation of Greek Industry today reports 53.6 unemployed people for every job vacancy. 

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Politico: Anarchic Athens finds a new cause: Ukraine

The neighborhood of Exarchia in central Athens has always been home to those who fight the system. Before Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ left-wing Syriza Party came to power in 2015, groups of police would stand on street corners bordering the area, riot shields at the ready, waiting for the streets to erupt into one of the area’s periodic fits of violence. Syrians, Afghans and Africans; pirated DVDs, cannabis and cocaine, you can find just about anyone and anything on the central square — except ATMs, symbols of “rapacious capitalism” that the anarchists long ago firebombed out of existence. [...]

Zafeiris started to pay attention to the political situation in Ukraine in the aftermath of the EuroMaidan protests, he recalls. “For the first time in recent European history we had a government in a European country with a Nazi element,” he says. He describes EuroMaidan as a NATO-organized coup “to overthrow Yanukovych because he was not interested in [drawing closer to] the EU.” [...]

Far-right parties only managed to secure a tiny percentage of the vote in Ukraine’s post-EuroMaidan elections, but that doesn’t deter Zafeiris from concluding that they’re a controlling element in Kiev. “It’s not a matter of size but of quality,” he says. “There are a lot of Nazis with top posts in the government.” The Ukrainian government, he claims, has become a “puppet for some parts of the U.S. regime.”

In March, Zafeiris decided to take action. He gathered a group of like-minded people and began to communicate with the separatist group in Donetsk, which granted him permission to open the Athens office. It’s not the first of its kind in Europe — there are offices in Italy, the Czech Republic and Finland. In Athens, the founding members put up their own money toward renting the premises to get the ball rolling.

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