openDemocracy: The tragedy of the Venezuelan opposition

Let us start with the appearances. The sheer size of the protests and their continuity in time led many to think that the regime’s fall was near. But the truth is that, except from the dissidence of Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz, the government block did not break, at least not in any apparent way, or enough so as to be forced to accept the opposition’s demands: an electoral timetable, the freeing of political prisoners, the opening of a humanitarian channel. On the contrary, while the police, the National Guard and the so-called "collectives" managed to control - although barely - a society which felt tired after more than three months of protests and more than one hundred dead, Maduro took the lead by calling a National Constituent Assembly (NCA). 

From that moment on, the opposition struggled to avoid its establishment and it won some great victories, such as the symbolic referendum on July 16 and the condemnation of Maduro’s initiative by many foreign countries. But the move allowed the government to lead the debate. And here is where the narrative links with the appearances: Maduro had no reason to roll back on his decision, but he made a couple of feints, such as his proposal to postpone the NCA if the opposition was willing to accept it. The indications are that the opposition leadership was so sure that they would manage to stop the initiative that, apparently, they did not prepare for the possibility that the NCA would finally be established. On the other hand, considering that opposition to the NCA was very strong among their followers, it was almost impossible for them to accept participating in it without offending them. The long list of unfulfilled promises which were made during the dialogues between the opposition and the government before the crisis also went against their heeding Maduro’s offer. [...]

And this is where Maduro confirmed that he was a better player. While in the opposition-dominated constituencies people decided not to vote - maybe the loss of middle-class voters who have emigrated began to be felt too -, the government ran an efficient voter co-optation machine through its aid – especially food - distribution channels and its well-disciplined militancy. Some observers say that this is very similar to what the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party does: electoral authoritarianism – that is, a system in which there is no need for massive fraud, you have only to add up many different forms of shifting the advantage to the government’s side so as to win always, with or without a majority. The forms in which the government can do, and does it range from last-minute transfer of middle-class opposition voters to polling stations further away from their homes, or to polling stations located in places they would consider dangerous, to using food distribution councils to mobilize voters. 

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The Atlantic: The Nationalist's Delusion

It was not just Trump’s supporters who were in denial about what they were voting for, but Americans across the political spectrum, who, as had been the case with those who had backed Duke, searched desperately for any alternative explanation—outsourcing, anti-Washington anger, economic anxiety—to the one staring them in the face. The frequent postelection media expeditions to Trump country to see whether the fever has broken, or whether Trump’s most ardent supporters have changed their minds, are a direct outgrowth of this mistake. These supporters will not change their minds, because this is what they always wanted: a president who embodies the rage they feel toward those they hate and fear, while reassuring them that that rage is nothing to be ashamed of. [...]

The specific dissonance of Trumpism—advocacy for discriminatory, even cruel, policies combined with vehement denials that such policies are racially motivated—provides the emotional core of its appeal. It is the most recent manifestation of a contradiction as old as the United States, a society founded by slaveholders on the principle that all men are created equal. [...]

Trump’s great political insight was that Obama’s time in office inflicted a profound psychological wound upon many white Americans, one that he could remedy by adopting the false narrative that placed the first black president outside the bounds of American citizenship. He intuited that Obama’s presence in the White House decreased the value of what W. E. B. Du Bois described as the “psychological wage” of whiteness across all classes of white Americans, and that the path to their hearts lay in invoking a bygone past when this affront had not taken place, and could not take place. [...]

Trump’s support among whites decreases the higher you go on the scales of income and education. But the controlling factor seems to be not economic distress but an inclination to see nonwhites as the cause of economic problems. The poorest voters were somewhat less likely to vote for Trump than those a rung or two above them on the economic ladder. The highest-income voters actually supported Trump less than they did Mitt Romney, who in 2012 won 54 percent of voters making more than $100,000—several points more than Trump secured, although he still fared better than Clinton. It was among voters in the middle, those whose economic circumstances were precarious but not bleak, where the benefits of Du Bois’s psychic wage appeared most in danger of being devalued, and where Trump’s message resonated most strongly. They surged toward the Republican column. [...]

Birtherism is a synthesis of the prejudice toward blacks, immigrants, and Muslims that swelled on the right during the Obama era: Obama was not merely black but also a foreigner, not just black and foreign but also a secret Muslim. Birtherism was not simply racism, but nationalism—a statement of values and a definition of who belongs in America. By embracing the conspiracy theory of Obama’s faith and foreign birth, Trump was also endorsing a definition of being American that excluded the first black president. Birtherism, and then Trumpism, united all three rising strains of prejudice on the right in opposition to the man who had become the sum of their fears.

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Atlantic Council: Moscow’s Eye Turns South

The parties across southern Europe that have sought to align themselves with Russia differ in ideology and position, but they all advocate for Russian interests, vote against common EU foreign policies, and undermine establishment parties to engender chaos and instability. For these reasons, the Kremlin has worked strategically and actively to cultivate closer relations with Europe’s emerging insurgent parties on the left and the right.

Italy is most vulnerable to Russian influence. In the past few years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has become increasingly popular among the Italian public; he is widely perceived as a strong and effective leader, the only one capable of saving Europe from the threats of Islamist terrorism and mass illegal immigration. Putin is seen by many as an adversary of the West’s “globalist elites,” and therefore a potential ally in Italy’s efforts to regain its sovereignty. [...]

M5S poses a particular danger. In the fall of 2017, it was consistently polling as the most popular party in Italy. The party’s documented pro-Kremlin stance combined with its grassroots mobilization capacity make it an especially important ally for the Kremlin, and thus a dangerous force against the EU, NATO, and the transatlantic partnership. With Italy poised for elections in early 2018, an M5S win could dramatically shift Italian foreign policy away from EU cooperation, support for common defense, and continuation of economic sanctions against Russia. [...]

But Moscow is only willing to go so far in supporting its allies. In 2015, Greece was still reeling from the economic crisis, which almost led the country to default on its debt. Alexis Tsipras, newly elected as prime minister after his party Syriza’s win in the elections, was locked in difficult negotiations with the EU over additional bailout funds. Tsipras’s government had made better relations with Russia a top priority, and that spring, Tsipras traveled to Moscow to meet with Putin. While both countries denied that the purpose of Tsipras’s visit was to request financial support, the timing raised eyebrows. Tsipras walked away empty-handed, nonetheless.

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Social Europe: Democracy À La Carte In Catalonia

There´s no mandate for independence. Not enough social support. No international recognition. There´s no plan. Just irresponsible politicians promising something they cannot deliver. But who can stop lies from making the headlines? Who will tell citizens that they have been fooled? As Bertolt Brecht said, when the truth is too weak to defend itself, it has to go on the attack. But that has become difficult in a Schrödinger-like Republic of Catalonia: a republic that exists and doesn’t exist at the same time. Where many people demand Democracy but show contempt for democratic norms. Where people demand their right of self-determination but overlook the political rights of those who don’t want to spend their days waving flags. A Republic that is not the next step towards a democratized and better European Union, but a step backward into nationalism and intolerance. [...]

Regardless, the situation is deteriorating. Despite the call for regional elections on December 21, the imposition of direct rule and the detention on of eight members of the Puigdemont cabinet have made a bad situation worse. Article 155 had never been applied before, while the detentions are being described by many as an attack against freedom and democracy. However, we should emphasize that we are not talking about political prisoners: a quick read will tell us that they don’t qualify as such. They have been detained because they ignored the law, took decisive steps to establish a parallel state and refused to comply with judicial rulings. We can disagree about the nature of the crime, and, certainly, about its punishment. But that doesn´t make them political prisoners: they were not arrested for believing in independence, but for violating the laws they promised to respect. [...]

These are turbulent times to be Catalan, Spanish and European. But there´s room for positive strategies and common solutions: the point of departure should be a peaceful negotiation about Catalonia´s place in Spain. However, acknowledging that Constitutions can change doesn’t mean we should dismiss the laws that allow us to live together: mob rule and social media cannot replace democracy. The future of Spain (and Europe) lies in cooperation within federal structures, not in separation. But a negotiated solution will only be possible if Puigdemont and Rajoy understand that the first step towards being a democrat is to behave like one.

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The Atlantic: Mugabe's Time Runs Out

If Mugabe's 37 years in power seemed interminable, it was partly because of the longstanding geopolitical movements he outlasted. To put his tenure in perspective, consider this: He withstood the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as its not-so-cold manifestations in Africa, where each superpower supported a litany of armed groups and dictators; he also outlasted the USSR itself. White-minority rule in southern Africa, which was so entrenched as to seem permanent before Mugabe took power, is now the stuff of history books, even if Africa and its people are still dealing with the economic and social consequences of its legacy. He is the world's third-longest-serving non-royal leader; only Cameroon's Paul Biya, who has governed since 1975, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the leader of Equatorial Guinea who came to power in 1979, have ruled longer. Mugabe also outlasted many of his own political rivals, as well as figures seen as possible successors, and in the process turned his country into an economic basket case. [...]

Although Mugabe seemed emblematic in the West of a kind of “big man” rule in African politics, the truth was that by the time his reign came to an end he was increasingly the exception rather than the rule. The continent has for years been moving away from the kind of politics where a single autocratic leader, often supported by the United States or, before its collapse, the Soviet Union, dominated a nation for decades. One reason for Mugabe’s longevity could be the fact that relative to other African countries, Zimbabwe shed white-minority rule only in 1980, decades after the wave of decolonization swept the rest of Africa. Racist rule is a recent memory in the country, and Mugabe, despite his obvious faults, represented the successful fight against it. [...]

Morley told me that Mugabe started off well enough when in the 1980s, but once he got his hands on the nation’s most valuable export—diamonds—he, like leaders in other resource-rich nations, came to believe that he had a right to the means of production. “People maybe could have put up with it from Mugabe himself,” she said, “but Grace [Mugabe] and her appalling shopping habits was what finally sent people over the edge.”     

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