Let us start with the appearances. The sheer size of the protests and their continuity in time led many to think that the regime’s fall was near. But the truth is that, except from the dissidence of Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz, the government block did not break, at least not in any apparent way, or enough so as to be forced to accept the opposition’s demands: an electoral timetable, the freeing of political prisoners, the opening of a humanitarian channel. On the contrary, while the police, the National Guard and the so-called "collectives" managed to control - although barely - a society which felt tired after more than three months of protests and more than one hundred dead, Maduro took the lead by calling a National Constituent Assembly (NCA).
From that moment on, the opposition struggled to avoid its establishment and it won some great victories, such as the symbolic referendum on July 16 and the condemnation of Maduro’s initiative by many foreign countries. But the move allowed the government to lead the debate. And here is where the narrative links with the appearances: Maduro had no reason to roll back on his decision, but he made a couple of feints, such as his proposal to postpone the NCA if the opposition was willing to accept it. The indications are that the opposition leadership was so sure that they would manage to stop the initiative that, apparently, they did not prepare for the possibility that the NCA would finally be established. On the other hand, considering that opposition to the NCA was very strong among their followers, it was almost impossible for them to accept participating in it without offending them. The long list of unfulfilled promises which were made during the dialogues between the opposition and the government before the crisis also went against their heeding Maduro’s offer. [...]
And this is where Maduro confirmed that he was a better player. While in the opposition-dominated constituencies people decided not to vote - maybe the loss of middle-class voters who have emigrated began to be felt too -, the government ran an efficient voter co-optation machine through its aid – especially food - distribution channels and its well-disciplined militancy. Some observers say that this is very similar to what the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party does: electoral authoritarianism – that is, a system in which there is no need for massive fraud, you have only to add up many different forms of shifting the advantage to the government’s side so as to win always, with or without a majority. The forms in which the government can do, and does it range from last-minute transfer of middle-class opposition voters to polling stations further away from their homes, or to polling stations located in places they would consider dangerous, to using food distribution councils to mobilize voters.
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