Today in Focus: The crisis in Kashmir

Azhar Farooq and Vidhi Doshi report on the crisis over Kashmir, triggered by the Indian government’s decision to impose direct rule from Delhi. Plus Jason Burke on life in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe.

A communications blackout means accurate, up-to-date information from Kashmir is extremely difficult to get. The reporter Azhar Farooq had to fly from its summer capital, Srinagar, to Delhi to file his dispatch as phone lines and internet connections are all down. He describes an eerie quiet on the streets as residents prepare for what they fear could be long period of lockdown.

On Friday, the BBC released a video appearing to show huge crowds marching through the streets of Srinagar. The footage shows people running for cover as police appear to open fire and use teargas.

The Guardian’s Vidhi Doshi tells Anushka Asthana that the history of Kashmir since it was given special status after Indian independence in 1947 has been that of a contested territory and the centre of tensions between India and Pakistan.

Mirza Waheed, a Kashmiri journalist and author, describes how his idyllic childhood in the 80s changed abruptly as his home town became a frontline for militants after elections widely seen to have been rigged by India sparked an insurgency.

Also today: Jason Burke reflects on life in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe where living conditions for millions have rapidly deteriorated.

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Foreign Policy: Can a New Currency End Tehran’s Economic Woes?

Faced with surging inflation and a falling national currency due to harsh U.S. sanctions that were reimposed after the United States unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal with world powers in May, Iran is planning to remove four zeros from the rial, taking its current official exchange rate with the U.S. dollar from 42,000 to the more palatable 4.2. The official rate is meaningless on the street, however; in reality, the value of the rial is far less – this week, it was trading at 120,000 to the dollar on the black market. [...]

The redenomination proposal comes just over two years after a previous attempt on a smaller scale. In early December 2016, President Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet approved a measure aimed at removing one zero from the national currency, effectively introducing the toman as the new official unit. Officials emphasized that it was not an attempt at redenomination but merely an initiative aimed at easing day-to-day transactions. It was criticized as a costly and insufficient move, so the initiative remained in a state of limbo and was ultimately rejected by lawmakers in September 2018. [...]

But in addition to the currency crisis and inflation, the local political landscape is also different this time. There is much more cooperation between Rouhani’s administration and parliament in terms of reaching economic solutions. For months, parliament’s economic commission has been reviewing and gradually passing bank reforms that promise to deliver the biggest changes to Iran’s banking system in decades— including granting the CBI more independence. [...]

In 2005, neighboring Turkey took six zeros off its currency and redenominated the lira in response to an inflation rate of higher than 50 percent. The move was relatively successful because it was implemented in tandem with wider reforms. But Turkey’s 2018 currency crisis proved immensely challenging and again decreased confidence in the lira mostly due to a problematic banking system. Turkey’s central bank gained independence in 2001 in the aftermath of an economic crisis, but that hasn’t meant it has been fully free of government meddling.

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The New York Review of Books: South Africa’s Cattle King President

Ramaphosa is a Soweto homeboy, the son of a police sergeant, who now lives in a grand home in Hyde Park, one of Johannesburg’s wealthiest suburbs. He qualified as a lawyer—no mean feat in apartheid South Africa—but his roots are in the labor movement and he played an important part in the downfall of the apartheid regime, mobilizing mineworkers. He has long been an avid fly-fisherman and now owns a cattle-ranch. When I profiled him for a South African newspaper in 1996, just after he left politics and joined the country’s largest new black-owned business, New Africa Investments, I described him as “charming and unflappable, entirely in control”:  [...]

I have followed Ramaphosa’s career for three decades. I was astounded by his skills in the 1990s, when he led the ANC’s negotiating team, thrilled at the possibility that he would be Mandela’s successor, and then disappointed by his hubris when he flounced out of politics: he refused, even, to attend Mandela’s inauguration in 1994. When I wrote that profile two years later, I was warily interested in the way he was leveraging his political credibility to gain a place at the high table of industry, as a beneficiary of the official policy of “black economic empowerment.” But some fifteen years later, in 2012, I was—like so many South Africans—distressed by the way he used his political connections to insist that the police take action against a wildcat strike at a platinum mine in which he held a stake. In the resulting “Marikana massacre,” thirty-four striking miners were killed by police, in an echo of the 1960 Sharpeville shootings. [...]

Even if these regal cattle and this glossy book are signs of swagger, or hubris, Ramaphosa has always been intensely conscious of his image. I have no doubt that there is a plan to the way he has cultivated his cattle-obsession and put it into the public domain. Released in the middle of his leadership campaign, Cattle of the Ages is Ramaphosa’s equivalent of Barack Obama’s Dreams From My Father. “Somewhere in the depths of my soul is the connection my father had to his cattle, the hills of Khalavha and his people,” he writes. “My love for cattle could be a reflection of my father in me; or some form of agency on behalf of my father, Samuel Mundzhedzi Ramaphosa,” because as “in most African cultures, cattle are a sign of wealth and stature among my father’s people,” the vhaVenda. Samuel Ramaphosa had tended his family’s herd but he had no opportunity to acquire his own, as he was forced in the apartheid era to migrate to the city for work. [...]

In his victory speech on Thursday, Ramaphosa diverted from his prepared notes to address the party congress’s standout resolution: to revise the country’s constitution so that land could be expropriated, without compensation, for redistribution to black South Africans whose ancestors were dispossessed by the 1913 Natives Land Act. When black people lost their land, he said, “poverty set in, because our forebears… [had] led a fulfilled life from the land. They were able to feed their families. And when the removals and dispossession took place, poverty became a partner to the people of our country.”

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Jacobin Magazine: Goodbye and Good Riddance, Robert Mugabe

As a young politician in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mugabe was by no means the most prominent of the black nationalists fighting white colonial rule. Neither was he the most motivated. He was, however, the most eloquent. For a clique of educated black elites, whose political and societal outlook was fashioned in mission schools, Mugabe was the man of choice to convey the message to white rulers — in voice and comportment — that blacks were no longer “uncivilized tribesmen.” They were sophisticated enough to deserve the franchise. [...]

At the time, Mugabe had come back home, presumably for the holidays, from Ghana, where he worked as a teacher, with the intention to go back to West Africa. He may never have wanted to stay in Rhodesia for long. He became the reluctant latecomer who would go on to dominate Zimbabwean politics for almost half a century. [...]

He was a rebel, but one who wanted to replace white rulers with a self-interested political project. When he “talked revolution,” it was out of expediency, to further his goal of securing the presidency for life. When he donned revolutionary garb, it was always fleetingly (in the early 1980s, for picture poses), and with an unseemly addition: a tie that clashed with his safari suit.  [...]

It is easy to point to the social programs during the independence euphoria of the 1980s as an example of Mugabe’s commitment to black people and socialism. But throughout the 1980s, and with “Britain’s willful blindness,” Mugabe sought to build a one-party dictatorship in the mold of the Kims’ North Korea. In fact, he invited North Korean military supervisors to help him create a private army brigade that hounded the opposition and committed one of the worst atrocities against African people in independent Africa. In the end, the Gukurahundi massacres left an estimated twenty thousand civilians, most of them isiNdebele-speaking black men, women, and children, dead in unmarked mass graves.

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Quartz: As Robert Mugabe finds a new home, here’s where other African dictators went to retire

In Saudi Arabia, Amin received a monthly stipend and the respect of still being called “Mr President.” Until his death in 2003, Amin was often spotted wandering through grocery stores, going to the health club, and praying at his local mosque. It was a life far removed from one the world’s most brutal dictatorships, during which about 300,000 were killed under Amin’s regime.

Saudi Arabia continues to offer a comfortable retirement to Africa’s strongmen. Ousted Tunisian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Jeddah after the 2011 revolution that ended his 23-year rule. Ben Ali’s retirement has not been as tranquil as he may have imagined, with Tunisia’s new government continuously calling for his extradition.

Until now, Mugabe himself has provided a safe haven for fallen autocrats. In 1991, Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the capital Addis Ababa and into safety in Zimbabwe. His departure brought an end to his Marxist-leaning government, which for 14 years was bedeviled by war, famine, failed economic policies, and a mass crackdown on enemies known as the Red Terror. [...]

Until now, Mugabe himself has provided a safe haven for fallen autocrats. In 1991, Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the capital Addis Ababa and into safety in Zimbabwe. His departure brought an end to his Marxist-leaning government, which for 14 years was bedeviled by war, famine, failed economic policies, and a mass crackdown on enemies known as the Red Terror.

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The Atlantic: Mugabe's Time Runs Out

If Mugabe's 37 years in power seemed interminable, it was partly because of the longstanding geopolitical movements he outlasted. To put his tenure in perspective, consider this: He withstood the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as its not-so-cold manifestations in Africa, where each superpower supported a litany of armed groups and dictators; he also outlasted the USSR itself. White-minority rule in southern Africa, which was so entrenched as to seem permanent before Mugabe took power, is now the stuff of history books, even if Africa and its people are still dealing with the economic and social consequences of its legacy. He is the world's third-longest-serving non-royal leader; only Cameroon's Paul Biya, who has governed since 1975, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the leader of Equatorial Guinea who came to power in 1979, have ruled longer. Mugabe also outlasted many of his own political rivals, as well as figures seen as possible successors, and in the process turned his country into an economic basket case. [...]

Although Mugabe seemed emblematic in the West of a kind of “big man” rule in African politics, the truth was that by the time his reign came to an end he was increasingly the exception rather than the rule. The continent has for years been moving away from the kind of politics where a single autocratic leader, often supported by the United States or, before its collapse, the Soviet Union, dominated a nation for decades. One reason for Mugabe’s longevity could be the fact that relative to other African countries, Zimbabwe shed white-minority rule only in 1980, decades after the wave of decolonization swept the rest of Africa. Racist rule is a recent memory in the country, and Mugabe, despite his obvious faults, represented the successful fight against it. [...]

Morley told me that Mugabe started off well enough when in the 1980s, but once he got his hands on the nation’s most valuable export—diamonds—he, like leaders in other resource-rich nations, came to believe that he had a right to the means of production. “People maybe could have put up with it from Mugabe himself,” she said, “but Grace [Mugabe] and her appalling shopping habits was what finally sent people over the edge.”     

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Haaretz: Is Zimbabwe's Coup Part of China's Grab for Africa?

Indeed, a few days before the coup, General Chiwenga, head of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) arrived in Beijing to meet two of China's most powerful men - Gen Li Zuocheng, chief of the joint staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China’s defense minister, Gen Chang Wanquan. [...]

China is Zimbabwe's largest investor and trading partner and has invested heavily in the country's mineral resources, particularly the diamond mining industry. In 2016, Harare enforced an indigenization law that sought to reduce foreign ownership of Zimbabwean businesses - leaving many Chinese investors concerned. [...]

"Mugabe is out, Mnangagwa is in. He got his revenge. It's an internal power struggle. We will celebrate today, repent tomorrow. And China will continue to control us, remotely." 

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The Atlantic: The Meaning of Robert Mugabe's Stunning Non-Resignation

The immediate issue of concern is what shape the political transition takes. Unfortunately, the most likely outcome is a military junta that retains only a fig leaf of legitimacy. The various opposition groups, especially the party of former labor leader Morgan Tsvangirai, would be wise to avoid a coalition trap again. A notional government of national unity, with Tsvangirai as prime minister, presided over the country from 2009 to 2013 after a disputed election that Mugabe lost. During that time, Mugabe and his cronies in ZANU-PF kept firm control and merely consolidated their political power. This culminated in a July 2013 election in which the opposition was thoroughly routed. [...]

Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s likely successor, was a longtime security chief and the prime architect of a massacre of at least 20,000 civilians in the 1980s. General Constantino Chiwenga, the organizer of the coup, launched a vicious campaign of violence against Tsvangirai’s supporters and civic leaders in 2008, which killed hundreds and left tens of thousands homeless. Both men are also part of ZANU-PF’s vast, corrupt business empire. The party meeting to expel Mugabe, for instance, was chaired by Obert Mpofu, a Mnangagwa ally who oversaw the nation’s diamond mines at a time when billions of dollars of revenue went missing, never making it into government coffers. Meanwhile, Mpofu and other ZANU-PF bigwigs live in extravagant mansions and own fleets of luxury cars. [...]

The United States will be even more relevant for Zimbabwe’s economic revival. Over half of Zimbabwe’s rural population relies on outside food assistance, a stunning statistic for a country that was once a net food exporter. The average Zimbabwean is poorer today than in 1980; by some estimates, unemployment is at 95 percent. The country is desperate for cash to jumpstart its once productive farms and factories. Although Mnangagwa and his political allies have long-standing ties to China, the road to recovery inevitably runs through Washington—the country is more than $9 billion in debt to western institutions, including the World Bank. A bailout plan proposed two years ago received British backing, but the United States blocked any financial support to the abusive Mugabe regime. The Americans will now need to be convinced that commitment to reform is real before agreeing to any restructuring or new loans to Zimbabwe. Importantly, too, Mnangagwa and Chiwenga are still under U.S. Treasury sanctions due to their involvement in widespread human rights abuses.

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Vox: The military coup in Zimbabwe, explained

On November 14th 2017, Zimbabwe military troops drove tanks into the capital city, Harare. They patrolled the streets, blocked access to government buildings, and took over the state television station to insist…. This is not a military takeover of government.

Once praised as a war hero, Robert Mugabe helped Zimbabwe win independence from Great Britain in 1980. He became president under Zimbabwe’s new constitution with the support of the people. But soon, he digressed into a repressive dictator. He secured his power through aggression and threats, there have been reports of state-sponsored torture and killings. And even though Zimbabwe is technically a democracy, there’s evidence Mugabe rigged elections in his favor.

Now that Mugabe is 93 years old, and reportedly in poor health, the fight for political influence is more important than ever. And it’s caused a split in Mugabe’s own party, the ZANU-PF. On one side we have the old guard lead by Mugabe’s sacked vice-president Emmerson Mnangagwa. Like Mugabe, he fought for Zimbabwe’s independence and has a checkered past that includes human rights abuses against political opponents and ethnic minorities. 

Slate: What Is Going to Happen to Zimbabwe Now?

Michelle Faul: It came as a shock. It came as a shock to everybody, even though I was home for three weeks last month, and everyone was saying, “Something’s got to happen. It cannot continue. People are suffering so much.” People are starving in my country. It’s disgraceful. Mugabe inherited, when we finally got independent black rule in 1980, a country that was self-sufficient. Five thousand white farmers, whatever their politics—and I am black—produced enough food to feed more than 8 million people, and food for export. And he has reduced our nation to one in which one-third of the people need food aid. Another third of the nation has left. We are scattered all over the world. [...]

I said Emmerson Mnangagwa is evil because he is considered the mastermind or what we called, or Mugabe called, Gukurahundi. This means the cleaning of the chaff—when you have wheat and clean it. That was a project to try and wipe out the minority Ndebele people. Nobody knows how many people were killed between 1984 and about 1988. I had to leave the country. I was forced to leave my country as a result of my reporting on Gukurahundi. Perhaps 20,000, perhaps 30,000 people were killed, and Emmerson Mnangagwa is considered the mastermind of those killings. [...]

I think Mnangagwa realizes that for the country to have any kind of positive future it can’t continue in the way it has been ruled. Mnangagwa has indicated that he would be willing to allow white farmers to return to Zimbabwe and farm the land. What happened with that project was that Mugabe accused the white farmers of supporting the opposition MDC party, which we believe has won at least two out of three of the last elections. He said the white farmers were supporting his opponents, which is when he began his program of violently forcing them from the land. The real reason, we think, was that his moneybags—an Indian chap who had done all his laundering of money for him—had taken off with all the veterans’ pension money. Mugabe no longer had money to pay veterans; the veterans were getting angry. So instead he said, “I will give you land. You can go take the farms.” [...]

I would suspect that they will be allowed to retire in disgrace. What I would like to see is someone like Mugabe being sent to the International Criminal Court to face trial for all the killings that occurred and other human rights abuses. Nobody knows how many people have died because of Mugabe’s destruction of everything he built up. He built up a fabulous education system. He was a teacher. He then destroyed it.

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