21 November 2017

Jakub Marian: Percentage of forest area by region in Europe

The LUCAS survey by Eurostat provided a lot of insight into land cover in the EU. As someone who likes to stroll in a forest, one of the statistics I found particularly interesting is the percentage of area covered by forests, which is what the following map shows:  [...]

If you really like forests, the direction you want to go is north. 68% of Finland and 64% of Sweden is covered by forests. However, Slovenia does not lag far behind with 61%.

The least forested country in Europe is Malta, with just 5% of forest area, followed by United Kingdom and Ireland (both 12%) and the Netherlands with 13%.

LSE Blog: Four graphs about Catalonia and citizens’ attitudes towards the EU

Nevertheless, and in spite of the continuous demands coming from the independentists, the EU has firmly backed the Spanish government, not showing any of support to the secessionist cause. In such context, we could ask ourselves whether this situation is affecting the attitudes of Catalan citizens on the EU. In other words: could this lack of European support undermine citizens’ perceptions of the EU? In this article, I will try to find a preliminary answer to this question, by analysing survey data coming from the last Public Opinion Barometer from the Catalan Opinion Studies Centre (CEO). [...]

The trend shown in the chart suggests that the response coming from the EU has significantly affected all population groups. On the one hand, trust in the EU strongly increases among those who believe that Catalonia should be part of Spain, something that is probably triggered by the perception of the EU backing their position. On the other hand, independentists go through a reverse process, where the lack of EU support for their aspirations may be driving the decline in trust shown in the data. [...]

Once again, we see a similar divergence. The starting point varies little among voting groups, with the exception of CUP voters (which is not surprising, the CUP being a leftist antisystem party), while the difference after the 1st of October is almost 5 points. The voters of constitutionalist parties feel more attached to the EU now than they did a year ago, while secessionists feel less attached. The most striking case is that of PDeCAT voters, who were the most attached to the EU in 2016, and whose decrease in attachment is the most pronounced. [...]

A complementary interpretation could build on Sanchez Cuenca’s explanation of the support of European integration. This is based on the idea that citizens tend to be more supportive of integration when they hold negative opinions of their national leaders in comparison to European ones. Following this line, we could say that Catalan nationalists supported the EU because they perceived the quality of the policies made in Brussels to be somehow superior to those made in Madrid. But this mechanism would break down at the moment when Brussels policies are no longer perceived as distinctly better than those coming out of Madrid.

Deutsche Welle: My Europe: 'Foreigners can be racists too'

I can well imagine this homeless man standing with the 60,000 far-right extremists in Warsaw on Polish independence day, bellowing, "All Poland sings with us: Piss off, refugees,” or calling for a "white Europe of brother nations”. And as he stood there, demonstrating against Muslims and refugees – of whom there are hardly any in Poland – the far-right demonstrators would be looking at him with contempt because he's homeless. Simply being the object of discrimination doesn't make someone a better person. [...]

Things start getting particularly complicated when xenophobes flee abroad and meet other xenophobes. Is that too abstract? I can offer you a concrete example as an explanation: At a demonstration by the right-wing extremist Identitarian Movement of Austria in Vienna, I heard the language spoken by my parents. Many Serbs and Croats were there to demonstrate against "Umvolkung” ("ethnicity inversion,” a term historically used by the far right to describe demographic change through immigration), "Islamification,” or whatever else it is they fantasize about. [...]

Serbs, Croats, Poles and other people from Central and Eastern Europe are now marching in Germany and Austria alongside the people who not long ago wanted them thrown out of the country. Ever since the war in Syria, we Balkan refugees suddenly find ourselves a little further up the pecking order. We're now deemed good enough to join in demonstrations against refugees. If that's what you call integration, it's worked beautifully. European nationalists have a very efficient cross-border network. The bogeymen they all have in common are refugees and Muslims – regardless of whether or not there actually are any in their respective countries.

20 November 2017

Jacobin Magazine: The Roots of Spanish Rage

While it is tempting to read ongoing events as an authoritarian lapse, this interpretation remains incomplete. More than a simple throwback to Spain’s past, the Catalan crisis presents an ominous vision for the future: one in which the reconfiguration of the state takes place along reactionary and punitive lines. Spanish nationalism has become a vehicle for this endeavor, galvanizing the right and presenting a critical challenge for left and progressive forces. But it is, by its nature, incapable of producing a stable political outcome. As long as symbols of national unity remain cudgels in the hands of the Spanish right, disarray will persist. [...]

Maurice Duverger once remarked that just as people are conditioned by their childhoods, political parties are defined by their origins. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s Partido Popular (PP), which governs with support from the center-right Ciudadanos (C’s), owes its existence to Franco’s longtime information minister, Manuel Fraga. In the late sixties Fraga realized the regime could not outlive Franco, so he pressed its modernizing cadres to accept a democratic transition after the dictator’s death. With the dictatorship’s structures still in place and the left too weak to topple them, elites from both sides negotiated a restoration of democracy, with the regime insiders managing to maintain the initiative throughout the process. Established opinion hailed it as a paradigmatic success. [...]

The “Spanish exception” to the rising tide of xenophobia in Europe, therefore, only begins to make sense when one takes into account that the PP represents a sizable number of hard-right voters. More importantly, the kind of xenophobia that in other European countries articulates along a native–foreign “other” axis in Spain is harnessed along center–periphery lines—a reflection of what Eric Hobsbawm called the “anomalous and self-contained” nature of the country. Anti-immigrant rhetoric is not a leading plank of the PP’s platform—but it is not a coincidence that its most xenophobic politicians often come from Catalonia and the Basque Country, where they would otherwise have very little to offer right-wing voters. Indeed Badalona, the only large Catalan municipality recently governed by the PP (in 2011–‘15), became ground zero for a Le Pen-style experiment under the mayorship of Xavier García-Albiol, now the leader of the PP in Catalonia. Xenophobia lurks not far beneath the surface, ready to be weaponized if more traditional demagogy fails. [...]

C’s originates from Barcelona, where it was founded twelve years ago as a center-left party opposed to Catalan nationalism. Led by Albert Rivera, a young and charismatic former banker, it was catapulted onto the national stage in 2015. Following Podemos’ success, it positioned itself as a “safer” alternative to established politics. Like Emmanuel Macron in France, Rivera repeatedly defines himself as “neither left nor right.” Ideological vagueness has long been a part of the party’s approach: during the 2009 European elections it ditched its pro-EU platitudes and progressive credentials to join a Eurosceptic right-wing coalition.

The Atlantic: The Meaning of Robert Mugabe's Stunning Non-Resignation

The immediate issue of concern is what shape the political transition takes. Unfortunately, the most likely outcome is a military junta that retains only a fig leaf of legitimacy. The various opposition groups, especially the party of former labor leader Morgan Tsvangirai, would be wise to avoid a coalition trap again. A notional government of national unity, with Tsvangirai as prime minister, presided over the country from 2009 to 2013 after a disputed election that Mugabe lost. During that time, Mugabe and his cronies in ZANU-PF kept firm control and merely consolidated their political power. This culminated in a July 2013 election in which the opposition was thoroughly routed. [...]

Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s likely successor, was a longtime security chief and the prime architect of a massacre of at least 20,000 civilians in the 1980s. General Constantino Chiwenga, the organizer of the coup, launched a vicious campaign of violence against Tsvangirai’s supporters and civic leaders in 2008, which killed hundreds and left tens of thousands homeless. Both men are also part of ZANU-PF’s vast, corrupt business empire. The party meeting to expel Mugabe, for instance, was chaired by Obert Mpofu, a Mnangagwa ally who oversaw the nation’s diamond mines at a time when billions of dollars of revenue went missing, never making it into government coffers. Meanwhile, Mpofu and other ZANU-PF bigwigs live in extravagant mansions and own fleets of luxury cars. [...]

The United States will be even more relevant for Zimbabwe’s economic revival. Over half of Zimbabwe’s rural population relies on outside food assistance, a stunning statistic for a country that was once a net food exporter. The average Zimbabwean is poorer today than in 1980; by some estimates, unemployment is at 95 percent. The country is desperate for cash to jumpstart its once productive farms and factories. Although Mnangagwa and his political allies have long-standing ties to China, the road to recovery inevitably runs through Washington—the country is more than $9 billion in debt to western institutions, including the World Bank. A bailout plan proposed two years ago received British backing, but the United States blocked any financial support to the abusive Mugabe regime. The Americans will now need to be convinced that commitment to reform is real before agreeing to any restructuring or new loans to Zimbabwe. Importantly, too, Mnangagwa and Chiwenga are still under U.S. Treasury sanctions due to their involvement in widespread human rights abuses.