Social Europe: Three Challenges In Contemporary Populism Research

Very often the movements, parties, leaders and discourses under examination seem to have nothing or very little in common as they range from the radical left to the radical right end of the political spectrum and from egalitarian to authoritarian orientations. Yet, one thing is obviously certain. They seem to cause surprise. Mainstream media, established political forces and academics are quick to denounce their scandalous nature: all of a sudden, the unthinkable seems to be happening. Populism is seen as violating or transgressing an established order of how politics is properly, rationally and professionally done. It emerges where it should not when it should not; it disrupts a supposed “normal” course of events and can only be seen as a signal of failure. [...]

In this sense, the first fundamental challenge populism research is facing today is a self-critical one: the need to seriously reflect on the language games developed around the ideological uses of “populism” within academic and media discourse from Richard Hofstadter, from the 1950s, to the present day. When we study populism, we talk about populism, we articulate meanings in language and discourse, and language is never innocent. In the long run it naturalises significations that were initially partisan, even arbitrary, and reifies into supposedly neutral objectivity crystallisations of historically-dependent power relations.

Within the broader context of the ongoing struggle between populist and anti-populist orientations, we can understand populism primarily as a specific type of discourse which claims to express popular interests and to represent associated identities and demands (the “will of the people”) against an “establishment” or elite, which is seen as undermining them and forestalling their satisfaction. Accordingly, populist discursive representations typically articulate a polarised, antagonistic framing of the socio-political field in a bid to inspire and mobilise frustrated/excluded social groups. [...]

In populist discourses proper, then, apart from being located at the core of the discursive articulation, “the people” operates as an empty signifier, as a signifier without signified, so to speak. In contradistinction, when nationalist discourses employ the signifier the ‘people’, this is either located at the periphery of their chain of signification or, even when it is given a more central place, its populist emptiness is moderated significantly, referring it back to “race” or “nation”, discursive units that in extreme right discourse often function as naturalised, original (mythical) points of reference, as Derridean “transcendental signifieds” attempting to fix signification once and for all.

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openDemocracy: ‘Nice Irish girls don’t have sex’ is the old idea at the heart of historic abortion rights battle

It’s safe to say that the fear of becoming pregnant was always there – that, and developing an STI that would leave you infertile for life. Why? Because sex was bad. That’s what you were taught during sex-ed class at school. If you were ‘at it’ and fell pregnant, you only had yourself to blame. As for having an abortion, well, that was the greatest sin of all. [...]

Ireland has an uncomfortable relationship with sex – in particular women having sex outside of marriage. International readers might be forgiven for thinking that we’re a progressive little country; we were the first country to legalise same-sex marriage by popular vote, after all. But we still have a long way to go.  [...]

And even if the 8th amendment is repealed, this ‘nice Irish girls don’t have sex’ mindset must be tackled if women are to fully access their reproductive rights. There are examples, including from Italy, where abortion has been legalised for years but can still be difficult to access because of widespread ‘conscientious objection’ by medical staff.

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Politico: Spanish Socialist’s survival strategy

The Madrid-born Socialist leader is offering constitutional reform that would give Catalonia increased autonomy, but not independence. “The secessionists are going to meet the wall of Spain’s rule of law if they go back to the unilateral path (to independence),” he said.

The appointment last week of hard-line independence activist Quim Torra as Catalan regional president makes it even less likely that the crisis is going to cool off in the short term. At the same time, supporters of Spanish unity have discovered a propaganda goldmine in Torra’s anti-Spanish writings and tweets. [...]

The Socialists are currently the second-biggest party in parliament after Rajoy’s conservatives, with the far-left Podemos in third place and Ciudadanos fourth. But recent polls of voter intentions put Ciudadanos either in the lead or second while the PSOE is most often ranked third after Rajoy’s party and Rivera’s. [...]

While Ciudadanos has poached voters from the PP and the PSOE, it is a more natural fit for disenchanted conservatives than leftists. Sánchez argued that the “fracture” on the right, in the context of a more fragmented political scenario where votes are split four ways rather than the traditional two-way PP-PSOE rivalry, means he is in a good position to win the next national election.

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Vox: Monogamy, explained

In 2016, more than 2.2 million couples got married in America, but more than 800,000 got divorced. Cheating and breakups cause grief and heartache every day. Yet some historians and evolutionary biologists say monogamy is a relatively new, self-imposed system. Their evidence suggests humans lived without it for more than 250,000 years. And we only started marrying for love in the 1700s.

So if monogamy is so hard, why do most of us, all around the world, make it a central goal of our lives?

Vox tackled this question in the first episode of our new show with Netflix, Explained, which premieres today! We’ll have new episodes every Wednesday, on topics ranging from monogamy to gene editing to the racial wealth gap to K-pop and more. If you like our videos, then you’ll love this show; it’s our most ambitious video project to date. 

Haaretz: Trump’s Talk of Sanctions Is a Dead-end. What He’s Really Pushing Is War Against Iran

Netanyahu himself has been hoping for regime change since 2002, when he mistakenly predicted an invasion of Iraq would have a spillover effect on Iran leading to regime change. [...]

While sanctions have had modest success in bringing adversaries to the negotiations table – most notably the Iran nuclear deal, democracies have tried and failed using sanctions to topple authoritarian regimes nearly 60 times between World War I and 2000, according to a long-term study. Examples range from Cuba and Panama to North Korea, Libya and Iran.  [...]

In most cases, the sanctions are lifted without achieving the desired effect. In some cases, partial success is achieved – sanctions are lifted in exchange for important, albeit partial, concessions by the regime under pressure. That is precisely what happened with Iran – in other words, the West extracted as much if not more from Iran than any other sanctions campaign in history. [...]

In some ways, Iran was already on a path to regime change. As the Iranian people saw how their leaders squandered the benefits of the lifting of sanctions on military exploits abroad, discontent was growing. It’s not for nothing that Iranian President Hassan Rohani leaked the budget that showed increases in military spending on the backs of social expenditures in order to mobilize the public to push for social reform. The Islamic regime’s legitimacy was beginning to slip away. 

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