Jacobin Magazine: Sadr, Sectarianism, and a Popular Alternative

The victory of Sadr’s “March for Reforms” alliance should be read in two ways. First, Iraqis have expressed their disgust at the country’s sectarian political system, social inequalities, and decrepit public services. According to the Iraqi government, absolute poverty levels reached 22.5 percent of the total population in 2014. Other estimates put the number even higher: some claim that nearly 10 million Iraqis, or well over a quarter of the country, live in abject poverty.

The second major reason for Sairoun’s first-place finish is discontent with the sectarian ruling class, an outgrowth of the US and British-led invasion. The sectarian ruling class is composed of all the various heads of ethnic or sectarian-based political movements in the country. The Shi’a fraction of the political and economic elite has been by far the dominating actor since 2003, gaining nearly absolute control over the state’s institutions and resources. This isn’t to say that Iraqi Shi’a are a privileged community — the vast majority have not benefited economically from their leaders’ political dominance and have suffered from the corruption and dysfunction of the state public services. [...]

Still, an electoral alliance between the various protest camps wasn’t a forgone conclusion. Iraqi Communist Party secretary-general Raid Jahid Fahmi said that in preparation for the elections, his party and the Sadrists agreed to focus on the issues that unite them — fighting unemployment and corruption, opposing foreign influences in Iraq — rather than those that don’t: namely, women’s rights and secularism. The Sadrists, for example, have not mobilized against the “Jaafari law,” which would have allowed women as young as nine to marry. [...]

In its election program, Sairoun emphasized anti-terrorism, anti-corruption, national reconciliation and unity, a new electoral law, improved governance, and guaranteed access to human and social rights (education, social security, decent living standards, and housing). The program was short on specifics, remaining vague about how to fight corruption or political sectarianism, the militarization of society, or regressive economic policies.

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Haaretz: Saudi Arabia Once Wrote Off Iraq as a Win for Iran. But Now, the Saudi Crown Prince Is Advancing on Baghdad

In their competition for regional supremacy, Iran has gained the upper hand over Saudi Arabia in their proxy wars in Syria and Yemen. Yet in Iraq, Tehran seems to have been wrong-footed – for the time being – by Riyadh’s charm offensive to woo Shia leaders and to frustrate Iran’s attempts to consolidate its influence over the fractured country. [...]

In the past year, under the leadership of Mohammad bin Salman, commonly known as MBS, Riyadh has stepped up its engagement with Shia-majority Iraq. The elections - in which Baghdad’s geopolitical orientation was a key consideration among the leading contenders - was a key impetus for this accelerated engagement. Indeed, rumors that MBS himself would pay a pre-election visit to Baghdad had provoked alarm in Iran and amongst Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians.

Sadr’s electoral success could open the way for further Saudi engagement. His Sairoon ("Marching Towards Reform") coalition, an unlikely combination of reformed Shia militants, communists, secular and civil society groups, won 54 seats in the ballot – the highest number – but still fell well short of a majority. [...]

While the Saudis would have preferred the Western-orientated Abadi to have won outright (his coalition was third with 42 seats) Sadr’s election victory is a favorable result, notwithstanding his unwavering distrust of America. [...]

Abadi twice visited Riyadh in 2017, but it was Sadr’s trip last July that really underlined the Crown Prince’s desire to send out an olive branch to Iraq’s Shia heartlands. There, many regard Saudi Arabia as a sponsor of Sunni extremism during Iraq’s years of ethnic turmoil, and are no doubt concerned about Saudi persecution of its own Shia minority.

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The Atlantic: A Shia Cleric's Radical Vision for Iraq

In the early days of the post-Saddam era, U.S. military officials variously described Sadr as an “annoyance” and a “thug.” But he quickly transformed himself into an influential—and controversial—figure. His fighters committed brutal atrocities in the post-invasion violence, fought the U.S. military in Sadr City and Basra, and were known for their corruption. A 2006 Newsweek cover story even labeled Sadr “the most dangerous man in Iraq.” Fifteen years after the fall of Saddam, Sadr, now 44 years old, is warily viewed as a potential kingmaker in Iraq’s parliamentary elections on Saturday. In a country riven by sectarian tensions and regional politics, Sadr has transformed himself again: He has now positioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist; allied himself with communists, Sunnis, and political independents; criticized Iran’s outsized influence in Iraq; and strongly criticized the sectarian nature of Iraq’s politics. [...]

Sadr is in many ways an embodiment of the tensions that have shaped Iraq since 2003, and a symbol what could change: if nationalism overtakes sectarianism as a political force; if Iraqi independence asserts itself over Iranian and U.S. influence; and if good governance can replace the kind of cronyism for which the country has become known. The formerly Shia sectarian ally of Iran who was known for corruption is forcefully embracing the opposite values in parliamentary elections at a time when the country may be uniquely ripe for them: Iraq has just emerged from a brutal battle against ISIS; the Shia parties are split into five major factions; there is no clear Sunni representative. And Iraq arrives at this juncture with many of the same problems that plagued it before ISIS seized large parts of the country in 2014. [...]

To understand how a man with a solid, but marginal support base can remain politically vital, it is helpful to examine the political situation in Iraq. The electoral landscape is perhaps more divided than it has ever been. There’s little to show for Shia solidarity, including in the ruling Dawa Party, where Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and his predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki, are running on different political lists. There is no clear Sunni leader. The Kurds, who until recently were both influential and powerful, have been chastened after they were crushed by the Iraqi military following the referendum on independence last year. The only certainty in the elections is that no one faction will emerge dominant in the 328-seat parliament.

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