Showing posts with label Dominic Cummings. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dominic Cummings. Show all posts

18 October 2020

New Statesman: Munira Mirza: the former radical leftist advising Boris Johnson

Those who know Mirza describe her as an independent thinker, intelligent, intellectually curious, reasoned, articulate and unflappable. Far from being a strident right-wing Tory, she once flirted with Marxism and is now a libertarian. Like Cummings, her fellow Downing Street iconoclast, she is not a Conservative Party member and is said to harbour no political ambitions of her own. [...]

Mirza does not deny that racism exists in Britain, but she argues that racial inequalities are the result of cultural and socio-economic factors more than institutional racism. She contends that efforts to promote racial equality through diversity programmes and “box-ticking multiculturalism” serve merely to deepen divisions, stoke tribalism and foster a “culture of grievance”. She rejects identity politics based on race and religion in favour of a universal humanity or “universalism”. [...]

Through PX she published “Living Apart Together” (2007), a paper that argued multiculturalism had encouraged Islamic extremism in Britain by dividing people along ethnic, religious and cultural lines instead of promoting a national identity. [...]

She was a principal author of the Tory party’s manifesto for the 2019 general election. As a northerner, like Cummings, she champions the idea of “levelling up”. There has been speculation, given her libertarianism, that she may have encouraged Johnson’s costly reluctance to impose the coronavirus lockdown last spring. True or not, she certainly would not have expected to be overseeing government interventionism on a scale unprecedented since the Second World War.

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19 June 2020

UnHerd: The Tories are facing a new revolt on the Right

Boris Johnson is a prime minister under pressure. Public disapproval of his government is drifting upwards. Confidence in the economy has collapsed. His approval ratings have shed more than 20 points in two months. The ‘rally effect’ that saw his support surge to nearly 70% has long gone. Former advisors are criticising the inner workings of his government. MPs openly complain about U-turns and indecision. The Conservative Party’s lead in the polls has crashed from more than 20 points to just five. And Keir Starmer now has the highest rating for any leader of the opposition since Tony Blair led Labour in 1995 and (What’s the Story) Morning Glory was topping the charts. Life comes at you fast, as my students say. [...]

This is what encouraged the sceptics to walk away. Ever since the referendum the Conservative Party has been haemorrhaging middle-class professionals and graduates. Already alienated by Brexit, the fumbled response to the Covid crisis and what they see as populist amateurism has pushed these former Tory voters further away. In the past six months alone Labour’s share of the Remain vote has jumped by nearly 10 points, with Remainers slowly but steadily starting to align in the way that Leavers did six months ago. [...]

Delivering Brexit, controlling migration and rebalancing an unequal nation struck a loud chord across Britain’s heartlands. And this rebalancing act was never just about bridges and trains. It was about reasserting all of the things that conservatives feel have been eroded over recent years — the family, our civic culture, virtue, morality, community, tradition, heritage and our national identity. The Conservative Party would, in short, be all that its name implied. [...]

It is this growing sense of disillusionment with Johnson’s premiership which now lies behind plans to launch a new movement. Embryonic talks started in the early days of the Great Lockdown and there is talk of significant financial resources. Given that the country no longer holds European elections under a more favourable system of proportional representation these activists contend that the main purpose would be to once again apply indirect rather than direct pressure. It would not be hard, they argue, to attract 8-10% of the vote simply by demanding that the Conservative Party be… conservative. “Boris has gone very, very wet”, complained one.

29 April 2020

UnHerd: Did anyone predict coronavirus?

I want to argue two things. One, predictions are amazingly hard. It doesn’t feel that way after the fact — we assume that whatever happened was always obviously going to happen, a phenomenon called hindsight bias. But actually it was not obvious in January or February that the outbreak in Wuhan would end up like this. Some people were saying it would; some that it wouldn’t. Suggesting in hindsight that the Government should have listened to the right people and not the wrong people isn’t much use.

But two, I want to argue that this shouldn’t let the Government off the hook — and, actually, it shouldn’t let the media off the hook, either. Just because you can’t foresee some outcomes doesn’t mean you shouldn’t act to avoid them. [...]

Sure, you might think it’s 90% sure that we’re not going to see a global pandemic. But that means you think there’s a 10% chance that there will be! We don’t play Russian roulette, even though there’s an 83% chance we’d be fine: a small-but-not-that-small chance of a terrible outcome is a serious thing that needs to be taken seriously. [...]

There’s an irony here. Dominic Cummings, the government adviser, is sometimes accused of pushing the Government towards the much-criticised “herd immunity” approach. He’s also linked to the Bay Area tech-rationalist people. If it turns out that the UK Government got it wrong, the problem may have been that Cummings didn’t listen hard enough to the nerds he admires so much.

25 March 2020

BBC4 Analysis: Command and Control?

When Sajid Javid resigned as Chancellor of the Exchequer in February rather than accept Boris Johnson's reported demand that he dismiss his own team of special advisers and accept a new one drawn up in 10 Downing Street, many saw the episode as a crude attempt by the Prime Minister to wrest control of economic policy from the Treasury. But would such a reform necessarily be a bad thing?

Edward Stourton considers the case for economic policy being driven from the very top of government. If decision-making, in arguably the most important government department, took place on the prime minister's terms rather than having to be negotiated with a powerful colleague leading a vast bureaucracy, would that make for quicker and more streamlined decision-making that gave clearer direction to the government overall? And has in any case the time come to clip the wings of the Treasury which too often determines policy on narrowly financial grounds rather than properly allowing for the potential benefits of government spending - and which has recently signed off such alarmingly over-budget projects as HS2 and London's Crossrail?

In seeking answers to those questions, Edward speaks to the former Chancellors, Alistair Darling and Norman Lamont; to former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair in Downing Street, Jonathan Powell; to former Treasury minister, David Gauke; and and to ex-officials, including former top Treasury civil servant, Nic Macpherson.



21 February 2020

TLDR News: Inside Cummings' Mind: Exploring Johnson's Chief Strategist's Blog

Dominic Cummings, Johnson's Chief Advisor, is an interesting character. He's been called a genius by Johnson, a dark political manipulator by the media and a career psychopath by Cameron. In this video, we take a look at his blog to find out what Cummings really believes and what his plans are to shape the British political landscape.



19 February 2020

The Federal Trust: Brexit: The British government starts to recognise reality

Michael Gove’s acknowledgement that trade between the UK and the EU after 1st January 2021 will be far from frictionless is a watershed in the Brexit process. The claim that Brexit would not significantly impinge upon British trade with the European Union was central to the 2016 Leave campaign. So central indeed that government ministers spent the three years thereafter repeating this dishonest assurance in the face of ever-mounting evidence to the contrary. [...]

The enduring denial that Brexit would involve customs and other checks at the border(s) of the EU was not merely a political and rhetorical convenience. The equivocation about the objective implications of Brexit for cross-border trade reflected a continuing disagreement among Leave voters and later within government itself about different models for quitting the EU. Campaigners for a Leave vote knew that there is not and never has been a majority within the British electorate for any specific form of Brexit. Any serious discussion during the referendum campaign of realistic alternatives to current British EU membership would have risked splintering the Leave coalition. Post-2016 government ministers have been forced to realise that any concrete form of Brexit, be it “hard” or “soft,” brought with it highly unpalatable consequences which they have been reluctant to discuss honestly with the electorate. Until now. [...]

The governmental volte-face on frontier formalities will probably need to be followed in short order by similar reversals of tack on Ireland, fisheries, financial services, digital exchanges and trading arrangements with third countries. These reversals will be intensely embarrassing to Boris Johnson’s administration, and it may well be that he concludes his short-term political interest is better served by abandoning negotiation with the EU and simply proclaiming that after the transition period ends the UK will trade with the EU on “WTO terms.” No informed commentator is in any doubt that this will cause considerable damage and disruption to the British economy. It will also exacerbate political tensions within the United Kingdom, heightening discontent in Northern Ireland and Scotland. Such political and economic dislocation would be unlikely, however, to deter this hubristic government. Boris Johnson would reasonably hope to be able to count on support from important sections of the traditional mass media to justify his recklessness in pursuing a new “no deal Brexit” as an unavoidable response to the “intransigence” of the EU. Over the past three and a half years, these Eurosceptic media have had much practice in depicting as unreasonable the EU’s wholly understandable reluctance to accommodate the ever-varying demands from London that are, in truth, inimical to the EU’s interests.

17 February 2020

TLDR News: Johnson's 'Power Grab': The Cabinet Reshuffle Explained

Yesterday Number 10 announced some pretty major changes to the makeup of Johnson's Cabinet with the most significant change coming in the form of Javid's resignation. The former Chancellor of the Exchequer was replaced by Rishi Sunak, a chancellor some speculate will be more loyal to Johnson and Cumming's plans. Is this a standard reshuffle or an attempt by Johnson the gain greater control over Number 11.


15 October 2019

The Atlantic: Is Boris Johnson Actually Winning?

Politically, winning is short-term and transactional: It involves setting the question you want voters to answer—and getting them to respond in the way you want, all in the service of winning elections. If successful, you gain the power necessary to achieve the things you want to do and to stop the things you do not. This is the game as played by political strategists across the world, including those most central to Johnson’s electoral successes to date: Lynton Crosby and Dominic Cummings. With Brexit, it is no different. It’s just that the stakes on the table are much higher. [...]

Of course, there have been huge compromises. Johnson has conceded that Northern Ireland alone will align with EU standards, and appears to have conceded that actual border checks cannot take place along or near to the border with the Republic of Ireland. While no agreement has yet emerged—and may not—Johnson’s stance has produced enough movement from Dublin and Brussels to create a pathway to a deal. The solution reportedly under consideration (a complicated tariff arrangement that would see Northern Ireland remain legally part of the U.K.’s customs zone, while for practical purposes being treated as if it were part of the EU’s) is a rehashing of a May proposal for the whole of the U.K. that was rejected by the EU. That Brussels has not rejected Johnson’s plan is an achievement in and of itself.

Johnson’s political strategy at home is also showing early signs of success. In contrast to May, he has sought to control the agenda, setting a simple narrative in the public’s mind about what he is trying to achieve and why voters should not blame him if he fails. Like Donald Trump with the border wall with Mexico, he calculates that it is not failure that is punished by voters, but a lack of trying.

20 September 2019

The Guardian: 'It has got worse': Boris Johnson 'hamstrung' by rift with Sajid Javid

They said No 10 was becoming increasingly annoyed by what it regarded as Javid’s intransigence, and was sidelining him in favour of Rishi Sunak, the chief secretary to the Treasury, with departments being directed to talk to him rather than the chancellor.

Insiders said Javid was still without a chief media adviser after Sonia Khan was sacked by Johnson’s chief of staff, Dominic Cummings, and marched out of the building for maintaining contact with an associate of the previous chancellor Philip Hammond. [...]

The episode underlined simmering tensions over the summer between Downing Street and the Treasury. Javid was ordered by No 10 to scrap a planned speech on the economy, while Downing Street took the lead in announcing spending plans for health, police and prisons.

29 July 2019

TLDR News: What Johnson's Cabinet Reshuffle Mean For Brexit

On Thursday night, Boris Johnson selected his new cabinet in the biggest reshuffle in recent memory. Cabinet selections really indicate what kind of people the Prime Minister wants to surround themselves with, what kind of strategies they will be using. So in this video, we will be discussing who Johnson chose, and what this might indicate about his Brexit plans.



24 July 2018

The Telegraph: The Week That Broke Brexit: A Telegraph Documentary

Britain's unexpected vote to leave the European Union on June 23rd 2016 provided enough political upheaval for a generation.

However, in the seven days after 17.4 million Eurosceptics clinched victory, would a series of further tumultuous events go on to have an irreversible impact on the country's departure from the EU

Exploring that very question, 'The Week That Broke Brexit' is a new long-form documentary from The Telegraph featuring exclusive interviews from those at the very heart of the 2016 referendum as well as our own journalists.



17 July 2017

The Guardian: There’s still a real chance for a second Brexit referendum

Project fear is becoming project reality. Each day brings new evidence of the dire consequences of Brexit. Sometimes it takes the form of a big company announcing that it’s moving operations from the UK to the continent, taking hundreds or thousands of jobs with it. It could be JP Morgan or Goldman Sachs or Samsung, depending on the day of the week. [...]

Ah, but surely all that lot are just whingeing remainers. Except the arch-leavers themselves have either become strangely quiet or else now implicitly admit that Brexit is a disaster unfolding in slow motion. Dominic Cummings, the anarchic genius behind the Vote Leave campaign, caused a stir when he confessed that Brexit was a task as difficult as defeating the Nazis – those outraged by Adonis’s comparison should take note – and caused a bigger stir when he admitted that voting leave may turn out to have been an “error”. Less noticed was David Davis’s dismissal of talk of a possible Brexit domino effect. “I don’t think anyone is likely to follow us down this route,” he said. [...]

The difficulties are legion, but the most important is the one raised by my colleague John Harris. He rightly wrote that simply to ignore the referendum result of June 2016 would be to inflame the very rage at an unlistening establishment that drove the leave vote in the first place. It would fuel a resurgent Faragism even worse than the original. [...]

The complication is that that moment may not arrive, and the terms of the future deal may not be clear, until after March 2019 – by which time the article 50 clock will have run out and the UK will have left the EU. From that point on, any referendum would not be about staying in but rejoining, which could be a very different proposition.