Deutsche Welle: Eritrea's capital added to UNESCO World Heritage site list

The committee appreciated the outstanding value of Asmara's 19th and early 20th century modernist architecture designed by colonial-era Italian architects and immersed in an African highland environment.

That distinctive, futuristic architecture includes an art deco bowling alley with colored glass windows and a gas station that resembles an airplane (pictured on top). Both date back to the city's time as part of colonial Italy during the reign of fascist dictator Benito Mussolini from 1936 to 1941.

It was the designs of architects that were rejected in conservative European cities that found a place in Asmara at a time when approximately half of the city's population was Italian. Indeed, back then Asmara was dubbed 'Piccola Roma,' or 'Little Rome.'

The modernist architecture of other Eritrean cities was destroyed during a decades-long war of independence from Ethiopia. But Asmara survived and was declared a national monument by the government in 2001.

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Deutsche Welle: Saudi Arabia exports extremism to many countries - including Germany, study says

Susanne Schröter: The findings do not surprise me at all. It has long been known that Saudi Arabia has been exporting Wahhabist ideology - largely similar to the ideology of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS). Propaganda material and organizational expertise are being sent along with money. People are being hired to build mosques, educational institutions, cultural centers and similar organizations, so that Wahhabist theology can reach the public – with great success. [...]

The export of Wahhabism got off the ground after the Islamic revolution in Iran. The revolution had dramatically shaken the Saudis. When Iran started exporting its Shiite ideology, the Saudis felt threatened by it. Around that time, in 1979, hardliners seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The Saudis launched an ideological offensive and said, "Now we are exporting our own ideology. We will show the hardliners in our own country what we are capable of achieving." Then, they started promoting Wahhabism through intermediaries and organizations like the World Muslim League in different countries throughout Asia, Africa and parts of Europe – for example, in former Yugoslavia where Muslims and Christians fought against each other in the civil war. Wahhabists saw it as gateway, where money was needed since the Muslim population was ready for a new and radical ideology.

The result is that, in many parts of the world, a radical form of Islam is gaining the upper hand. I have experienced this first hand in Southeast Asia. In southern Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and sometimes Malaysia, it was always said that a special form of Islam was practiced, a much more open, much more tolerant version. There has been a dramatic development towards radicalism over the past three decades. It is perfectly clear that this development has been encouraged by Saudi money. Moreover, young intellectuals have been recruited with generous scholarships at Saudi universities. These people return to their homes after having studied at Saudi universities and suddenly carry out Wahhabi missionary work in all their home countries.

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BBC4 Profile: Emmanuel Macron

Emmanuel Macron has become France's youngest-ever President at the age of 39. He created a new political movement out of nothing and defeated the populist Marine Le Pen of the Front National. But who is the former banker and civil servant and how did he rise so far so fast? The BBC's Paris Correspondent Lucy Williamson speaks to his old friends, his biographer, his voice coach and his political colleagues to find out how this son of two provincial doctors - who once dreamed of being a novelist or actor - has made it to the top of French politics.

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Slate: A New Warsaw Pact

Thus far, Donald Trump has governed as a typical Republican president, with the usual suite of tax cuts, deregulation, and conservative nominees for the federal bench. The difference is that unlike his predecessors, Trump isn’t rooted in the tenets of conservativism. Indeed, as a man of id and impulse, it’s hard to say he’s rooted in anything. To the extent that he does have an ideology, it’s a white American chauvinism and its attendant nativism and racism. It was the core of his “birther” crusade against Barack Obama—the claim that for reasons of blood and heritage, Obama couldn’t be legitimate—and the pitch behind his campaign for president. Trump would restore American greatness by erasing the racial legacy of Obama’s presidency: the Hispanic immigration, the Muslim refugees, the black protesters. [...]

In the context of terrorism specifically, a deadly threat but not an existential one, this is overheated. But it’s clear Trump has something else in mind: immigration. He’s analogizing Muslim migration to a superpower-directed struggle for ideological conquest. It’s why he mentions “borders,” why he speaks of threats from “the South”—the origin point of Hispanic immigrants to the United States and Muslim refugees to Europe—and why he warns of internal danger. [...]

Defenders of the Warsaw speech call this reading “hysterical,” denying any ties between Trump’s rhetoric in Poland and white nationalism. But to deny this interpretation of the speech, one has to ignore the substance of Trump’s campaign, the beliefs of his key advisers, and the context of Poland itself and its anti-immigrant, ultranationalist leadership. One has to ignore the ties between Bannon, Miller, and actual white nationalists, and disregard the active circulation of those ideas within the administration. And one has to pretend that there isn’t a larger intellectual heritage that stretches back to the early 20th century, the peak of American nativism, when white supremacist thinkers like Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard penned works with language that wouldn’t feel out of place in Trump’s address.

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Jacobin Magazine: Morocco’s Burgeoning Resistance

On Friday, October 28, police killed Mohasin Fikri. The now-standard press story explains that the officers put Fikri’s fish in the back of a garbage truck after he refused to bribe them; Fikri tried to retrieve his catch, and both he and the fish were crushed. The other version — which Rifian activists say is more credible — has it that Fikri got in the truck first, as if to say, “This is my livelihood; you must go through me.” [...]

Protests began immediately in al-Hoceima, and the day after, twenty thousand people joined the funeral march to Fikri’s hometown Imzouren. The day after, protests broke out in every major city across the country. Fikri’s horrible death was taken as a symbol of the regime’s abuse — its corruption, violence, and lack of accountability — and brought people into the streets. [...]

That month saw a rash of protests and rallies in al-Hoceima: women led a massive demonstration on International Women’s Day; on May 18, the largest demonstration yet took place, and less than two weeks later, Popular Movement activist Nasser al-Zafzafi interrupted the imam of the largest mosque in town, asking, “Are these mosques of God, or of the Makhzan?” [...]

The king serves as the official Commander of the Faithful, and the Makhzan uses the church for politicking in the most direct sense: according to Le Desk, Minister for Islamic Affairs Ahmed Taoufik “demanded of imams in the al-Hoceima province, all of whom get their salaries from the ministry, to deliver a sermon reproaching the young rebels for promoting fitna, or division among Muslims.” [...]

The group’s female leadership has also increased the movement’s reach. Ziani has become one of the more prominent figures, and prison has only increased her fame. After al-Zafzafi’s arrest, the anti-cancer activist Nawal Ben Aissa became the movement’s recognized leader until her own arrest.

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