Al Jazeera: How do Palestinians see the Syrian war?

Throughout their long struggle against Zionism, Palestinian political factions have found support in Syria, often maintaining headquarters on its territory. Traditionally it was leftist, nationalist and Baathist movements in Palestine that were closest to Damascus, but as Hamas and Islamic Jihad came to prominence in the early 1990s and developed close relations with Iran, they also started receiving Syrian support. Syria would give Palestinian groups logistical assistance, training, and political backing to the level that no other Arab country would.[...]

This led to a crisis in relations between the Palestinian authorities and the Syrian regime which ultimately ended with the death of Arafat and the rise to power of Mahmoud Abbas. Since then, Syria has pressed for rapprochement, fearing that the Palestinian Authority could move closer to Jordan and Egypt, curbing its influence over the Palestinian issue. [...]

Hamas took a very different position. After much internal deliberation, it chose to leave Syria as a way to demonstrate its rejection of the Syrian regime's brutal crackdown on popular protests. It joined the axis of the Syrian opposition supported by Gulf states, cutting its relations with the regime and angering Iran.

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Haaretz: Hamas Stands to Emerge Dominant From Possible Gaza Deal – at Abbas' Expense

Two main proposals are under discussion – one presented by Egypt and the other by United Nations special Mideast envoy Nickolay Mladenov. The Egyptian proposal gives high priority to internal Palestinian reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah; to exchanges of prisoners and of bodies of soldiers, with Israel; and to an agreement for a long-term cease-fire, to last from five to seven years, with the first step being a cease-fire within days of signing the accord. [...]

Mladenov’s proposal stresses economic factors and prioritizes the prisoner exchanges. According to this scheme, Israel will allow goods to enter the Strip on a large scale; inject about half-a-billion dollars into its development; establish desalination plants; boost the Strip’s electrical supply; and issue numerous work visas to residents there. [...]

Egypt wants the Palestinian Authority to accept this proposal and move ahead quickly on reconciliation. However, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has presented 14 objections that could derail the whole process. Moreover, Abbas recently appointed Nabil Abu Rudeineh deputy prime minister, which Hamas sees as a step showing the president's opposition to a new, unified government. Without such a government, there can be no reconciliation, and without reconciliation, Cairo will have to decide whether it will disregard the PA and become an even more active partner in an accord. [...]

If this is indeed the outcome of the current talks, it will be a turning point in ties between Israel and Hamas. Israel will have to allow Hamas to conduct extensive business ties with manufacturers in Israel and the West Bank; give more work permits to Gazans, who will also receive permits from Hamas; and redefine the closure on the Strip, which will gradually disintegrate. But more than this: Israel will have to accept the possibility that the new Palestinian government that will be established (if it is established), and will consist of Hamas and the PA, will be granted international legitimacy.

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BBC4 Analysis: The Middle East Conundrum

Edward Stourton asks if there any chance of a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tensions have been rising following the move of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and the deadly clashes at the border between Israel and Gaza. The peace process - if it exists at all - seems to be in deep freeze. The idea of a two-state solution does not appear to be getting any closer, while a one-state solution would effectively mark the end of a Jewish state. Does Israel have a long-term strategy?

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Jacobin Magazine: Why Israel Kills

Palestinian nonviolent protests have an additional virtue. They internally divide Israeli society rather than unite it in hatred and violence, strategically undermining the efficacy of Israel’s favorite political glue: anti-Arab racism. As I write, the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem has launched an unprecedented campaign for Israeli soldiers to refuse illegal orders to shoot unarmed protestors. [...]

First: occupied Palestinians have tried unarmed resistance before. The first intifada, in 1987, was, in Edward Said’s words, “one of the most extraordinary anti-colonial and unarmed mass insurrections in the whole history of the modern period.” An entire society mobilized itself and self-organized not only to counter Israeli domination and occupation but to actively build alternative self-governing structures as well. Women, students, teachers, and workers formulated independent modes of resistance (strikes, demonstrations, tax boycotts, etc.) that allowed them to counter Israel’s stranglehold over their lives. Workers realized the Israeli economy was massively dependent on the cheap labor of Palestinian migrants, giving them leverage over Israel’s occupying society. Israeli peace activists, following the lead of Palestinian activists, actively organized against the country’s occupation regime. [...]

Second: the failure of the first intifada and the Oslo Accords generated a groundswell of political cynicism. While governing elites profiteered, the overwhelming majority of occupied Palestinians experienced deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. Settlements grew, closure intensified, freedom of movement was internally and externally restricted or blocked. In these desperate times, the only way many Palestinians felt they could directly get at their occupiers (which had left the big cities in the hands of the PA’s repressive security apparatuses) was violently — through suicide bombings. Palestinian factions began fetishizing such armed resistance. Organized individual martyrdom increased. Though this violent tactic blasted Israel’s security-with-occupation policy, it ended up harming Palestinian society itself and its international image. Israel’s state terror was unleashed even more harshly, in sync with the global fight against Islamic terrorism after 9/11.   [...]

Lastly: if Oslo divided Palestinian society, Israel tried to stoke these divisions into violent eruptions through its security coordination with the PA (fighting Palestinian resistance factions) and through its policy of isolating Gaza and separating it off from the West Bank. Fueling Palestinian conflict ultimately led to Hamas’s violent takeover of Gaza in 2007 and its banishing of the PA’s security apparatus. The schism persists more than a decade later. Hamas is on one side, carrying the old mantle of armed struggle abandoned by Fatah (the PLO’s ruling group) in 1988; Fatah is on the other, carrying the mantle of endless bureaucratic diplomacy and concessions.

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Haaretz: Three Reasons We Aren't Seeing a Third Intifada

In retrospect, the first intifada had been an event waiting to happen. It just needed a spark. The Palestinians at that point, over 20 years after the Six-Day War, wanted to prove to themselves, the Israelis and the rest of the world that they were not prepared to continue sitting docilely by while successive Israeli governments blurred the Green Line and settlements spread, stymieing the prospect of an independent Palestinian state. [...]

The second intifada was a very different affair. It had spontaneous and “popular” elements at first, in the rioting that broke out in Jerusalem following then-opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount. But from a very early stage it had a much more organized fashion, with the paramilitary groups of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas and other organizations competing with each other to carry out armed attacks on Israeli soldiers and terror bombings against civilians within the Green Line. [...]

In the two intifadas, the uprising took place nearly simultaneously among all three Palestinian communities living under Israeli occupation – the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Currently, not only are these groups physically divided to an unprecedented extent, they also have different agendas. [...]

The PA in the West Bank and Hamas leaders in Gaza are loath to back a new round of all-out violence in their fiefdoms. They still feel they have too much to lose from chaos. Hamas is calling for an intifada, but only in the West Bank and Jerusalem where they don’t have any control. But an intifada in the West Bank will almost certainly mean the end of the PA – and when tens of thousands of officials and security personnel rely on the PA for their livelihood, there is a vested interest to continue coordinating with Israel and keeping a lid on things.

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Al Jazeera: Why Saudi-Israeli normalisation could be dangerous

On Thursday, the Israeli army's chief-of-staff, Gadi Eizenkot, gave the first-ever interview to a Saudi news outlet, saying that Israel is ready to share intelligence with Saudi Arabia on Iran. Also for the first time, Israel co-sponsored with Saudi Arabia a resolution against Syria in the UN Human Rights Council last week. Furthermore, Israeli Communications Minister Ayoub Kara extended a warm invitation to Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti, Abdul Aziz Al Sheikh, to visit Israel for what he said were his friendly comments about the country. 

To "legitimise" steps taken to normalise relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia summoned Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to Riyadh last week, to convince him to accept a peace plan put forward by US President Donald Trump's special adviser, Jared Kushner. Saudi-Israeli collaboration is an integral part of that plan. According to the New York Times, the proposal could include, among other normalisation measures, "overflights by Israeli passenger planes, visas for business people, and telecommunication links" with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE.

Abbas' cooperation is essential for Saudi-Israeli normalisation to proceed; without it, the Saudi move would be seen as a betrayal to the Arab and Muslim position on Palestine. Although not much has been revealed about what really happened during Abbas' visit to Riyadh, some reports talk about the Saudi leadership pressuring Abbas to accept whatever plan Kushner puts forward, or to resign. [...]

Just a few days later, another blow was dealt to the PA. On Sunday, the US administration announced that the license of the PLO office in Washington will not be renewed - this could not be a mere coincidence. In fact, it might be another strong sign that Abbas continues to resist Saudi-US pressure. In line with this argument, Mohammad Shtayyeh, Fatah Central Committee member and one of the candidates to succeed Abbas, told me, "Reconciliation will not be a railway for a regional political project at the expense of the Palestinian cause."

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Jacobin Magazine: Ending a Civil War

The last general elections were held in 2006. When Hamas won, the United States and Israel refused to recognize the results. Israel arrested Hamas parliamentarians, boycotted their government, and imposed sanctions, and the US and Israel both supported Fatah’s attempts to secure power despite the loss. Tensions rose and fighting broke out, ultimately leading to Hamas kicking Fatah out of the Gaza Strip. Fatah wound up governing the West Bank, while Hamas solidified power in Gaza. 

Speaking about the Hamas electoral victory, then-Senator Hillary Clinton said in a leaked recording, “I do not think we should have pushed for an election in the Palestinian territories. I think that was a big mistake. And if we were going to push for an election, then we should have made sure that we did something to determine who was going to win.” [...]

Last summer, Abbas announced a strengthening of sanctions — cutting salaries of PA employees in Gaza by 30 percent, reducing electricity supplies to an average of two to three hours a day, and slashing medical funding. Due to the Israeli blockade, unemployment in Gaza hovers around 40 percent and living conditions present a constant humanitarian crisis. [...]

One sticking point is that Abbas has demanded that Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, forfeit their weapons to the PA. Abbas said he doesn’t want a situation like that in Lebanon, where Hezbollah maintains their weapons and a large degree of independence from the rest of the state. Hamas leader Ismail Haniya has said his organization will always retain its right to armed resistance, signaling difficult negotiations ahead. [...]

A unity government with parliamentary elections would likely renew interest in negotiations between Palestine and Israel, something Netanyahu would want to avoid. His government has been having a relatively easy time quietly expanding settlements, something a reinvigorated “peace process” would throw into jeopardy.

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Al Jazeera: The Hamas problem

Furious after Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections, the US and Israel pushed for a regime change in Gaza, clearly a Hamas stronghold. The 2007 attempt to depose Hamas was led by Palestinian security chief at the time, Mohammed Dahlan. That plot was, in fact, financed by the UAE to the tune of $30 million that ultimately ended in disaster and consolidated Hamas' power, while expelling Dahlan and his co-conspirators from Gaza. [...]

However, regional players astutely observe that the main obstacles to Dahlan's coronation are the current PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, and his political movement, Fatah, as well as Hamas. While overcoming the objections by Abbas and Fatah would be relatively easier due to the massive leverage Israel, the United States and other regional actors have over them, the acquiescence of Hamas and other groups to the installation of Dahlan, they reasoned, would have to be achieved through economic, political, and military measures, including pressuring their current Qatari patron. [...]

Since Hamas is considered the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the threat of this movement was, fairly or not, extended to Hamas. For political and strategic reasons, Saudi Arabia offered support to Islamist groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, for decades. But ever since the Arab Spring phenomena, this marriage of convenience was abandoned in favour of a bitter rivalry that became enmity.

Furthermore, the Saudi regime has claimed twice to have been undermined by Hamas. The first occurred when Hamas did not accept the so-called Arab peace initiative for resolving Israel's colonisation of Palestinian land, initially promoted in 2002 by then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. And secondly, the Saudis blamed Hamas for the failure of the 2007 Mecca reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas - brokered by the late King Abdullah, even though other players, particularly the US and Israel, played a crucial role in blocking it.

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Al Jazeera: Will Hamas survive the Gulf crisis?

Over the past few years, Hamas has been able to adapt to the Arab region's reality, in light of the popular uprisings that swept the region, and it survived - albeit with many losses - the sharp turning points that exhausted the movement and affected its alliances and capabilities. The current crisis, however, seems to be the most difficult in the movement's history. [...]

Internally, Hamas is facing mounting pressure with the deteriorating living situation in the besieged Gaza Strip, compounded by the Palestinian Authority's recent decisions to cut electricity supply and medicine as a result of the stalled political crisis between Hamas and the PA. [...]

But the movement was taken aback by the Gulf crisis that has placed the expulsion of its leaders from Qatar on the top of the agenda for solving the crisis. Hamas officials were also shocked by the recent Saudi foreign minister's statements which characterised it as a "terrorist movement". [...]

Hamas has lost its Islamist allies, which formed the backbone of its future hopes and aims; the movement lost its Iranian ally when the Syrian uprising broke out and Hamas chose to ally with the anti-government camp, leaving the movement with its Qatari ally. [...]

As for the second scenario - which is the most likely one - is that Hamas will lean towards political accommodation and reach a compromise deal with Abbas and Fatah that will allow the return of PA power in Gaza again. This option will not mean a disintegration of Hamas' alliance with Iran.

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Haaretz: Gaza Power Crisis Explained: Why Israel and Hamas Are Heading for a Face-off Neither Side Wants

The decision by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to ratchet up the economic pressure on the Hamas government in the Strip is the primary reason for the new tensions. Ten years after senior Fatah officials were booted out of Gaza, with the Hamas leadership refusing to recognize any sign of PA authority in the Strip, it seems that Abbas is tired of funding his political rivals. The sanctions on Gaza included lopping a third off the salaries of PA employees in the Strip, reducing the financial support for released prisoners and serious disruptions in the electricity supply. [...]

Military officials told cabinet ministers that it’s important to maintain the accommodations that prevent a new military conflict in Gaza. They stressed that further disruption to the electricity supply in the territory could accelerate an escalation. The Israeli government must presumably weigh the fact that the sums at issue, tens of millions of shekels a month, are lower than the economic cost of a single day of combat in Gaza, without even considering the expected casualties.

The crisis between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is also affecting the mood in Gaza. In the past, when Hamas needed financial help, Qatar stepped up to the plate, with Egyptian support. Now however, Qatar is confronting an embargo imposed by the Saudis with Cairo’s clear support. These developments could push Hamas back into the arms of Iran. [...]

Last week the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was forced to announce that it had discovered a Hamas tunnel under one of its schools in Gaza. The announcement reinforced an old Israeli claim, which was also proved during Operation Protective Edge, that Hamas exploits humanitarian sites for military purposes. At the start of Sunday’s cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on the United Nations to reconsider the continued existence of the agency, which is devoted to supporting long-time Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

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The Guardian: Israeli minister seeks cabinet backing for Gaza artificial island plan

A senior Israeli minister is seeking to win cabinet backing for an ambitious $5bn (£3.4bn) plan to ease the economic blockade of Gaza with an artificial island linked to the territory by a secure three-mile bridge.

Transport and intelligence minister Yisrael Katz’s argument for the island, which would include a seaport and possibly even an airport, is that it would restore Gaza’s links with the outside world without jeopardising Israeli security. [...]

Husam Zomlot, an official in Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah faction, has said Katz’s “dubious” proposal could spell “the final severing of Gaza” from the West Bank.

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