Vox: Why Putin wants Alexei Navalny dead

 In 2006, a lawyer named Alexei Navalny started a blog where he wrote about corruption in his home country of Russia. It’s the most prominent problem under the regime of Vladimir Putin, who has ruled Russia since 2000. Putin has systematically taken over the country’s independent media, oligarchy, elections, and laws to cement his own power and wield corruption to his advantage.

That’s what Navalny set out to expose. And in 2010, he published a groundbreaking investigation into a state-owned transportation company, Transneft, which was funneling state money into the hands of its executives. The post launched Navalny into politics.

By 2016, he had become the face of Russia’s opposition movement, run for mayor, and was running for president against Putin himself. Navalny was unifying Russia’s opposition like no politician had before. That’s why the Kremlin tried to kill him. Navalny survived the assassination attempt, launching a movement never before seen in Russia.

openDemocracy: How conservative is the Russian regime?

The flip side of this prevailing conservatism is individual self-concern, the priority of private interest over the common good. The sustainability of the government’s conservative rhetoric, combined with market-driven social atomisation, was especially evident during Putin’s previous term as president (2012–2018). This was a period that witnessed the growth of state-promoted nationalism, especially after 2014, when the annexation of Crimea and confrontation with the west dovetailed with the commercialisation of medicine and education, as well as an overall reduction in the Russian state’s obligations to society. The so-called “Crimean majority” (the silent majority of patriotic Russians who rallied around the Kremlin’s foreign policies) was marked by its pride in the revival of “historic” Russia and its ever-growing distrust of specific government institutions. [...]

Despite the authorities’ rhetorical embrace of Russia’s “special path”, the current ideological conjuncture can be fruitfully compared with the neoconservative turn in the west, as exemplified by the policies of Thatcher and Reagan 30 years ago. It was then, during an economic crisis, that the right’s attack on the welfare state took the shape of an authoritarian populism featuring previously incompatible ideological components, such as the appeal to conservative values and the defence of the market’s unlimited sway. Thatcher’s famous adage (“There’s no such thing as society”) directly contradicted the foundations of the conservative worldview, in which society had been a defining category. Thatcherism was a break not only with the previous social democratic consensus, but also with conservative political tradition.[...]

The phase of the Putin regime’s evolution that kicked off in 2012–2014 has thus been marked by simultaneous radicalisation of both halves, neoliberal and conservative, of the ideological symbiosis. At the same time, their discordant unity has acquired an ever more coherent shape in which the idiom of axiological conservatism has served as the natural expression of neoliberal content. Thus, Russia’s unconditional sovereignty and the moral and political unity it imposes on society has been proffered as a necessary condition in the global fight for resources, a fight depicted as a natural extension of the law of competition amongst individuals, while conservatism’s scepticism towards doctrines that limit sovereignty in favour of universal rights has led to the suspicion that all appeals to defend society’s interests are hypocritical.

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Al Jazeera: Alexey Navalny: Putin's sole political nemesis

The demonstrations, which came just days after some 10,000 people attended a major rally in Moscow against the banning of popular messaging app Telegram, were held under the banner "He's Not Our Tsar!" in 90 cities across the country. [...]

A lawyer by profession, Navalny entered politics through the liberal opposition party Yabloko, of which he became a member in 2000. He climbed to the ranks of the party eventually becoming a deputy head of its Moscow branch only to be forced to resign in 2007 over his dealings with ultranationalists.

Navalny has not only attended the far-right "Russian march" and engaged with its organisers, but has also made a number of racist statements, including calling Georgians "rodents" during Russia's war with Georgia in 2008 and comparingmigrants to "insects". He also was the cofounder of a short-lived nationalist movement aimed at fighting for democracy and the rights of ethnic Russians. [...]

"During the [2012] Bolotnaya protests, Navalny was one of the leaders of the Russian opposition, along with Boris Nemtsov, Garry Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov, etc," says Kashin. "Then, it was like the nursery rhyme in Agatha Christie's novel 'And then there were none' - one by one, [these leaders] either got killed, left the country or just decided to retire from active work."  [...]

His campaign has maintained vast and sophisticated social media presence, which has emerged as an alternative source of information and criticism of the regime. It has been producing live and recorded high-quality content for YouTube and actively engaging with supporters on all major social media networks.

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Bloomberg: Hungary's Orban Isn't Another Putin

As a result, I think that Orban's style of running his country resembles Putin's in a number of important ways. But the differences, at least so far, outweigh the similarities -- they're on key issues that determine whether a country is a democracy or a dictatorship. It's important to make a clear distinction between a government that legitimately pursues illiberal and often noxious policies and one that is fundamentally illegitimate, repressive and a danger to its citizens, whether they realize it or not.

Orban and Putin share an obsession with sovereignty -- the kind that critics would call unlimited personal power. Their goal is not to allow any external force to undermine their power to make decisions on their nations' behalf, be that wealthier Western countries, multinational corporations or non-governmental organizations. Orban, however, has been far more sophisticated than Putin in reaching for that goal. That sophistication isn't "softness" -- rather, it's a sharper sense of what's sufficient. [...]

Though there have been some calls for a recount in Hungary because of possible voting irregularities, no one has suggested the massive falsification detected by independent observers of the Russian election -- up to 10 million fake votes for Putin, almost 18 percent of his total. And the high turnout in Hungary wasn't caused, as in Russia, by local officials' pressure on public employees. There is one similarity: The opposition parties in both countries have failed to present a united front, which makes them easier to defeat. [...]

Even on this, though, there are important differences between Russia and Hungary. Toth estimates that 15 to 24 percent of government procurement is corrupt. In Russia in the first half of 2017, the Finance Ministry found that 42.5 percent of the total amount of government-owned companies' procurement contracts was distributed without a competitive procedure at all -- a clear indication that these are corrupt deals. According to Martin, the overall share of corrupt and cronyist business in the Hungarian economy is between 5 and 10 percent; in Russia, according to a 2015 estimate by Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov, corruption causes an annual loss of 10 to 20 percent of official economic output.

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openDemocracy: Vladimir Putin and the rural roots of authoritarian populism in Russia

The Russian regime, however, is somewhat different to what we commonly understand as authoritarian populism. Putin’s governance is not characterised by a genuine anti-establishment and anti-corruption agenda. Moreover, while populist leaders in other countries aim to mobilise and politicise their supporters, Putin’s regime is based on the demobilisation and depoliticisation of the Russian population. [...]

Putin’s authoritarian populism has a strong rural basis in Russia. According to a recent public opinion poll by the Levada-Centre, 70% of Russian villagers express an outright positive attitude towards  Putin (62.5% of urban dwellers are of the same opinion). Rural Russians are the major supporters of key features of authoritarian populism: strongman leadership, authoritarian governance, populist unity between the leader and the ordinary people, nostalgia for past glories and confrontation with the ‘Others’ (in the Russian case – the ‘Others’ abroad). For example, 45% of villagers believe that Russia needs strongman leadership, and 61% regret the collapse of the Soviet Union (in urban areas, these figures are 35% and 56%, respectively). [...]

Rural Russians are, certainly, more traditional and less exposed to alternative political ideas, but it would be wrong to link their support for Putin with propaganda only. Propaganda does play an important role, but if propaganda messages do not fit national archetypes, they become rather inefficient and are most likely rejected. [...]

Certainly, contemporary rural Russians are not traditional peasants; however, they share some common features with peasant society – namely, conservatism, traditionalism, a subordinate position, and anti-elite and anti-capitalist sentiments. This may explain why authoritarian populism finds strong support among villagers, who are more conservative and traditional than urban dwellers.

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Al Jazeera: Will Putin follow in Brezhnev's footsteps?

At the start of his fourth term, Putin's space for any domestic and foreign policy manoeuvring appears to be quite limited. And as he surpasses Leonid Brezhnev as the longest-serving leader in Russia's modern history (if Putin's term as prime minister is counted), critical voices in Russia and abroad have started comparing him to his Soviet predecessor, whose 18-year reign ended in 1982. [...]

While the parallel with the 1970s' Soviet Union is not complete (for one, Putin appears to be in excellent health, compared with Brezhnev, who succumbed to alcoholism and illness), Russia does appear to be entering a similar period of stagnation in foreign and domestic affairs. [...]

Medvedev's pursuit of rapprochement with the West precipitated Russia's abstention during the 2011 UN Security Council vote to approve a US-led intervention in Libya - a move that Putin sharply criticised. [...]

Putin himself is also not ready to make compromises on Russia's positions and, in a sense, admit that he made a mistake in Ukraine. For that reason, Galeotti says, it is unlikely that there will be a resolution of the Ukrainian crisis in the following six years. [...]

The biggest barrier to economic development, in his opinion, is the lack of investment in the Russian economy. There are two reasons for that: one, the economic sanctions which have caused a lot of Western capital to depart from Russia; and two, the lack of the rule of law.

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Politico: Kelly furious over Putin 'DO NOT CONGRATULATE' leak

Trump was instructed in briefing materials “DO NOT CONGRATULATE” before his call with the recently re-elected Putin, but congratulated him anyway, according to the Washington Post’s report on Tuesday night. He also ignored a recommendation to condemn the recent poisoning of a former Russian spy in the United Kingdom, which the Kremlin has been accused of orchestrating, according to the report. [...]

In a statement, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) on Tuesday dismissed the election as a “sham” and said Trump “insulted every Russian citizen who was denied the right to vote in a free and fair election to determine their country's future, including the countless Russian patriots who have risked so much to protest and resist Putin's regime.” [...]

The episode also raised the broader issue of leaks, a subject that has animated Trump since he took office. Trump insisted early last year that senior White House officials sign non-disclosure agreements, according to two former senior administration officials, and after some resistance officials agreed, concluding the agreements would not be enforceable anyway.  

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The New Yorker: Putin, a Little Man Still Trying to Prove His Bigness

During his third term as President, which began in 2012, Putin and his allies grew increasingly ambitious, seizing Crimea, in 2014, intervening in Syria’s civil war, in 2015, meddling in the 2016 American Presidential election, allegedly plotting the assassinations of exiles and dissidents over the past couple of years, and, shortly before the 2018 Russian Presidential election, boasting of a new nuclear weapon capable of evading U.S. missile defenses. [...]

“He is not necessarily a Soviet man, but he is a Cold War man. And he’s a K.G.B. man,” Nina Khrushcheva, the granddaughter of the former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, reflected at an event at the New School, in New York, last month. “And, for every K.G.B. officer, it was a dream to be known or to be thought of as somebody who can take down American democracy. For him, that image around the world would probably be even more important than this kind of partnership and parity with the United States.” [...]

Western powers long considered resistant to Russian mischief are increasingly vulnerable. Britain is now investigating whether Russia tried to manipulate the 2016 referendum on Brexit. In Germany, Russia allegedly exploited tensions over immigration to undermine Chancellor Angela Merkel, Europe’s strongest advocate for aiding desperate refugees from war-torn countries. Moscow is blamed, for example, for planting a false story about a thirteen-year-old German girl abducted by migrants that emotionally skewed Germany’s immigration debate in the run-up to its election last year. Meanwhile, Spain has charged Russia with fomenting support for the Catalan referendum on independence in 2017. [...]

Russia may now be questioning its investment in Trump’s victory, however. Since his election, Trump has—so far—not helped improve Moscow’s relationship with Washington. This month, the United States imposed new sanctions on Russia—including on its intelligence service—for cyberattacks on the American electricity grid, aviation, and other infrastructure. “The Russians may want to take credit for Trump’s victory, but they may now see that as a mixed blessing,” Tom Pickering, a former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and Under-Secretary of State, said. “They have a man in power who acts as if he’s on a reality-TV show, for whom governance is a second priority.”

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Bloomberg: Putin Is Sure of Victory, But Little Else

Cruising to a fourth term in the March 18 elections, Vladimir Putin is relying on a deep well of support based on two main factors: the huge rise in living standards over his 18 years in office and Russia’s triumphant return to the world stage. When he came to power, he warned that “for the first time in the last 200–300 years, Russia is facing the real danger of winding up among the second or even third-tier of nations in the world.” [...]

Years of underinvestment and a business environment marred by predatory government officials and ever-expanding state companies stymied efforts to expand beyond Russia’s reliance on oil and other natural resources. Sanctions, which squeezed access to Western capital and technology, only made that worse, cutting as much as a full percentage point off growth by some estimates. Adding to the pain of cheaper oil, the ruble nosedived, eroding the affordability of imported goods or trips abroad. The travel industry was among those hurt. [...]

Putin’s initial economic ambitions now seem modest: to match the per-capita income of Portugal within 15 years. But even that has proved out of reach. Slow growth and a weak ruble mean Russia’s now falling further behind. U.S. sanctions will remain “at least as long as Putin is in power,” predicts Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council, a research group set up by the Kremlin. [...]

In addition to the depleted resources to fund his assertive foreign policy, Putin now faces a Western world on guard for his next moves. Kremlin efforts to influence votes for pro-Russia candidates in France and Germany fell flat last year, for example, after both countries said they’d prepared for such efforts to manipulate news and the Internet. Other countries, such as Austria and the Czech Republic, count in his “win” column.

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The Washington Post: Yes, the Kremlin is worried — about Russia’s own presidential elections

Putin’s regime represents what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way term “competitive authoritarianism.” Elections in hybrid systems like Russia are not designed to determine who rules, but rather to signal the regime’s power and resilience to potential challengers. [...]

In his book “Patronal Politics,” Henry Hale points out that authoritarian regimes deploy every available resource to dominate elections, even when opposition candidates would not win a free and fair contest. Competitive, if unfair, elections send a potent message about the power of incumbent regimes. [...]

The “great power of expectations,” as Hale labels this phenomenon, drives Russian politics — and the Putin regime has set a high bar for itself. Last year, the Kremlin’s top political technologists established a “70 at 70” objective for Putin’s reelection in March 2018 — 70 percent of the vote with 70 percent turnout. In a recent interview, Russian political expert Tatyana Stanovaya remarked, “Putin just needs to be elected quietly and quickly, without fuss, with good turnout, and a good result.” [...]

A Reuters report, meanwhile, suggests the Kremlin ordered major energy and utility companies to supply the Presidential Administration with news items that cast Russia’s leadership in a positive light. A memo to industry leaders requested stories “where it’s possible to say that state support helped lift the economy out of crisis” and benefited local residents. State-run media outlets are supposed to disseminate the stories to the public. [...]

According to a Levada Center poll from late November, 67 percent of likely voters would vote for Putin, with anticipated turnout between 53 and 55 percent — not the 70 percent figure the Kremlin hopes to see. Trailing far behind are the nationalist firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Russian Communist Party’s Gennady Zyuganov, each with just four percent.

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Al Jazeera: Is Vladimir Putin tired?

There is suddenly too much entropy in the Russian political universe. At least some people are acting as if there are no adults in the house. Political campaigns seem to start without the Kremlin's blessing, state TV channels contradict each other in their coverage of important stories, and infighting between Kremlin factions gets into the open. A major player in that infighting has been Igor Sechin, the head of the oil giant Rosneft, who helped engineer the arrest of Economy Minister Alexey Ulyukayev, but who is currently ignoring court summons for the same the case. [...]

Of course, the Russian leader is very much still around, his busy schedule reflected in daily news broadcasts on state TV. But as political expert Gleb Pavlovsky writes: the "the president is disappearing". Currently a critic of Putin's political regime, Pavlovsky was one of its chief architects in the 2000s - definitely a man whose opinion matters on such occasions. In the article, he goes on to describe the Russian leader as a "not-so-young gentleman dogged by power fatigue and accumulated weaknesses". [...]

If the Kremlin allows Navalny to register as a candidate, Putin is still very likely to win, but for him, that means stepping into unchartered territory. Will this let a revolutionary genie out of the bottle, as it happened with Mikhail Gorbachev's limited reforms leading to the colossal release of political energy which destroyed the entire communist system? Will it be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the hardline part of the establishment? And is this allegedly tired man up for the challenge of running a real campaign against a real rival? Can he run in an election that does not use the surrogate opposition leaders who helped the Kremlin maintain a semblance of pluralism in the last three elections? [...]

The second season began with the chaotic revolution in Ukraine, which allowed the political leadership, or - as many Russians say - the "collective Putin", to rebrand the regime by embracing irredentist nationalism and aggressive conservatism, a plagiarised version of the Christian fundamentalism of the US Bible Belt. That transformation culminated in the annexation of Crimea, which sent Putin's approval ratings soaring to almost 90 percent.  

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