Today, even the Union recognizes Germany as a “country of immigration.” Its right wing has been weakened and outright reactionary positions like an ethnic definition of German identity marginalized. Women are no longer seen as the natural servants of their husbands, and the rights of gays and lesbians to life partnerships and parenthood are legally enshrined. The modernization of the Union’s immigration, gender, and family policies is primarily strategic: particularly since Angela Merkel become party leader in 2000, the party has increasingly sought to attract new voters from the political center, rather than the right.[...]
Generally speaking, a structural crisis can have two possible outcomes: either the ruling classes make adjustments to the prevailing order that allows it to survive, or the political paradigm undergoes a more fundamental shift. Although a paradigm shift in European politics seemed possible for a brief moment (Syriza’s rise in Greece, for example), it soon became clear that a slightly modified version of neoliberalism would prevail. [...]
The AfD now began to target voters among the “losers of globalization.” The party’s initial support had mostly come from professionals, entrepreneurs, and the upper echelons of society. Now, support among the unemployed and underprivileged grew as well, due to the AfD’s successful linking of social inequality to immigration in the public eye. While the similar material interests of refugees and the German poor were downplayed, ethnic and cultural differences were magnified. [...]
The AfD’s single biggest threat is by far internal conflict within its own ranks. Should the party collapse in the near future, it will be for this reason alone. The new right is extremely heterogeneous, and strife can break out at any time. Moderate national conservatives and national neoliberals are deeply concerned about the völkisch wing collaborating with forces of the extra-parliamentary far right. The biggest potential for conflict, however, relates to economic policy, as the party has failed to unite on key issues like free trade. While some members reject the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) categorically, others are willing to support it if certain conditions are met. Concrete policies proposals which serve the interests of Germany’s wealthiest stand alongside rhetorical claims to represent the poor and downtrodden. The völkisch wing’s attempts to introduce welfare policies clash with the party’s capital-friendly program and the strong support it still enjoys among small and medium-size business owners and the petty bourgeoisie. [...]
In this light, it appears that both the established parties and the media have exaggerated the threat posed by the AfD. The breaking of political taboos is a strategic tool that grants it disproportionate media attention. At the same time, government actions often escape scrutiny. After all, it was the Union and the SPD that drastically curtailed German asylum law in the past eighteen months, not the AfD. As a consequence, refugees receive less financial support and social services, asylum applications are rejected without proper investigation, Residenzpflicht (“mandatory residence”) has been reintroduced, severely limiting the free movement of asylum seekers within Germany, and war-torn countries have been declared safe, meaning that refugees are returned to them in increasing numbers. All of these measures reflect and echo the AfD’s demands.
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