The motives behind the Kremlin’s operation are not mysterious. Moscow is seeking to reinforce its position in the Azov Sea and limit Kiev’s access to Ukraine’s eastern ports. In doing so, the Kremlin appears to be pursuing a similar strategy to what it did in Georgia, where its creeping annexation also took the form of constantly changing “borders” between Georgia and South Ossetia.
Intervening violently in Ukraine also shifts the Russian public’s focus away from domestic politics and back to the war in the east, at a time when Putin’s popularity has dropped to its lowest point since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, following a controversial pension reform. Today, some 58 percent of Russians say they support Putin, down from a 75 percent high last year, according to a recent Levada Centre survey published in October. [...]
Starting in 2016, the EU added another strand to its Russia strategy: selective engagement on issues of common interest. This two-pronged strategy had the double merit of securing political unity — to Moscow’s surprise — among EU member countries, while also arguably preventing the conflict from escalating further. [...]
This political unity will not be a response to violations of the Minsk agreement. It’s become crystal clear over the past few years, in fact, that the Minsk agreement will not be fully implemented. Neither Moscow nor Kiev is likely to budge first in fulfilling their side of the deal. They don’t see the point.
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