The United States is not a significant source of trade or investment for Iran. Being unable to sell or buy directly from the United States will not have a big impact on the Iranian economy. The problem for Iran is the so-called secondary sanctions—the inability of non-American companies to access the American market or use the U.S. banking system if they do business with Iran.
But, secondary sanctions are a game that two can play. The European Union collectively has an economy larger than that of the United States. China, also a party to the JCPOA, is the world’s second largest economy. If the United States can use secondary sanctions on European and Chinese businesses to promote its foreign policy objective of hurting Iran, the Europeans and Chinese can retaliate with secondary sanctions aimed at preserving the agreement.
Iran might reasonably work with Europe, China and Russia to foil U.S. secondary sanctions. Such arrangements might even enhance the economic value of the nuclear deal to Iran since many European companies were unwilling to invest in Iran under the JCPOA because of remaining (not nuclear related) U.S. sanctions. [...]
There was nothing that Macron wanted to accomplish more than to persuade Trump to stay in the Iran deal. He failed as he said for U.S. domestic reasons (i.e. Trump’s obsession with humiliating his predecessor). Indeed, Macron has nothing to show for his cultivation of Trump—not on the environment, trade, or anything else. Almost certainly, he will now try a different tack. With the United States itself isolated, the French president is the natural leader of Europe and the free world. And to accomplish Europe’s objectives, Macron will now likely chart an independent course. And, almost certainly part of that will be to find ways to keep Iran in the JCPOA.
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