Such conclusions are based on the superficial similarity of the scenarios. People rise up against a corrupt authoritarian regime, usually provoked by an event like a stolen election or a new unpopular policy. They unite around a simple symbol (like a rose in Georgia in 2003 or a white ribbon in Moscow in 2011). The protests and the new government formed if they succeed immediately get U.S. support. [...]
If Saakahsvili is in possession of some sort of "color revolution" toolkit, he's been remarkably unsuccessful at applying it in Ukraine -- and not because this time around, he didn't enjoy U.S. support. He has excellent connections in Washington, especially in conservative circles, and the Atlantic Council crowd is largely indignant at Poroshenko's lawless, authoritarian treatment of a critic and political rival. If Saakashvili managed to mobilize enough popular support in Ukraine, he probably would have gotten some sort of U.S. political backing given his strong anti-corruption credentials and the growing Western fatigue with sly and grasping Poroshenko. [...]
The Chinese regime's political scientists, according to a 2010 paper by National Chengchi University's Titus Chen, came to the conclusion that "raging domestic grievances" and the institutions of electoral politics, which fostered a political opposition and gave it opportunities for seizing power, were more important causes of "color revolutions" than any foreign interference. In response, the regime has made an effort to punish corruption and avoided political liberalization, as well as to make it more difficult for Western actors to influence people in China. Putin's regime, of course, is doing all that too -- but its focus appears to be on the foreign aspect. That's a mistake that could eventually lead the Putin system to ruin -- if Russians ever get angry enough, they won't need a playbook to mess it up. No U.S. interference will be needed.
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