The rest of Syria is either under the control of the regime or the US-allied Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Thanks to two years of Russian intervention and attacks by ISIL and HTS, a significant part of the real armed opposition was liquidated, and we can say that the period of active hostilities has come to an end. The issues of peace and stability have become much more important to Syrians than problems of power and the future political order. [...]
Russia, however, does not have the financial capacity to invest heavily in Syria after the end of the conflict. In this context, its positions in Syria no longer seem so convincing. This has forced Moscow to realise that alliances with Tehran and Ankara in Syria might not be so beneficial in the future and that it needs to find new allies for the post-conflict period. As a result, the Russian government has upped its efforts on keeping the negotiating process under its control to make sure it is not ousted from its position as kingmaker in Syria. [...]
Particularly revealing in this respect was the "unexpected trick" with Bashar al-Assad showing up in Sochi. This was Assad's second trip out of his country since 2011; in 2015 he went again to Russia to meet Putin. For Moscow, the Syrian president is a kind of a "liquid asset", which the Russian leadership is trying to convert into diplomatic success. His visit was meant to reinforce Russia's monopoly over the Syrian file. It sent a clear message to the international community that Moscow holds the keys to Damascus and is the only patron of the regime able to push it to the negotiations table. [...]
Despite its crucial role in the Syrian negotiating process, its resources and capabilities are clearly not enough to hold it. Russia needs another partner in Syria which is able to guarantee funds for reconstruction in the post-conflict period. And that partner needs to be willing to route the financial flows through Moscow.
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