Back in 1983, he was a Lieutenant Colonel aged 44 in the Soviet Air Defense Forces. On September 26 of that year, he was stationed in a missile detection bunker near Moscow, and it was his job to look for any surprise intercontinental ballistic missile launches from any territory allied with the United States. If he did, it was potentially his role to authorize the launch of similarly destructive Soviet missiles, to ensure the principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD). [...]
That day in September, warning lights blared, and the computer system told him that five nuclear missiles were heading to the Soviet Union and would arrive in less than 20 minutes. That meant that the USSR had less than that to launch a counter-offensive that, if he did, would have destroyed Washington DC and would have likely triggered an all-out nuclear offensive on both sides.
The siren was furiously blaring, and the computer gave him the option to launch. Indeed, his superior officers thought that he should, but taking a look at the data, Petrov concluded that this was a mistake. Despite the fact that to many it looked like a genuine launch, it was more likely a satellite error.
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