Not so long ago, 2017 was set to become the annus mirabilis in European politics, a year in which the liberal establishment in key EU countries would be blown away, opening up space for their populist competitors. Representatives of the illiberal tide who had already taken power, such as Kaczynski in Poland or Orban in Hungary, saw themselves as the avant-garde of a new European mainstream. The Polish national-conservatives (PiS) were so certain that the zeitgeist was in their favour that they declared the Eurosceptic United Kingdom to be their key ally in the EU (instead of Germany). PiS strongly believed that the Polish-British idea of less Europe and more power for the capitals was destined to gather momentum. But that prediction proved to be wrong. Instead, the history books will mark 2017 as a moment in which Europe could take a breath, with special thanks to Emmanuel Macron and his German counterpart (whomever it will be). It is now safe to predict that upcoming changes in the architecture of the EU will follow a different script than that advocated by Kaczynski, Orban or (in the past) Cameron. [...]
There are multiple studies, including one by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, which confirm this new pattern in Western politics. The classical division of the left and right, defined by the attitude of voters to economic and social issues (the role of the state in the economy, the scale of redistribution) has lost its dominance. A new conflict has begun to polarise Western societies, one centred on cultural values: attitudes towards the so-called others in terms of race, community and globalisation. It is precisely these “combined with social and demographic factors [that] provide the most consistent and parsimonious explanation of voting support for populist parties”, Inglehart and Norris wrote. While some people view globalisation, immigration and cultural/religious pluralism as something either neutral or positive (if requiring some modification), others reject these phenomena as being in conflict with national interests and traditional values or undermining their identity. The divide between these two approaches largely defines the very strong cultural subtext of modern politics. [...]
There is no silver bullet for liberals attempting to hold their ground. It will take time until they fully adapt to the new circumstances and grasp the magnitude of the challenge posed to them by identity politics. As things stand, however, resistance against the proponents of nativism and illiberalism will not succeed unless liberals rethink at least three key components of their political agenda. First, the populist appeal benefits from people’s need for community and belonging. Liberals are not good at thinking in terms of community. They tend instead to underline the values of individualism and diversity. But the ideas of common good, social cohesion and unity are not at odds with liberal fundamentals. In fact, the opposite is true. Liberals have simply ignored the importance of these concepts and left their definition to the right or, most recently, to populists. The rise of the nationalconservatives in Poland would not have been possible without liberals having fully abandoned the issues of history, national identity and culture as non-political. In the era of identity politics, this approach is a recipe for failure. Politics has become (highly) emotional again, and to win the game one needs to find ways not to let the opponents monopolise the discourse about identity and culture. A new liberal narrative must therefore take the value of community seriously, but shape it in line with its own principles.
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