The first is America’s legendary sponsorship of the Afghan mujahedeen who beat back the Soviet invasion between 1979 and 1988. This covert effort began with small amounts of support funneled through various middlemen (including Pakistan’s shadowy security apparatus) and grew into billions of dollars of money, sophisticated weapons (like Stinger missiles capable of shooting down Russian helicopters), and technical assistance. What made this effort so successful was its narrow goal—inflicting Soviet casualties in the context of the Cold War—and the simple truth that it’s easier to support an insurgency than a counterinsurgency, especially when that insurgency is playing on its home turf. However, after this insurgency pushed out the Soviets, the U.S. washed its hands of this support. Over time, parts of this rebel movement would evolve into al-Qaida and the Taliban, with major long-term repercussions for the U.S. [...]
This reflects a broader theory of counterinsurgency that it’s best done by indigenous security forces. To the extent that much of the current U.S.–Afghanistan strategy relies on supporting Afghan forces as they fight the Taliban and al-Qaida, this holds some promise. However, foreign forces cannot fight our wars; eventually interests diverge, or conflict emerges between client and patron. This may soon happen in Afghanistan, particularly if the Afghan government decides to reach a political settlement with the Taliban, and possibly with al-Qaida elements, even as the U.S. wants to continue fighting. [...]
Today, the Joint Special Operations Command machine continues its work across Afghanistan and Pakistan—doing the hard, bloody, dangerous work of counterterrorism with elite special operations troops or drones. This counterterrorism effort most closely aligns with our primary interest (as articulated by President George W. Bush, and President Barack Obama, as well as President Trump) of preventing another attack on the U.S. emanating from Afghanistan. Although this machine is small, it is costly; elite troops cost more, and are in shorter supply, than their conventional counterparts in the U.S. military. However, it is conceivable that the U.S. could continue to operate this counterterrorism machine indefinitely in Afghanistan, whether led by the military’s special operations command or an analogous agency within the U.S. intelligence community. This plan is not without risk though: Counterterrorism raids often risk alienating civilians, or inflicting civilian casualties, in ways that can create enemies or undermine local government partners, as has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen during the past 16 years. Counterterrorism operations must be carefully calibrated and overseen in order to be effective—something that runs counter to Trump’s promise to take the gloves off and end White House micromanagement of warfighting.
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