JSTOR Daily: Why does Oklahoma have the Panhandle?

What’s up with Oklahoma’s salient? More popularly known as the Panhandle, the three counties extending in a row west of the rest of the “pan” of the state are one of those geographical quirks of history that really jump off of the map. The Panhandle is also the location of the only county in the country with four states on its borders: Cimarron County, the westernmost part of the state, borders Colorado, Kansas, Texas, and New Mexico.

Today fewer than 1% of Oklahomans live in the 168 x 34 mile-wide strip. It was Spanish territory until 1821, when it became part of independent Mexico. The Republic of Texas claimed it when declaring independence. But then, upon entering the Union as a slave state in 1845, Texas surrendered its claim to the region because slavery was prohibited north of 36°30′ latitude by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. 36°30′ became the Panhandle’s southern boundary. Its northern border at 37° was set in 1854 by the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which repealed the Missouri Compromise and allowed Kansas and Nebraska to decide for themselves if they would be slave or free. [...]

Finally, in 1890, this orphan rectangle of land was incorporated into Oklahoma Territory, and in 1907 it became part of the state of Oklahoma, which also included the former Indian Territory. Indian Territory had been the end of the Cherokee Trail of Tears, and then the progressively reduced promised homeland for many tribes.

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Al Jazeera: What is fuelling Yemen's cholera epidemic?

More than 20 million Yemenis require humanitarian support, with nearly half of those in acute need of assistance, according to the United Nations. This year, a new wave of cholera cases further devastated the population, infecting hundreds of thousands of people and killing more than 2,000. Aid agencies have warned that without urgent action, the situation will continue to deteriorate.

Analysts have described the Saudi-led offensive in Yemen as a strategic failure, but although Saudi's crown prince recently expressed his desire for an exit strategy, there is no immediate end in sight - and the humanitarian consequences will endure long after the bombs stop falling. [...]

There has been a gradual disintegration of the municipal water infrastructure and systems in a context where few civil servants are being paid, and a relatively small trigger like a period of heavy rain or burst pipes creates a backflow of sewage into water pipes, an overflow of latrines and septic tanks, etcetera. [...]

In a roughly three-month period following the cholera outbreak in October 2010, Haiti had 50 percent more cases on a per population basis and over 200 percent more deaths.

Yemen's current cholera outbreak is the largest in terms of scale of suspected cases at the current time, though not necessarily the largest historically. In any case, these comparisons are not meaningful. Comparing Haiti and Yemen is not helpful in describing either epidemic. What matters is the impact on the country, and we can see this is a heavy burden to bear.

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Politico: Juncker slaps down Orbán over border funding request

In a letter obtained by POLITICO, Juncker wrote that during the migration crisis in 2015 Hungary declined “the possibility to benefit from [the] relocation of up to 54,000 persons and decided to return nearly €4 million of EU funds pre-paid by the Commission to Hungary.”

The Hungarian premier wrote to Juncker on August 31 requesting the Commission reimburse his government for half of its spending in managing its border — some of which is an EU external border — in recent years. [...]

Juncker said three emergency grants totaling €6.26 million were made available to Hungary, which failed to complete the necessary paperwork to access most of the money. [...]

Juncker also bluntly noted that Hungary receives EU subsidies amounting to more than 3 percent of its GDP each year, the highest percentage of any EU member country.

“Solidarity is a two-way street. There are times in which member states may expect to receive support, and times in which they, in turn, should stand ready to contribute,” Juncker said.

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Political Critique: The Transnistrian challenge: why tensions are escalating between Russia and Moldova

The situation also has relevance for Ukraine. From the perspective of the pro-Western government in Kyiv, Transnistria, as a Russian military stronghold, poses a threat to Ukrainian national security. Ukraine fears that Russia may try to use the Transnistrian territory to destabilise the security situation in the Odessa Oblast, where there is a significant concentration of Russian-speakers. Kyiv has therefore aimed to isolate Transnistria, weaken it economically and politically, and undermine the Russian political and military presence in the region. This strategy has been undertaken in cooperation with Moldova’s pro-Western government. For example, Ukraine and Moldova have established mutual control of the border between Transnistria and Ukraine, allowing Moldovan officials to also control the movement of people and supplies into Transnistria through the Ukrainian border.

From the Moldovan perspective, Transnistria is not just a separatist region, but also a security and political challenge for the country’s pro-Western government. The Moldovan Parliament and government are currently controlled by a pro-Western coalition. However, in the presidential election in November 2016, the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon emerged victorious, defeating the pro-Western candidate, Maia Sandu from the Action and Solidarity Party (a newly founded, centre-right and pro-Western party), by a narrow margin. [...]

However, the relative popularity of a pro-Russian candidate should not have come as a surprise. It reflected disappointment with the ruling elite following poor implementation of reforms and a variety of corruption scandals, rather than a belief in the ability of Russia to offer an alternative model for economic or socio-political development. Russia itself is experiencing economic stagnation due to its ineffective, energy oriented economy, as well as Western sanctions. It is unable to implement the necessary reforms which would create the conditions for economic modernisation and improvement of the socio-economic conditions in Russia, far less in Moldova. [...]

The key question is how long Russia will continue to support Transnistria, and to what extent. After the seizure of Crimea, the strategic importance of Transnistria has decreased. Moreover, the de-facto blockade of Transnistria by Moldova and Ukraine makes the Russian presence in Transnistria more complicated and expensive. This is especially the case given Russia’s current economic stagnation: the Russian government has recently been forced to close hospitals around the country and cut subsidies for social programmes. Moreover, Russia is investing significant resources in Crimea, and funding additional military operations abroad.

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America Magazine: How the Vatican is encouraging dialogue between Russia and the West

President Vladimir Putin has visited the Vatican five times and has already had two private conversations with Pope Francis, in 2013 and 2015. He is expected to meet him again next January, when he comes for the opening of a Russian art exhibition in the Vatican. Moreover, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has met his Vatican counterparts on several occasions and engaged in what sources say were “substantial, constructive discussions.” [...]

This developing friendship has been matched by an ever-improving relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church, with its 150 million members, and the Holy See. Pope Francis has played a huge role in this with his approach to the Orthodox Church and his willingness to meet with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. Relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Holy See have been encouraged by President Putin, who has embraced the Orthodox faith not only at a personal level but also as part of his effort to consolidate his power at home. Last year, Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis met in Havana in February; a month later, the pope appointed one of the Holy See’s top diplomats, Archbishop Celestino Migliore, as nuncio to Russia. [...]

The Vatican’s secretary of state, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, visited Russia from Aug. 20 to 24, upon an invitation from Russian state and church authorities. (This was the first visit by a secretary of state since 1999, and the most significant since Cardinal Agostino Casaroli’s 1990 visit following the collapse of the Soviet Union.) Cardinal Parolin had what he defined as “important and constructive encounters” with President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion, president of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations and the number-two official in that patriarchate.

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